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THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 


GIFT  OF 

Estate  of 

Ernst  and  Eleanor 

van  LBben  Sels 


PEACE  OR  WAR 
IN  SOUTH  AFRICA 


A.  M.  S.  METHUEN. 

m 


ENGLISH  EDITIONS  FIFTY-SEVEN  THOUSAND. 


METHUEN  &  CO., 
LONDON 


ONE  SHILLING 

(Twenty-four  Cents). 


American  Edition  (Reprint) 
By 

CHARLES   D.   PIERCE, 

Consul  General  Orange  Free  State, 
136  Liberty  Street,        -       -        -        New  York. 

PRICE,  TEN  CENTS. 


ACKNOWLEDGMENT. 

This  is  a  reprint  of  a  book  written  by  Mr.  A.  M.  S.  Methuen,  senior  member 
of  the  publishing  house  of  Methuen  &  Co.,  of  London,  England,  whose  object  was 
to  procure  an  extended  circulation  in  England  and  the  English  Colonies  of  the 
facts  therein  contained  for  the  purpose  of  influencing  English  public  opinion 
against  the  prolongation  of  the  war  in  South  Africa.  The  truth  of  his  state- 
ments must  appeal  to  every  person  not  blinded  by  national  prejudice.  We  reprint 
ithe  book,  with  acknowledgement  to  Mr.  Methuen,  for  the  purpose  of  backing  up 
the  public  opinion  he  wishes  to  create  in  England,  with  a  sturdy  American  senti- 
ment against  an  infamous  attempt  to  deprive  a  free  people  of  their  liberty  and 
independence. 

The  solution  of  the  South  African  question  offered  by  Mr.  Methuen  in 
chapter  IX.,  along  the  line  of  what  seems  to  him  the  "wisdom  of  compro- 
mise," is  not  in  accord  with  the  sentiment  of  the  Boers  themselves  or  their 
sympathizers  in  America.  What  they  desire  is  not  "compromise,"  but  independ- 
ence. Their  fealty  to  England  cannot  be  purchased  with  any  such  "mess  of  pot- 
tage" as  therein  concocted. 

May  this  book  accomplish  in  Amer  ica  what  those  who  love  the  Boer  cause 
most  ardently  desire — the  cooperation  of  American  sentiment  and  English 
opinion  against  the  continuance  of  a  war  which  never  had  the  shadow  of  a 
real  excuse  for  its  beginning. 


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Consul-General  Orange  Free  State, 

Trustee  and  Treasurer  Boer  Relief  Fund, 

136  Liberty  Street,  New  York  City. 
November  1,  1901. 


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iv  PREFACE  TO   THE   ORIGINAL   EDITION. 

direct  result  of  the  political  errors  which  have  prolonged  the  war  beyond  all  reasonable  neces- 
sity. But  I  hope  I  have  not  dwelt  on  them  overmuch.  They  are  things  which  later  on  we  had 
better  hide  in  decent  oblivion. 

It  is  difficult  in  the  treatment  of  such  a  problem  as  this  to  write  or  to  speak  in  terms  so 
moderate  as  to  win  the  approval  of  one's  opponents,  but  I  trust  they  will  believe  that  I  have 
endeavoured  to  do  justice  to  views  which  are  honestly,  though,  as  I  think,  erroneously  held. 
I  cannot  hope  that  those  who  still  advocate  hostilities  d  outrance  will  accept  the  arguments 
or  the  proposals  contained  in  this  book,  but  I  beg  them  if  they  be  tempted  to  call  me  a  Pro- 
Boer,1  and  my  policy  a  policy  of  cowardice,  to  remember  that  Lord  Kitchener  is  opposed  to  "a 
fight  to  a  finish,"  that  He  is  in  favour  of  offering  reasonable  terms  to  the  Boers  and  an 
amnesty  to  the  Cape  rebels,  and  that  of  his  own  initiative  he  has  offered  such  terms.  It  is 
clear,  therefore,  that  if  the  advocates  of  conciliation  are  guilty  of  cowardice,  they  possess  this 
unfortunate  defect  in  common  with  the  Commander-in-Chief  in  South  Africa.  Those  who 
obstinately  oppose  the  wishes  of  the  one  man  who  is  acquainted  with  the  position  in  South 
Africa  must  bear  a  terrible  responsibility. 

I  hope  that  many  readers  who  may  not  agree  with  my  treatment  of  the  origin  and  conduct 
of  this  war  may  be  ready  to  consider  with  attention  the  dangers  of  continued  warfare  and  the 
arguments  which  I  have  advanced  for  a  policy  of  peac,e.  However  divergent  our  views  on 
the  past  may  be,  we  are  all  bound  to  frame  our  policy  in  the  interests  of  our  own  country.  I 
have  written  neither  as  a  Conservative  nor  as  a  Liberal,  nor  as  a  sentimentalist,  but  as  an 
Englishman  who  believes  that  the  time  has  come  when  all  reasonable  and  moderate  men 
should  attempt  to. save  their  country  from  the  costly  humiliations  that  await  her  if  our  Min- 
isters pursue  their  present  path.  Of  one  thing  I  am  sure :  if  the  Government  is  allowed  to 
follow  its  policy  of  mingled  drift  and  violence,  the  result  will  be  disaster. 

In  a  book  which  covers  a  period  of  time  so  long  and  so  full  of  important  episodes,  it  is 
probably  impossible  to  avoid  errors  of  fact  or  inference.  I  can  only  say  that  I  have  endeav- 
oured to  be  accurate  in  my  facts  and  fair  in  my  conclusions.  A.  M.  S.  M. 

May  28th,  1901. 


In  the  second,  third,  fourth,  and  fifth  editions  of  this  book  I  have  made  many  additions 
and  a  few  corrections. 

June  14th,  1901.  July  12th,  1901. 

June  2gth,  iooi.  August  $th,  1901. 


The  sixth  and  seventh  editions  of  this  book  have  been  again  enlarged  by  the  addition  of 
many  references  and  of  an  index.  For  these  I  am  indebted  to  the  kindness  of  a  friend.  I 
owe  thanks  also  to  the  numerous  correspondents  who  have  written  to  me  on  various  points 
in  the  controversy.  I  am  glad  to  say  that  in  no  case  have  I  been  called  a  "traitor"  or  a 
"criminal." 

August  30th,  1901.  September  15th,  1901. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  CHEAP  EDITION. 

In  answer  to  very  numerous  requests  I  have  determined  to  issue  a  cheap  edition  of  this 
book. 

October  \oth,  1901. 

1  This  term  seems  to  bear  a  double  meaning.  On  the  one  hand  it  may  describe  a  man  who  admires 
the  splendid  patriotism  of  the  Boers  and  who  believes  that  the  war  was  unnecessary.  In  this  respect  I 
am  a  Pro-Boer  in  common  with  millions  of  my  fellow-countrvmen.  This  term  is  also  used  abusively  to 
denote  a  man  who  wishes  to  see  his  country  beaten  and  humiliated,  and  who  is  infected  by  the  virus  of 
antipatriotism.     There  are  not  many  thousands  of  such  men,  and  I  am  not  one  of  them. 


CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION. 

PAGE 

1775  AND   1899:    A    PARALLEL  TO   THE    AMERICAN    REVOLUTION  .  .  .1 

CHAPTER    I. 
THE   NATION,    1895-1900  .  .  .  .  .  .  13 

CHAPTER  II.  f 

SOUTH    AFRICA    TO    1 896  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  15 

CHAPTER  III. 

SOUTH    AFRICA,    1896-1899      ...  .  .  .  .  .  .25 

CHAPTER  IV. 

THE   CAMPAIGN     ..........       36 


CHAPTER   V. 

THE    ENEMY      ...... 


CHAPTER  IX. 

PEACE,  OR    GOVERNMENT   WITH    CONSENT       . 


54 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE   ECONOMIC    FUTURE  OF    SOUTH    AFRICA       .  .  .  .  .  .60 

CHAPTER  VII. 

SIR   A.    M1LNER  .........  62 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

UNREST,  OR   GOVERNMENT   WITHOUT    CONSENT  .  .  .  .  -67 


75 


CHAPTER   X. 

THE  CONCLUSION   OF  THE   MATTER  .  .  .  .  .  .  .81 

APPENDICES. 

A.  Agriculture  in  South  Africa. 

B.  A- Convention  concluded    between   Her  Majesty  the  Queen,   etc.,   and    the   South 

African  Republic. 


"In  South  Africa  two  races — the  English  and  the  Dutch — have  to  live  to- 
gether. At  the  present  time  the  Dutch  are  in  a  majority,  and  it  is  therefore  the 
duty  of  every  statesman,  of  every  well-wisher  of  South  Africa,  to  do  all  in  his 
power  to  maintain  amicable  relations  between  the  two  races.  In  our  own  Cape 
Colony  the  Dutch  are  in  a  majority.  There  are  tens  of  thousands  of  Dutchmen 
in  the  Cape  Colony  who  are  just  as  loyal  to  the  throne  and  to  the  British  connec- 
tion, as,  let  me  say,  our  French-Canadian  fellow-subjects  in  the  Dominion  of 
Canada.  But,  at  the  same  time,  these  Dutch  fellow-subjects  of  ours  very  naturally 
feel  that  they  are  of  the  same  blood  as  the  Dutchmen  in  the  two  Republics,  and 
they  sympathise  with  their  compatriots  whenever  they  think  that  they  are  subject, 
or  are  likely  to  be  subject,  to  any  injustice,  or  to  the  arbitrary  exercise  of  force." 

Mr.  Chamberlain,  April,  1896. 


PEACE    OR   WAR 
IN   SOUTH   AFRICA. 

INTRODUCTION. 

1775  AND  1899  :     A  PARALLEL. 

HISTORICAL  parallels  are  often  fanciful,  and  it  is  unwise  to  press  them 
severely.  But  history  is  the  best  teacher  of  the  present,  as  it  is  the  best 
prophet  of  the  future ;  and,  though  there  are  many  and  important  points 
of  difference,  the  most  casual  student  of  history  cannot  fail  to  notice  the  painful 
resemblance  between  the  situation,  both  military  and  political,  of  '  1775  to  1783 
and  the  situation  of  to-day. 

The  cause  of  the  war  of  1775  may  be  stated  in  a  few  words.  The  King 
and  his  Ministers  claimed  the  right  of  sovereignty  over  the  American  Colonies. 
From  this  they  deduced  the  right  of  taxing  those  colonies  for  Imperial  purposes. 
The  Americans,  admitting  the  abstract  right  of  sovereignty,  denied  the  right  of 
taxation  by  an  English  Parliament  in  which  they  were  not  represented.  The 
English  Ministers  were  determined  to  maintain,  defend,  and  test  this  right;  the 
Colonists  were  equally  determined  to  resist  its  practical  exercise.  The  English, 
believing  that  the  Americans  would  yield  to  pressure,  proceeded  to  coercive 
measures ;  and  in  six  years  England  was  defeated,  and  her  American  Colonies  were 
lost.  It  may  not  be  uninteresting  or  unfruitful  to  examine  in  some  detail  the 
political  and  social  conditions  which  preceded  and  caused  the  crisis. 

The  middle  years  of  the  eighteenth  century  were  years  of  gross  and  material 
prosperity.  The  moral  and  intellectual  aims  of  the  day  were  low ;  the  ideal  was 
languishing;  wealth  and  the  influence  of  wealth  were  growing;  and  most  of  the 
population  were  plunged  in  torpor  and  indifference  to  any  but  material  concerns. 
With  prosperity  came  a  jealous  insolence  in  the  public  spirit,  a  brutality  of 
ambition  which  could  brook  no  rival,  and  a  hopeless  vulgarity  in  political  thought. 
All  classes  were  pervaded  by  it,  from  the  King  to  the  cobbler.  The  wealth  which 
had  followed  the  great  conquests  of  Chatham  in  Asia  and  America  during  the  last 
years  of  George  II.  brought  with  it  extravagant  habits  of  life ;  and  with  them  came 
the  necessity  for  making  money  fast,  and  the  temptation  to  make  it  corruptly. 
The  standard  of  financial  morality  was  steadily  sinking  lower,  and  society  was 
vulgarised  by  ambitious  parvenus  from  the  East  and  West  Indies.  The  old  and 
respectable  ideals  of  commerce  were  rejected  in  favour  of  swifter  and  more  ques- 
tionable ones.  Men  and  women  in  the  highest  ranks  of  society  thought  it  no 
shame  to  consort  with  vulgar  millionaires  who  had  fattened  on  war  contracts,  with 
stock-jobbers  who  had  made  vast  fortunes  by  dishonest  means,  with  speculators 
and  slave-drivers  and  usurers.  Serious  observers,  who  saw  the  frantic  and  suc- 
cessful efforts  which  the  over-gorged  and  bloated  "peculators  of  the  public  gold" 

1  The  War  of  the  Revolution  in  America. 


2  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

made  to  enter  high  society,  felt  something  of  the  indignation  which  inspired 
Juvenal's  burning  satire. 

The  increasing  luxury  and  the  rise  in  the  price  of  the  necessities  of  life  drove 
our  public  men  to  seek  sources  of  revenue  which  their  forefathers  would  have 
scorned.  The  sale  of  public  offices,  of  seats  in  Parliament,  and  of  influence,  had 
created  a  system  of  jobbery  so  gigantic  that  it  is  to-day  almost  impossible  to 
appreciate  its  far-reaching  effects.  The  Paymaster  of  the  Forces  thought  it  no 
disgrace  to  use  hundreds  of  thousands  of  pounds  of  the  public  money  for  private 
ends;  Ministers  did  not  shrink  from  open  bribery,  from  receiving  fees  and  per- 
centages, and  from  sharing  the  profit  on  contracts  of  every  kind. 

The  picture  is  not  an  exaggerated  one.  The  memoirs,  letters  and  novels  of  the 
day  paint  it  in  even  stronger  colors,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  in  1770 
public  morality  and  public  spirit  were  at  their  lowest  ebb. 

On  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic  a  new  race,  sprung  from  the  same  stock, 
was  making  for  itself  a  very  different  social  scheme.  The  American  Colonists, 
in  whose  blood  the  stern  love  of  civil  and  religious  liberty  which  inspired  Crom- 
well's 'troopers  had  lost  none  of  its  strength,  had  passed  through  long  and 
bitter  struggles.  They  had  emerged  from  the  first  phases  of  colonisation.  The 
New  England  States  were  beginning  to  show  signs  of  prosperity  and  of  an  ordered 
civilisation.  Agriculture  was  flourishing,  public  schools  and  libraries  were  being 
established  in  every  town,  and  in  1775  the  population  of  the  Colonies  was  not  less 
than  two  millions.* 

The  character  of  the  American  Colonists  has  been  drawn  for  us  in  its  main, 
and,  it  may  be  added,  in  its  most  pleasing,  features  by  Burke.  The  dominant  note 
of  the  American  character  was  a  fierce  love  of  freedom,  a  love  so  strong  that  it  ill 
bore  any  restraint,  and  would  brook  no  coercion.  The  Colonists  were,  in  many 
cases,  descendants  of  men  who  had  left  their  homes  in  England  because  they  would 
not  suffer  the  persecution  of  the  Church  and  Monarchy.  That  stubborn  spirit, 
which  gave  them  the  courage  to  brave  tempestuous  seas  and  the  perilous  unknown, 
.they  bequeathed  to  their  heirs,  together  with  a  religious  creed  which,  hard  and 
narrow,  was  yet  a  source  of  strength,  an  inspiration,  and  a  vital  force.  They  had, 
through  their  provincial  assemblies,  practically  acquired  the  right  of  self-govern- 
ment and  self-taxation.  Living  at  wide  distances  from  one  another,  they 
gained  the  strength  and  self-reliance  which  isolation  often  brings.  Life  on  their 
farms  and  the  chase  of  wild  animals  gave  them  vigour  and  a  sturdy  spirit,  while 
in  the  Southern  States  the  possession  of  large  bands  of  slaves  made  them  haughty 
and  impatient  of  control.  Travellers  in  America  were  unanimous  in  their  eulogy 
of  American  hospitality,  kindliness  and  simplicity.  The  extremes  of  wealth  and 
poverty  were,  in  most  States,  absent.  Every  one  seemed  comfortable,  courteous 
and  dignified. 

The  defects  of  the  Americans  were  the  defects  of  their  qualities.  They  were 
stubborn,  litigious,  and  bitterly  suspicious.  Strenuous  and  active  in  their  daily 
lives,  they  made  no  allowance  for  the  temptations  of  a  civilisation  which  was  some 
centuries  older  than  their  own.  They  were  adepts  at  driving  hard  bargains,  and 
their  methods  were  not  always  consistent  with  the  highest  commercial  honour. 
They  yielded  with  a  bad  grace,  and  could  not  bear  defeat.  In  a  word,  they  were 
not  an  easy  or  pleasing  people  in  their  business  dealings,  and  they  were  a  most 
dangerous  people  with  whom  to  embark  on  a  political  dispute. 

There  could  be  little  sympathy  between  such  men  and  the  English  Ministers. 
To  the  officials  who  had  been  sent  to  America  because  their  debts  or  their  amours 
made  England  too  hot  for  them,  their  austerity  was  odious  and  ridiculous.  To 
them  the  Colonists  appeared  as  did  the  Roundheads  to  the  Cavaliers — canting, 
hypocritical,  and  cowardly.  The  Colonists,  on  their  side,  chafed  under  the 
unsympathetic  hands  of  the  English  Governors ;  they  were  repelled  and  shocked  by 
a  profligacy  and  want  of  principle  to  which  they  were  unaccustomed,  and  they 
were  angered  by  the  constant,  if  petty,  invasions  of  rights  which  they  held  dear. 


INTRODUCTION.  3 

For  England  and  the  King,  as  the  impersonation  of  all  that  was  highest  and 
best  in  the  English  character,  the  Colonists  entertained  a  warm  and  pathetic 
affection.  They  had  been  oftentimes  willing  to  shed  their  blood,  to  give  their 
money  and  their  time,  for  the  Imperial  interests  of  England.  They  did  not  under- 
stand, and  they  could  not  believe,  that  the  policy  which  was  so  fast  making  them 
into  rebels  proceeded  from  the  King's  obstinate  character,  and  they  discriminated 
between  the  King  and  his  officials. 

From  such  a  body  of  men,  so  simple  and  yet  so  shrewd,  so  fierce  and  yet  so 
affectionate,  with  all  its  crude  qualities  so  attractive,  the  United  States  of  America 
have  sprung ;  and  what  soon  will  be  the  mightiest  nation  on  earth  was  lost  to  the 
English  Crown  by  the  perversity  of  a  foolish  King  and  the  obstinacy  and  ignorance 
of  an  English  Cabinet  and  English  officials. 

The  war  between  England  and  her  American  Colonies  was  the  culmination 
of  a  discontent  which  might  be  traced  back  at  least  eighty  years..  America  had 
long  fretted  under  the  regulations  of  the  English  Parliament.  Whether  these 
regulations  were  justifiable  or  not,  is  beside  the  question;  they  were  vexatious, 
and  they  bore  no  fruit  but  irritation.  The  Colonists  complained  that  their  trade 
was  crippled  by  the  Mother  Country,  that  customs  and  duties  were  forced  upon 
them,  that  they  were  expected  to  maintain  a  large  number  of  English  troops,  and 
that  they  were  charged  with  the  salaries  of  English  Governors  and  officials.  The 
imposition  of  the  Stamp  Act  of  1765  was  received  by  the  Americans  with  an 
indignation  which  found  vent  in  serious  riots,  and  though  this  Act  was  repealed  in 
1766,  the  good  effect  of  the  repeal  was  soon  nullified  by  the  imposition  of  new 
duties  on  the  import  from  Great  Britain  of  various  articles  of  commerce,  including 
tea  and  glass.  The  duties  were  both  irritating  and  barren.  The  Colonists 
quickly  found  means  of  evading  the  imposts,  either  by  legal  methods,  in  which 
their  skill  was  supreme,  or  by  declining  to  allow  the  import  and  use  of  the  articles 
on  which  the  duties  were  laid.  The  English  officials  were  forced  to  retire  dis- 
comfited from  the  unequal  contest,  and  their  defeat  begat  in  the  minds  of  the  King 
and  his  Ministers  the  conclusion  that  force  was  the  only  remedy. 

The  earnest  protests  of  the  Colonists  were  received  with  little  consideration. 
•  They  were  not  in  accord  with  the  temper  of  the  time,  and  the  King  regarded  them 
as  a  derogation  of  his  sovereign  power.  He  saw  in  the  action  of  the  Colonists  the 
misconduct  of  rebellious  and  forward  subjects.  He  read  in  their  irritation  a 
desire  to  break  away  from  the  British  Empire.  He  was  told  that  a  great  conspiracy 
was  on  foot,  and  that  the  leaders  of  American  opinion  were  definitely  aiming  at 
complete  freedom  from  English  control.  Unwise  counsellors  assured  him  that  the 
repeal  of  the  Stamp  Act  and  a  policy  of  magnanimity  had  already  created  a  danger- 
ous insolence  among  the  Americans,  and  that  if  he  did  not  decide  to  stem  the  rising 
waters  of  insubordination,  America  would  be  lost  to  the  Empire. 

There  were  a  large  number  of  Colonists  who  were  unwilling  to  oppose  the 
King's  policy,  either  from  a  sentiment  of  pure  loyalty  or  because  they  were  political 
opponents  of  the  champions  of  American  rights.  These  men  were  called  Loyalists, 
and  their  counsel  was  for  stern  measures.  They  assured  the  Ministers  that  they 
had  only  to  be  firm  to  conquer,  that  the  "traitors,"  haughty  as  they  were  in 
speech,  were  cowards  at  heart,  and  that  chastisement  with  a  high  and  unsparing 
hand  was  the  only  cure  for  an  intolerable  position. 

In  vain  did  Benjamin  Franklin  warn  the  Ministers  that  it  was  dangerous  to 
place  too  great  a  strain  on  the  loyalty  of  the  Americans.  He  was  heard  before  the 
Privy  Council,  and  was  answered  and  attacked  by  Wedderburn  with  studied  inso- 
lence. The  Privy  Councillors  shook  in  their  seats  with  laughter.  Franklin  said  not 
a  word,  but  stood  composed  and  erect.  He  wore  a  full  dress  suit  of  velvet,  and 
the  next  time  he  wore  that  suit  was  when,  in  1778,  he  signed  the  treaty  with  France 
which  gave  to  the  United  States  the  rank  of  an  independent  nation. 

The  decay  of  public  morality  and  public  spirit  is  generally  accompanied  by 
the  decay  of  Parliament.    The  authority  of  the  House  of  Commons  was  at  a  low 


4  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

ebb;  and  the  Ministry,  backed  by  a  powerful  and  submissive  majority,  did  not 
ponceal  their  contempt  for  the  representatives  of  the  people.  The  fortunes  of 
England  were  in  the  hands  of  her  King.  George  III.  had  become  not  only  King  of 
England,  but  the  absolute  ruler  of  his  Ministers.  They  were  his  servants,  trained 
to  execute  his  decrees,  and  to  sink  their  will  in  his.  North,  who  had  become  Prime 
Minister  after  the  retirement  of  Grafton  in  1770,  was  a  man  of  considerable  parts 
and  of  a  kindly  nature.  He  was  uneasy  about  the  King's  policy,  and  the  most 
respectable  members  of  his  own  Cabinet  had  similar  misgivings.  But  North's  char- 
acter was  fatally  weak.  In  the  House  of  Commons  he  was  constantly  asleep,  and, 
gifted  though  he  was  with  clearness  of  vision  and  common  sense,  he  was  too  proud 
or  too  indolent  to  assert  his  own  will.  Such  men  are  not  rare  in  our  political 
history,  and  their  tenure  of  office  has  not  infrequently  been  a  time  of  national 
disaster.  They  yield  their  own  prudence  to  the  rash  obstinacy  of  a  stronger  and 
less  refined  will.  The  dangers,  which  they  foresaw,  approach,  the  storm  rises, 
and  the  rocks  appear ;  they  wring  their  hands,  the  rudder  slips  from  their  grasp, 
and  the  ship  is  wrecked. 

Rigby,  Wedderburn,  and  Thurlow,  the  three  chief  advocates  of  the  Ministerial 
policy,  were  men  of  great  ability,  considerable  force  of  character,  and  absolutely 
unscrupulous  methods.  Wedderburn's  career  was  typical  of  the  political  standards 
of  the  day.  He  was  an  apostate  from  the  Whigs  because  he  saw  among  the  Tories 
higher  hopes  of  success.  He  soon  justified  his  promotion  by  his  violence.  His 
tongue  was  as  bitter  as  his  character  was  corrupt.  Master  of  lucid  and  incisive 
speech,  he  was  able  to  dominate  a  weak  House  of  Commons  and  to  hide  his 
ambitions  under  the  mask  of  patriotism.  He  had  no  sense  of  political  morality. 
To  him  the  highest  form  of  Parliamentary  success  was  to  browbeat  those  whose 
arguments  he  could  not  refute,  and  to  denounce  as  traitors  men  whose  characters 
were,  as  compared  with  his  own,  as  white  as  snow.  He  had  not  even  the  excuse  of 
ignorance.  Before  his  apostasy  he  had  been  a  determined  opponent  of  that  de- 
testable policy  of  which  he  was  now  the  champion,  and  the  speeches  which  he 
had  in  his  saner  days  delivered  against  this  policy  would  have  formed  a  com- 
plete armoury  for  the  Opposition.  His  own  party  feared  as  much  as  they  admired 
him:  his  opponents  hated  him:  no  one  trusted  him.  In  the  bitter  phrase  of 
Junius,  there  was  something  about  him  which  even  treachery  would  not  trust. 

A  determined  and  united  Opposition  would  have  prevented  the  approach  of 
the  crisis.  But  in  1773  the  Whigs  were  divided  by  jealousies  and  disheartened 
by  constant  defeat.  It  requires  a  high  degree  of  moral  courage  to  stand  up 
night  after  night  in  the  House  of  Commons  in  opposition  to  a  powerful  Ministry, 
when  that  Ministry  is  unscrupulous,  and  when  it  has  the  enormous  advantage 
of  being  able  to  say  that  any  opposition  is  unpatriotic  and  a  direct  incentive  to  war. 

We  need  not  be  surprised,  therefore,  that  the  Opposition  was  languid  and 
impotent.  Rockingham  and  Richmond  were  men  of  the  highest  honour;  but 
they  withdrew  in  despair  from  the  hopeless  contest.  They  confessed  that  nothing 
would  restore  common  sense  to  the  country  "except  the  dreadful  consequences 
which  must  follow  from  the  diabolical  policy  of  the  Government."  Horace  Wal- 
pole,  in  a  pungent  sentence,  disposes  of  the  charge  that  Colonists  were  strengthened 
•in  their  resistance  by  the  Whigs.  "The  cruellest  thing  that  has  been  said  of 
the  Americans  by  the  Court  is  that  they  were  encouraged  by  the  Opposition.  You 
might  as  soon  light  a  fire  with  a  wet  dish-clout."  Burke  in  vain  attemped  to  rouse 
both  the  Opposition  and  the  public  from  their  apathy.  He  advocated  the 
assertion  of  the  great  principles  of  liberty  and  justice  which  had  brought  England 
to  her  present  supremacy.  The  people,  he  said,  were  asleep  or  intoxicated ;  they 
were  not  answerable  for  their  supine  acquiescence ;  God  never  made  them  to 
think  or  act  without  guidance.    But  the  guides  were  cowed  into  silence. 

There  were,  indeed,  noble  exceptions.  Chatham,  the  most  splendid  and 
generous  of  our  Ministers,  was  beloved  by  the  Americans  as  the  incarnation  of 
all  that  was  great  in  the  English  character ;  and  though  by  the  irony  of  fate  the 


INTRODUCTION.  5 

Ministry  of  which  he  was  the  nominal  head  imposed  the  duty  which  was  the 
penultimate  cause  of  the  rebellion,  he  continued  to  advocate  their  claims  to  our 
sympathy,  to  attack  with  fierce  eloquence  and  scathing  irony  the  Ministers  who 
were  drifting  nearer  to  ruin,  and  to  denounce  the  use  of  German  mercenaries  and 
Indian  savages  against  an  Anglo-Saxon  people.  He  defended  the  action  of 
the  Americans.  "I  rejoice  that  America  has  resisted,"  he  said;  and  his  brave 
words  were  received  with  a  torrent  of  abuse  by  the  Ministerial  party  and  by  the 
petty  scribblers  of  the  day.  But  Chatham  was  undaunted.  Again  he  attacked 
the  policy  of  the  Ministers.  It  would  be  "an  impious  war,"  he  said,  "with  a 
people  contending  in  the  great  cause  of  public  liberty.  All  attempts  to  impose 
servitude  upon  such  men — to  establish  despotism  over  a  mighty  continental  nation 
— must  be  vain  and  futile.  We  shall  be  forced  ultimately  to  retract;  let  us  retract 
when  we  can,  not  when  we  must." 

Two  years  after  the  war  had  begun,  he  used  words  which  came  naturally  from 
the  mouth  of  a  noble  and  chivalrous  Englishman:  "If  I  were  an  American,  as 
I  am  an  Englishman,  while  a  foreign  troop  was  landed  in  my  country,  I  never 
would  lay  dorvn  my  arms — never — never — NEVER." 

Burke,  the  wisest  of  our  political  writers  and  the  greatest  of  English  orators, 
was  equally  outspoken.  He  defended  the  right  of  the  Colonists  to  resist  an  attack 
on  their  liberties,  and  inveighed  against  the  "impious"  demand  of  the  Ministers 
for  "unconditional  submission."  In  two  speeches  which  contain  the  very  essence 
of  political  wisdom,  he  laid  down  the  rules  which  should  govern  our  relations  with 
our  Colonies,  rules  which  must  remain  for  all  time  the  basis  of  our  Imperial 
system.  With  that  clear  insight  into  the  phenomena  of  the  moment  which  dis- 
tinguished him,  he  saw  that  the  Americans  were  fighting  the  battle  of  civil  liberty 
all  over  the  world ;  and  two  years  after  the  war  had  begun  he  dared  to  say  that 
he  could  not  wish  the  Colonists  to  be  subdued  by  arms.  He  knew  that  such  a  sub- 
jugation could  only  be  effective  by  maintaining  a  great  body  of  standing  forces, 
and  perhaps  of  foreign  forces.  He  foresaw  the  growth  of  military  influence  with 
results  fatal  to  English  interests  and  English  liberty. 

Charles  James  Fox  spoke  with  a  voice  as  clear  and  vigorous.  Brushing 
aside  the  cheap  fallacy  that  any  opposition  to  the  Ministry  of  the  day  is 
unpatriotic,  he  attacked  the  insane  policy  that  was  leading  England  into  a  dis- 
astrous war.  He  did  not  hesitate  to  express  his  admiration  of  the  American 
leaders,  and  to  compare  their  resolute  and  heroic  struggle  for  liberty  with  the 
fatuous  mixture  of  violence  and  weakness  which  was  dignified  by  the  title  of  the 
Ministerial  policy. 

These  great  men,  refusing  to  prophesy  smooth  things  to  a  blinded  public, 
and  courageous  to  hold  their  own  country  in  the  wrong,  were  shouted  down 
in  Parliament,  and  assailed  with  every  form  of  virulent  abuse  by  the  supporters  of 
the  war,  who  had  few  facts  to  bring  forward  and  no  arguments  to  interpret  those 
facts.  They  were  called  "traitors,"  "friends  of  the  Americans,"  *  "enemies  to  the 
King,"  "enemies  of  England,"  and  "emissaries  of  the  enemy." 

It  is  too  true  that  these  violent  counsels  were  popular  both  in  high  social 
circles  and  among  the  body  of  the  people.  The  English  public  was  intensely 
irritated  by  what  it  considered  a  purely  vexatious  resistance  on  the  part  of  the 
Colonists.  The  average  mind  has  no  means  of  testing  the  statements  of  inter- 
ested officials ;  the  newspapers  of  the  day  gave  little  guidance ;  and  what  guidance 
they  did  give  was  in  the  direction  of  a  "strong"  policy.  The  most  potent  cause 
of  political  error  is  ignorance.  Involuntary  ignorance  is  comparatively  harmless, 
and  can  be  cured ;  but  wilful  ignorance,  the  ignorance  that  results  from  prejudice 
and  passion  and  foolish  pride,  has  generally  been  the  parent  of  grave  national  dis- 
aster.   The  ignorance  which  despises  every  other  nation,  which  closes  its  eyes  to 

'Burke  was  even  called  "an  American"  (Letter  to  the  Sheriffs').    There  was  apparently 
no  use  of  "pro-"  then. 


6  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

every  danger,  which  refuses  to  receive  warning  or  advice,  was  the  direct  cause  of 
the  disaster  of  1775.  The  King  and  the  Ministry  knew  nothing  of  the  temper  of 
the  American  Colonists ;  and  all  their  information  was  derived  from  officials.  These 
officials  were  either  the  victims  of  the  grossest  illusions  or  guilty  of  the  grossest 
falsehood.  The  language  in  which  they  described  the  character^of  the  Colonists, 
their  disloyal  ambitions,  their  dishonesty,  their  hypocrisy,  and  the  certainty  of  their 
submission  at  the  first  stroke  of  the  whip  was  both  ludicrous  and  tragical. 

An  English  officer  wrote :  "As  to  what  you  hear  of  their  taking  arms,  it  is 
mere  bullying,  and  will  go  no  further  than  words.  Whenever  it  comes  to  blows 
he  that  can  run  fastest  will  think  himself  best  off.  Any  two  regiments  here 
ought  to  be  decimated  if  they  did  not  beat  in  the  field  the  whole  force  of  the 
Massachusetts  province,  for  though  they  are  numerous,  they  are  but  a  mere  mob 
without  order  or  discipline,  and  very  awkward  in  handling  their  arms."  According 
to  General  Gage,  the  Bostonians  were  "sly  traitors"  and  "turbulent  puritans," 
"scoundrels,"  "ruffians,"  and  "cowards,"  "the  worst  of  subjects,"  and  the  most 
"immoral"  of  men.  With  that  extraordinary  facility  for  saying  the  wrong  thing 
which  always  distinguishes  the  foolish  ruler,  he  issued  a  Proclamation  against 
Hypocrisy :  a  characteristic  example  of  the  tact  and  consideration  of  the  English 
Colonial  Governor  of  that  day. 

In  vain  did  those  who  knew  the  American  spirit  and  character  warn  the 
public  and  the  Ministry  of  the  dangers  of  their  policy.  General  Lee  wrote  that 
(there  were  200,000  able-bodied  men,  hardy,  active,  ready  to  encounter  every  danger 
Ifor  their  liberty.  The  Government,  ignorant  and  self-complacent,  sent  10,000 
men  to  Boston,  reinforcements  numerous  enough  to  irritate  the  Colonists,  but 
absurdly  inadequate  to  hold  down  a  district  so  vast  and  a  people  so  valiant.  The 
King  readily  believed  what  he  wished  to  believe;  the  Ministry  followed  his 
wishes ;  and  the  public  received  its  instructions  from  the  Ministers. 

Many  of  the  English  officials  were  men  of  high  character  and  ability.     But 
they  were  utterly  deficient  in  common  sense  and  imagination  and  they  took  their 
ideas  from  the  Loyalists,  whose  violence  and  folly  saw  in  a  "strong  policy"  the  only 
cure  for  political  trouble.    Of  the  English  Governors  and  officials  Franklin  wrote : 
"Their  office  makes  them  insolent ;  their  insolence  makes  them  odious ;  and, 
being  conscious  that  they  are  hated,  they  become  malicious.    Their  malice 
urges  them  to  continual  abuse  of  the  inhabitants  in  their  letters  to  Admin- 
istration, representing  them  as  disaffected  and  rebellious,  and   (to  en- 
h  courage  the  use  of  severity)  as  weak,  divided,  timid,  and  cowardly.    Gov- 

ernment believes  all ;  thinks  it  necessary  to  support  and  countenance  its 
officers.    Their  quarrelling  with  the  people  is  deemed  a  mark  and  conse- 
quence of  their  fidelity.    They  are,  therefore,  more  highly  rewarded,  and 
this  makes  their  conduct  still  more  insolent  and  provoking." 
Ignorance  so  enormous,  misinformation  so  wanton,  miscalculation  so  gross  and  so 
disastrous,  have  probably  been  displayed  by  a  political  party  only  at  one  other 
period  of  English  history. 

Meantime,  the  temper  on  both  sides  was  rising  fast.  The  Ministers  were 
discussing  preambles  when  they  should  have  thought  of  conciliation,  and  logic 
when  they  should  have  looked  to  facts.  In  Parliament  coercive  measures  were 
passed  by  large  majorities,  strong  bodies  of  troops  were  despatched  to  America, 
and  the  King  and  Ministers  were  determined  to  teach  the  Americans  "a  sharp 
lesson."  On  the  other  hand,  the  Colonists,  threatened  by  penal  and  coercive  meas- 
ures, lost  neither  their  dignity  nor  their  courage.  They  recognised  that  their 
choice  must  lie  between  submission  with  its  infamy  and  ruin,  and  resistance  to 
the  enormous  power  of  an  Empire  which  had  beaten  every  rival.  Boston,  with  her 
5,000  citizens  able  to  bear  arms,  did  not  take  long  to  make  her  choice.  Quietly, 
but  firmly,  she  prepared  for  what  seemed  to  her  the  inevitable  conflict.  The 
various  townships  of  the  Colony  were  not  slow  to  promise  their  assistance,  and  the 
other  States,  under  stress  of  common  menace,  prepared  to  take  their  stand  with 


INTRODUCTION. 


ph'ies  which  BX#«  ha<l  used  thousands  of  years  before  were 

their  career  of  shame  and  disaster.  narrate  in  anv  detail  the  histpry  of 

It  is  not  necessary    -  ou^  Purpose  tonarr ate  m^ny        and  ^    W 

the  American  War  It  is  a  war  ^"f  stin£  .  „eneral  reader  it  is  the  narrative 
and  particularly  to  the  political  stu den ,  bu  gfor1*ef  ^^e  indined  now  to  one 
of  a  long  and  tedious  struggle  in  which  the  balance  ot  «»y  were 

side  and  now.  to  the  other;  ™J^*^CTe^^KS,ald  avoid  exhau^ 

i^ir^^^  ^  °pthe  war  of  i775 

micrht  have  been  different.  ^.mr>„a      He    could    count    on    only    a 

Washington's    difficulties   were   enormous      He    ~«W^co  ^  ^ 

section  of  the  American  population,  at  leas    on<^al1  bootless,  his 

His  numbers  continually  sank  from  15,00c  to ^  5,000,  *g™  hifd  man 

as  Washington's,  and  finally  pr j»ved    ata  1      The  ;      bore       ^  between  large 
It  was  at  one  time  and  in  one  dist net  a  r^uiar  w  f  At  another 

bodies  of  troops,  and  according  to  the  XTature  of  aVuerilla  war  waged  by 
time  and  in  another district  1 .partook of  the ^^Y6  ^^  ^ 

small  and  mobile  columns  of   he  enemy  against  a  foe ^om        X        ^^      R 

to  defetV  ffi£Tit£^^  to  these  minor  opera; 

,s  possible  that  the  Americans  °we°  ™  as  the  persistent  onset  of 

tions.     Nothing  so  quickly  dishea    ^s  -^/^^  the  JJ  deliVers  a  swift 

1SST2 'Sfifi  with'  e^alTapfdity,  leaves  his  unwieldy  enemy  impotent 
-d  SfflStt Army  ^l^^^^i^VS^^, 

its  frequent  reverses.     Officers  and 1  ^P8  ^Jg ated  and  maddened  by  the 
the  set  rules  of  war  se Jdo jm  knei de ^J^e    rr  {armers      They 

elusive  tactics  a^.W^Sit  the  Colonists  were  a  rabble 

!lld  been,^dotasnhooteythat  their    roTps  were  mere  bands  of  marauding  mis- 

bloody  experience  of  Bunker  s  ^1,  and  the  ^«nder  g  ,  §  ^  ^.^ 

S?  ^yt^SZt^  *  their  politicians, 

and  Thf^^w^onSeTwHh'the  greatest  rigour,  and  menacing  proclama- 
tion,™'™cl£e^^^  The  English  Ministers,  alarmed  at  the  long 


8  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

continuance  of  the  war  and  the  entry  of  France  into  the  struggle,  sent  a  Peace 
Commission  to  America.  But  it  was  now  too  late,  and  terms  which  a  year  ago 
might  have  been  accepted  were  declined  by  the  Colonists.  In  revenge  for  this 
rebuff,  the  Commissioners  flew  to  violence.  The  Colonists  were  described  as 
an  "infatuated  multitude"  who  ''affected"  to  fight  against  the  royal  troops. 
Those  who,  even  at  the  eleventh  hour,  were  wise  enough  to  desert  their  "mis- 
guided leaders"  would  be  pardoned  by  their  royal  Master;  but  for  the  leader 
themselves  the  proclamations  held  out  no  hopes  of  mercy.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  Colonists  neglected  "the  forgiveness  offered  by  a  considerate 
monarch,"  it  would  be  necessary  for  his  generals  to  devastate  America,  and  to 
render  it  useless  both  to  the  Colonists  and  their  allies. 

The  brutal  and  deliberate  policy  of  devastation,  by  which  the  Government 
attempted  to  intimidate  a  foe  whom  they  could  not  conquer,  was  supported  by 
the  Tories  on  the  ground  of  "military  exigencies."  Even  the  clergy  and 
bishops,  degenerate  servants  forgetful  of  the  precepts  of  their  Master,  approved 
these  barbarous  methods.  There  were  indeed  two  noble  exceptions — the 
Bishops  of  Peterborough  and  St.  Asaph.  The  former  attacked  the  barbarous 
and  cruel  policy  of  the  Government  and  the  generals. 

"It  is  principally  owing  to  the  mild  influence  of  Christianity  that  every 
nation  professing  the  belief  of  it,  as  it  were  by  common  consent,  set 
bounds  to  the  savage  fierceness  of  revenge  and  cruelty.  Shall  we, 
then,  be  the  first  among  the  nations  of  Europe  to  forget  so  very  essential 
a  part  of  its  excellence  as  the  humanity  and  benevolence  it  inspires? 
Shall  we,  I  say,  be  the  first  to  establish  desolation  upon  system?  And, 
to  gratify  an  impotent  resentment,  deal  fruitless  destruction  on  the 
wives  and  children  of  an  enemy  we  cannot  conquer,  and  of  friends  we 
can  no  longer  protect?" 
And  again — 

"If  such  is  the  Christianity  we  are  to  propagate  among  the  natives,  it  is 
better  for  their  teachers,  and  better  for  themselves,  that  they  should 
live  and  die  in  ignorance.     If  they  are  to  be  involved  in  our  guilt,  take 
not  from  them  their  plea  for  mercy.    Let  them  still  have  it  to  urge  at 
the  Throne  of  God  that  they  have  never  heard  the  name  of  Christ." 
Two  years  before  the  same  wise  Bishop  had  pointed  out  the  folly  of  the 
Ministers,  who  hoped  to  hold  in  subjection  a  race  so  stubborn  as  the  Americans. 
"Experience  must  surely  have  convinced  us  that  it  is  not  a  single  battle  or 
campaign  that,  as  among  the  effeminate  inhabitants  of  Asia,  is  to  decide 
the  fate  of  the  Western  world.    The  vanquished  must  fly,  but  they  will 
rally  again;  and  while  the  love  of  liberty  remains,  there  will  be  some 
sparks  of  courage  ever  ready  to  take  fire  on  the  slightest  occasion. 
The  cities  must  be  burnt,  the  country  laid  waste,  and  many  a  brave  man 
must  perish,  ere  the  miserable  remnant  is  brought  to  absolute  submis- 
sion; and  when  that  is  done  what  advantage  can  we  expect?" 
Such  a  policy  deserved  to  fail,  and  it  did  fail.1      It  is  needless  to  say  that  the 
sight  of  their  burning  farms  and  ruined  villages  inspired  the  Americans  with  a 
hatred  more  bitter  and  a  determination  more  stubborn.     They  wreaked  their 
vengeance  on  those  unfortunate  Loyalists  who,  confiding  in  the  ultimate  success 

1  "Indeed,  our  affairs  are  in  a  bad  condition.  I  do  assure  those  gentlemen  who  have 
prayed  for  war  and  obtained  the  blessing  they  sought  that  they  are  at  this  instant  in  very 
great  straits.  The  abused  wealth  of  the  country  continues  a  little  longer  to  feed  its  dis- 
temper. .  .  .  But  America  is  not  subdued.  Not  one  _  unattacked  village  which  was 
originally  adverse  throughout  that  continent  has  yet  submitted  from  love  or  terror.  You 
have  the  ground  you  encamp  on  and  you  have  no  more.  The  cantonments  of  your  troops 
and  your  dominions  are  exactly  of  the  same  extent.  You  spread  devastation,  b.ut  you  do 
not  enlarge  the  sphere  of  authority." 

Edmund  Burke. 
(Letter  to  the  Sheriffs  of  Bristol,  1777.) 


INTRODUCTION.  9 

of  England,  had  refused  to  join  the  ranks  of  the  Colonists.  The  position  of 
these  men  was  a  difficult  and  a  painful  one.  On  the  one  hand,  if  they  aided  the 
English  army  they  were  liable  to  be  shot  by  the  Americans,  and  on  the  other,  if 
they  assisted  the  Colonists  they  were  liable  to  be  hanged  by  the  English. 

At  home  it  was  necessary  to  sustain  the  fast-waning  interest  of  the  public. 
The  most  atrocious  calumnies  were  spread  abroad  concerning  the  conduct  of 
the  war  by  the  Colonists.  They  were  said  to  be  cruel  to  their  prisoners,  and  to 
break  the  rules  of  honourable  warfare.  It  was  asserted  that  poisoned  bullets 
had  been  found  in  the  pouches  of  the  rebels.  The  Ministry  went  so  far  as  to 
publish  in  the  London  Gazette  an  official  statement  that  the  Americans  had 
scalped  the  wounded.1  The  condition  of  the  American  Army  was  represented 
to  be  hopeless,  and  the  most  sanguine  reports  were  laid  before  the  English 
Ministry.  It  was  stated  on  the  authority  of  the  English  generals  and  Governors 
that  the  Colonial  troops  were  discontented  and  ready  for  mutiny;  that  they 
could  secure  no  recruits;  that  their  army  was  perishing  of  starvation  and 
fatigue;  that  they  had  few  supplies,  and  that  for  these  they  were  obliged  to  pay 
ir.  depreciated  paper  money.  The  public  were  regularly  and  constantly  assured 
that  the  war  was  practically  over;  that  the  Colonies  were  awaiting  an  opportu- 
nity to  submit  to  the  King's  authority;  that  it  was  only  with  the  greatest 
difficulty  that  Washington  was  able  to  prevent  his  officers  and  his  army  from 
deserting  to  the  royal  troops,  and  that  the  desire  for  peace  was  universal. 

The  real  position  of  the  English  Army  was  carefully  concealed  from  the 
public.  The  awful  wastage  which  a  long  and  indecisive  campaign  in  a  distant 
country  always  brings,  the  fever,  the  fatigue,  the  heart-sickness,  were  producing 
their  inevitable  effect  on  the  unhappy  English  forces.  Ministers  were  obviously 
uneasy,  and  it  was  difficult  to  obtain  from  them  either  precise  information  or  a 
general  estimate  of  the  military  situation.  Where  they  had  no  comfortable 
news  to  give,  it  seemed  to  them  an  impertinence  that  the  Opposition  should 
demand  facts. 

In  September,  1780,  the  English  Parliament  was  suddenly  dissolved;  and 
though  the  resentment  of  the  country  at  the  mistakes  of  the  politicians  and  the 
prolongation  of  the  war  was  considerable,  the  Opposition  was  still  weak.  The 
Ministers  demanded  that  their  hands,  in  view  of  the  dangers  which  threatened 
England,  should  be  strengthened,  and  the  Ministerial  party  was  returned  by  a 
slightly  increased  majority.  The  Ministers  regarded  their  victory  at  the  polls 
both  as  a  condonation  of  any  mistakes  they  might  have  made  and  as  a  mandate 
for  the  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war.  In  vain  the  Opposition  pleaded  for  a 
return  to  common  sense  and  for  the  opening  of  negotiations  with  a  foe  whom 
they  could  never  hope  to  conquer.  Fox's  motion  of  conciliation  was  rejected 
bv  a  large  majority,  and  the  Ministers  proceeded  on  their  policy  of  violence  and 
drift.     „ 

But  in  their  very  hour  of  triumph  the  crisis  was  approaching.  It  is  possible 
that  neither  the  Ministry  nor  the  public  appreciated  the  enormous  difficulties 
against  which  the  English  generals  had  to  contend,  difficulties  which  were,  in 
fact,  insuperable,  and  which  made  success  almost  impossible.  In  the  first  place, 
the  English  were  fighting  against  the  most  dangerous  foe  whom  they  had 
hitherto  met,  a  foe  of  their  own  blood,  of  the  same  stubborn  spirit,  and  with  the 
same  unconquerable  love  of  freedom.  Though  there  were  many  cowards  and 
incapables  among  the  Colonists,  it  is  certain  that,  man  for  man,  they  were 
superior  to  the  English  soldiers  in  intelligence,  in  physique,  in  skill  with  the  rifle, 
in  knowledge  of  the  country,  and  in  a  passionate  and  individual  devotion  to  their 
cause.    They  had,  too,  the  enormous  advantage  which  the  English  Army  did 

'  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  English  officers  and  privates  who  had  been  taken  prisoners  by 
the  Colonists,  loudly  praised  the  tenderness  and  care  with  which  they  had  been  nursed  by 
their  "savage"  enemy. 


io  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

not,  and  could  not,  possess;  they  were  fighting  in  their  own  country  and  for  their 
freedom;  they  were  filled  with  an  enthusiasm  which  was  not  only  patriotic  but 
religious,  and  which  made  the  struggle  bear  in  their  eyes  the  character  of  a 
Holy  War. 

The  English  Army,  though  of  a  considerable  size,  was  scattered  over  a  vast 
district,  with  bad  roads,  and  sparsely  populated.  It  was  obliged  to  operate 
against  an  elusive  foe  and  among  a  hostile  population.  It  was  difficult  to  bring 
the  enemy  to  decisive  action;  the  capture  of  an  important  town,  which  in  a  land 
of  higher  development  would  have  been  a  blow  at  the  heart  of  the  country,  had 
no  lasting  effect;  and  the  English  were  quite  unable  to  follow  up  their,  successes. 
The  great  towns  of  the  Colonists  fell  one  by  one  into  the  hands  of  the  English, 
but  the  struggle  continued,  and  the  Americans  hung  still  at  the  very  gates. 
Great  tracts  of  country  submitted  to  the  English  troops,  but,  on  their  retire- 
ment, fell  away  from  their  allegiance.  The  English  could  not  effectively  occupy 
the  country,  and  where  that  is  impossible,  ultimate  success  is  impossible. 
Above  all,  the  labour  of*  feeding  a  large  army  in  scattered  positions  at  great 
distances  from  their  bases  and  depots  was  a  task  of  supreme  difficulty.*  These 
bases  were  3,000  miles  from  England:  the  lines  of  communication  were  imper- 
fectly held,  and  were  liable  to  interruption  by  a  mobile  foe  at  any  moment. 

It  was  beginning  to  be  seen,  even  by  the  King's  advisers,  that  to  conquer 
such  a  country  was  almost  beyond  their  power,  while  to  hold  in  subjection  a  land 
so  vast,  so  thinly  populated,  where  more  than  half  of  the  fiercer  spirits  of  the 
population  would  be  permanently  disaffected,  would  require  an  immense  army, 
and  would  entail  the  greatest  dangers  and  an  enormous  expense.  They  were 
anxious  for  peace,  and  for  any  honourable  means  of  escape  from  an  impossible 
position.  But  the  Americans  could  accept  nothing  less  than  independence,  and 
this  the  King  refused  to  grant. 

The  English  Commander-in-Chief,  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  saw  at  last  that  the 
operations  of  his  troops  at  great  distances  from  the  sea  were  involving  him  in 
serious  difficulties.  In  the  autumn  of  1781  he  recalled  Cornwallis,  who,  at  the 
head  of  7,000  troops,  had  been  laying  waste  Virginia  with  fire  and  sword,  and 
ordered  him  to  retire  to  the  sea  and  fortify  himself  in  York  Town,  where  it  was 
hoped  that  the  British  fleet  would  be  able  to  co-operate  with  him.  To  York 
Town  Cornwallis  retreated,  followed  by  Lafayette,  who,  later  on,  was  joined  by 
Washington  with  a  considerable  body  of  troops.  The  end  was  near.  Corn- 
wallis was  invested  from  the  land  side,  and  from  the  sea  he  was  blockaded  by  a 
powerful  French  squadron,  which  had  been  able  to  forestall  the  English  fleet 
and  to  take  up  its  position  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbour.  Against  such  odds  it 
was  impossible  long  to  struggle,  and,  on  October  19,  1781,  after  a  siege  of  21 
days,  6,000  English  troops  and  100  guns  surrendered  to  Washington. 

The  disastrous  news  of  the  surrender  of  York  Town  reached  England  a 
month  after  the  event.  When  the  intelligence  was  taken  to  North  he  burst  into 
an  agony  of  grief.  "It  is  all  over,"  he  cried.  The  Ministers  and  the  public 
recognised  that  it  was  indeed  "all  over,"  and  the  Opposition  redoubled  their 
efforts  and  assailed  the  Ministry  with  the  utmost  violence.  The  King  himself 
displayed  a  courage  which  it  is  impossible  not  to  admire.  He  would  never  yield 
to  America  or  encourage  the  traitors  who  formed  the  Opposition.  To  acknowl- 
edge the  independence  of  America  was  to  acknowledge  that  the  sun  of  England 
had  set  for  ever.  We  should  be  humiliated  in  the  sight  of  the  whole  world,  we 
should  lose  the  West  Indies  and  our  Indian  Empire,  we  should  sink  to  the  state 
of  a  third-rate  Power,  and  be  confined  within  our  own  shores.  But  the  King 
could  find  no  one  to  support  him  against  facts  so  stubborn  and  so  overwhelming. 
He  accepted  the  resignation  of  North's  Ministry,  and  a  Whig  Ministry  was 
formed.     Negotiations  were  opened  with  America,  and,  after  the  signature  of 

*  So  it  is  in  South  Africa. 


INTRODUCTION.  n 

preliminaries  of  peace,  a  final  peace  was  signed  in  1783  by  which  the  independ- 
ence of  the  American  Colonies  was  fully  recognised. 

The  defeat  of  the  English  had  been  ascribed  to  many  causes.  The  Min- 
isters attributed  it  to  the  incapacity  of  the  generals,  and  the  army  to  the 
mistakes  of  the  politicians.  The  English  generals  were,  indeed,  men  of  inferior 
capacity,  and  deserved  North's  pathetic  reproach:  "I  do  not  know  whether  our 
generals  will  frighten  the  enemy,  but  I  know  they  frighten  me  whenever  I  think 
of  them."  As  Pitt  said,  the  war  was  "a  series  of  ineffective  victories  or  severe 
defeats."  Carlisle,  in  1778,  speaking  of  the  great  scale  of  everything  in  America, 
wrote:*  "We  have  nothing  on  a  great  scale  with  us  but  our  blunders,  our 
misconduct,  our  ruin,  our  losses,  our  disgraces,  and  misfortunes." 

But  the  army  might  have  retorted  with  equal  justice  that  never  had  generals 
been  so  badly  supported  by  Government.  The  Ministers  made  nearly  every 
mistake  which  it  was  possible  for  Ministers  to  make.  They  had  hopelessly 
underestimated  the  strength  and  determination  of  the  Colonists.  They  sent  out 
incapable  generals,  and  they  failed  to  feed  the  army  with  a  constant  flow  of  rein- 
forcements. They  conducted  their  peace  negotiations  as  though  they  were 
certain  of  military  success,  and  their  warfare  as  though  peace  were  a  matter  of 
to-morrow.  No  estimate  or  prophecy  was  fulfilled  by  events,  and  they  seemed 
inspired  by  a  weak  and  incurable  optimism  which  always  saw  in  the  coming 
week  a  decisive  victory  and  the  end  of  the  war. 

The  partial  loss  of  the  command  of  the  sea  was  a  disastrous  blow  to  Eng- 
land. It  was  difficult  enough  to  feed  and  reinforce  a  great  army  at  such  a 
distance;  but  when  a  foreign  fleet  could  interrupt  our  supplies  and  blockade  our 
troops,  the  position  became  almost  untenable.  We  must  not,  however,  assign 
too  high  an  importance  to  the  intervention  of  France.  The  essential  difficulties 
of  the  situation  were  enormous,  and  though  the  entry  of  France  and  Spain  and 
Holland  into  the  struggle  undoubtedly  hastened  the  end,  the  ultimate  failure  of 
England  was  certain.  It  is  true  that  Washington's  army  was  in  the  last  stage 
of  exhaustion,  and  it  is  possible  that  if  England  could  have  raised  and 
despatched  another  army,  and  had  been  willing  to  continue  hostilities  for  one  or 
two  years  more,  the  submission  of  the  Colonists  might  have  been  secured.  But 
such  a  submission  could  only  be  temporary.  From  the  day  when  the  first  blood 
was  shed  at  Lexington,  America  was  lost  to  England.  It  was  impossible  to  hold 
America  without  the  consent  of  the  Americans. 

In  any  case  the  weariness  of  the  public  forbade  the  prolongation  of  the 
struggle.  At  its  beginning  and  in  its  first  stages  the  war  was  popular,  but  the 
supply  of  volunteers  had  soon  ceased,  and  the  hire  of  German  mercenaries  and 
Indian  auxiliaries,  and  the  cruel  devastations  of  the  English  geenrals,  had  given 
to  the  struggle  an  odious  character  in  the  eyes  of  the  English  people.  A  very 
different  spirit  indeed  was  seen  when  France  and  Spain  entered  the  lists.  The 
whole  country  rose  in  loyalty;  and  the  men  who  would  not  volunteer  for  service 
in  America  came  forward  in  tens  of  thousands  to  defend  their  country  against 
their  hereditary  foes. 

The  English  people  had  at  least  awakened  from  its  apathy.  It  was  disgusted 
by  the  miscalculations  and  the  falsified  prophecies  of  its  leaders.  It  had  been 
told,  day  after  day,  that  the  conquest  of  America  was  practically  complete,  and 
the  disappointment  was  bitter  and  overwhelming.  Six  years  of  war,  of  ever- 
increasing  debt,1  of  shocking  loss  of  life,  of  a  never-ending  series  of  disasters, 
and  of  increasing  dangers  from  our  continental  rivals,  had  completely  weaned 
the  public  mind  from  its  early  affection  for  the  war.  It  saw,  too,  that  a  tem- 
porary victory  at  the  cost  of  further  sacrifices  would  be  unavailing.     It  saw  that 

*  History  repeats. 

'The  war  cost  England  over  £100,000,000.     The  cost  of  the  war  against  the  Boers  has 
been  over  $1,000,000,000,  and  the  end  is  not  yet. 


12  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

to  hold  America  in  subjection  it  would  be  necessary  to  maintain  there  a  large 
standing  army  amid  a  hostile  population,  nursed  in  bitter  hatred  of  our  rule, 
3,000  miles  from  England:  a  population  waiting  silently  but  eagerly  for  the 
moment  when  European  complications  might  bind  our  hands.  A  rebellion 
raised  at  such  a  time  it  would  be  impossible  to  resist,  and  Great  Britain  would  be 
obliged  to  retire  in  defeat  and  in  a  humiliation  more  bitter  and  more  costly  than 
the  humiliation  of  the  present  peace. 

Thus  ended  the  most  unhappy  war  that  England  had  ever  undertaken.  It 
was  a  war  which  in  its  inception  and  its  conduct  owed  most  of  its  disasters 
to  the  obstinacy  and  incapacity  of  its  King  and  his  Ministers.*  Their  first  mis- 
take was  to  insist  on  the  enforcement  of  a  right  which  was  both  vexatious  and 
unfruitful.  Their  second  error  was  to  trust  to  the  advice  of  ignorant  and  preju- 
diced officials.  The  third  mistake  of  the  Ministers  was  to  present  to  the  Ameri- 
cans the  alternative  of  starvation  or  rebellion,  of  unconditional  submission  or  a 
war  of  extermination.  Their  final  folly  was  the  failure  to  recognise  that  they 
had  wholly  misjudged  the  character  and  resources  of  the  Americans.  They  had 
raised  a  problem  which,  deficient  as  they  were  in  imagination  and  common 
sense,  they  were  unable  to  solve.  They  were  unwilling  to  face  stubborn  facts, 
and  to  proportion  their  policy  to  their  strength;  they  were,  therefore,  compelled 
to  continue  a  policy  of  drifting  impotence,  of  which  the  end  was  disaster. 

*  A  parallel  case  is  the  war  with  the  Boers. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE    NATION,    1895-I9OO. 

WITH  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century  England  seemed  to  many 
observers  to  be  entering  on  a  period  of  decline.  From  every  quarter 
and  in  every  society  the  same  ominous  tale  was  told.  Some  lamented 
an  England  of  little  men;  the  overgrowth  of  Cabinet  rule;  the  decay  of  represen- 
tative institutions;  a  Parliament  of  mediocrities;  a  Ministry  of  blunderers,  likely 
to  perish  by  virtue  of  its  very  size;  an  Oppostion  weak,  timid,  and  divided;  the 
absence  of  efficiency  in  the  public  service;  a  growing  expenditure  and  a  lessen- 
ing trade;  a  declining  birth-rate;  an  army  unequal  to  its  task.  Others  lamented 
an  England  no  longer  supreme  in  Asia,  threatened  on  the  seas  by  France  and 
Russia, in  its  commerce  by  Germany  and  America.  They  foresaw  graver  troubles 
in  the  future:  constant  retreats  and  constant  rebuffs,  India  threatened  by  Russia, 
China  absorbed  by  the  same  devouring  colossus,  Germany  cold,  France  hostile, 
and  England  isolated  and  hated  by  every  nation.  The  weary  Titan  was  becom- 
ing conscious  of  his  burden.  A  disquiet,  indefinite  but  profound,  haunted  the 
minds  of  men. 

By  the  idealist  a  similar  decay  was  discerned  in  the  moral  sphere.  The 
material  side  of  life  was  victorious;  religious  faith  was  weakening.  Money  had 
brought  luxury  and  enervation,  and  the  desire  of  money  was  gratified  by 
crooked  paths.  The  vast  wealth  of  cosmopolitan  speculators  was  spreading 
everywhere  its  influence,  sometimes  by  open  bribery,  often  by  methods  more 
subtle  but  not  less  dangerous.  The  golden  calf  was  openly  set  up  in  the  temple, 
and  the  high-born  thronged  to  worship.  The  standard  of  political  life  had 
declined.  It  was  no  longer  held  ignoble  for  politicians  to  traffic  in  contracts, 
and  the  sensitiveness  which  felt  a  stain  like  a  wound  was  out  of  favour.  Great 
nobles  thought  it  no  humiliation  to  sell  their  titles  for  gold,  and  thousands  of 
men  and  women  were  decoyed  into  ruin  by  the  glamour  of  a  great  name. 
Gambling  and  betting  were  the  amusement  of  multitudes  and  the  business  of 
not  a  few. 

Things  were  seen  in  false  perspective.  The  education  which  was  to  be  a 
source  of  refinement  seemed  rather  to  have  brought  the  capacity  to  admire 
wrongly;  and  the  cheap  journalist  corrupted  and  degraded  whatever  he  touched. 
Hence  sprang  the  worship  of  the  violence  which  masquerades  as  strength:  of 
the  vulgarity  which  passed  for  native  force.  In  our  eagerness  to  be  sincere  we 
had  thrown  off  the  conventions  which  redeem  life  from  half  its  grossness.  It 
was  in  politics  as  in  literature,  in  social  life  as  in  international  intercourse.  The 
sober  ideals  and  decent  modesty  of  our  forefathers  were  to  us  mere  cant  and 
sentiment.  The  simple  formulae  of  life  which  sufficed  for  them  were  not  good 
enough  for  us.  Force  was  held  the  only  remedy:  material  success  the  only 
standard. 

We  saw  the  other  nations  pressing  at  our  heels:  we  must  be  up  and  doing. 
A.  restless  and  suspicious  egotism  possessed  us;  the  dignity  and  self-control  and 
proud  patience  of  the  English  seemed  lost  gifts.  Hence  came  the  neurotic 
excitement  of  our  crowds,  the  hysteria  of  the  music  hall,  the  sensations  of  the 
cheap  paper,  the  violence  of  our  fashionable  politicians.  Hence,  too,  came  our 
impatience  with  all  that  is  not  born  of  strength,  our  scorn  of  the  ideals  which 
inspired  our  fathers  and  made  possible  the  splendid  activities  of  a  past  genera- 


14  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

tion.  Hence  came  our  contempt  for  the  rights  of  small  nations  whom  once  it 
was  our  pride  to  defend,  our  irritation  with  the  stubborn  race  who  turned  a  deaf 
ear  to  our  counsels  and  demands.  We  could  not  bear  to  find  a  little  nation 
in  our  path:  self-conscious  and  irritable,  we  saw  in  them  only  vermin  to  be 
exterminated  from  the  face  of  our  earth.  On  them  was  vented  the  resentment 
which  we  had  been  bearing  within  our  bosoms  since  first  our  pre-eminence  was 
questioned  by  our  rivals. 

Such  is  the  picture  which  men  painted  as  their  own  special  fears  affected 
them.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  it  was  too  dark.  That  there  were  grave 
symptoms  in  the  social  organism  and  the  political  outlook  of  1895-1900  is  true. 
But  each  man  exaggerates  his  own  particular  hopes  or  fears,  and  in  the  main 
England  is  as  sound  to-day  as  she  was  fifty  years  ago.  Our  worst  enemies  can- 
not deny  that  we  bore  the  first  disasters  of  this  war  with  a  self-control  which  did 
honour  to  our  race.  To  see  things  as  alarmists  see  them  is  to  lose  proportion.  If 
the  perfectly  good  man  or  the  perfectly  wise  nation  does  not  exist,  yet  experi- 
ence tells  us  that  the  majority  of  mankind  are  passably  good  and  moderately 
sensible,  that  they  do  not  consciously  act  from  wrong  motives,  and  that,  where 
they  err  greatly,  they  err  through  ignorance.  The  English  people  have  always 
been  an  honest,  a  shrewd,  and  a  generous  people;  and  at  the  worst  the  fault 
which  has  been  at  the  root  of  the  troubles  of  the  last  two  years  is  the  fault  from 
which  we  have  suffered  and  recovered  before.  We  have  been  weakened  by  a 
certain  lassitude,  born  of  past  energy,  and,  it  may  be,  of  too  much  prosperity:  a 
good-natured  indifference  which  did  not  permit  us  to  examine  with  intelligence 
the  statements  and  the  counsels  of  our  advisers,  and  which  has  left  us  the  easy 
victims  of  hare-brained  adventurers. 

It  is  an  old  tale,  and  will  be  told  again  when  another  century  has  passed 
away.  A  nation  lives  by  successive  periods  of  strength  and  weakness,  of  energy 
and  languor.  The  costly  results  of  our  error  we  are  now  beginning  dimly  to 
see,  and  we  shall  quickly  become  again  the  England  which  after  1781  arose  from 
its  sleep:  the  England  alert,  strong,  silent,  and  self-controlled,  which  was  able. 
after  countless  humiliations,  to  save  herself  by  her  exertions  and  Europe  by 
iier  example. 


CHAPTER   II. 

SOUTH    AFRICA   TO.  I896. 

THE  history  of  South  Africa  is  in  the  main  the  history  of  the  antagonism 
of  the  English  and  the  Dutch  and  of  the  dealings  of  the  two  races  with 
the  natives.  From  the  interconnection  of  these  two  causes  have  sprung 
nearly  all  the  troubles  which  have  made  South  Africa  the  despair  of  statesmen 
and  the  grave  of  reputations,  and  which  seem  likely  for  many  years  to  make  it 
a  land  of  racial  unrest. 

The  first  discoverers  of  South  Africa  were  the  Portuguese,  who,  neglecting 
the  healthier  districts  of  Cape  Colony,  made  their  settlements  on  the  southeast 
coast  in  a  district  which  they  still  hold.  In  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth 
century  a  Dutch  crew,  who  had  been  shipwrecked  in  Table  Bay,  bore  to  Hol- 
land a  glowing  description  of  the  great  advantages  of  such  a  port  as  a  half-way 
house  to  the  East  Indies.  The  Dutch  East  India  Company  sent  out  a  body  of 
settlers  who  raised  a  fort,  and  in  1689  the  number  of  the  colonists  was  increased 
by  three  hundred  French  Huguenots  who  were  flying  from  the  persecutions 
which  seemed  to  await  them  in  France.  The  Dutch  and  the  Huguenots  soon 
blended  by  intermarriage,  and  the  whole  body  of  settlers,  casting  off  those  ties 
of  home  and  blood  which  bind  most  emigrants  to  the  mother  country,  formed 
a  new  nation  with  individual  characteristics  and  a  patriotism  of  its  own. 

They  were  a  pastoral  people,  not  given  to  agriculture  in  the  strict  sense  of 
the  word,  but  living  isolated  lives,  and  journeying  in  their  waggons  from  spot  to 
spot  with  their  flocks  and  herds.  They  became  rearers  of  cattle  and  great 
hunters,  and  they  developed  not  only  the  qualities  of  self-reliance  and  courage 
which  were  necessary  to  their  lives,  but  also  that  stubborn  love  of  freedom 
which  has  given  them  both  a  stamp  of  individuality,  and  an  impatience  of 
control,  and  has  made  them  the  most  difficult  of  subjects.  They  became 
known  as  Boers;  i.  e.,  farmers  or  peasants,  and  though  they  were  ruled  by  a 
Dutch  governor,  they  were  continually  at  issue  with  their  rulers  until,  during 
the  Napoleonic  war,  an  English  force  was  in  1806  landed  at  Cape  Town,  and 
in  1814  the  Colony  became  a  part  of  the  British  Empire. 

It  does  not  appear  that  during  the  early  years  of  the  British  occupation  the 
Dutch  were  treated  with  harshness,  but  in  the  years  from  181 5  to  1836  constant 
disputes  arose,  caused  in  the  main  by  a  misunderstanding  nf  the  Dutch  character 
and  by  an  unwillingness  on  the  part  of  the  English  to  frame  their-  policy  in 
reasonable  accordance  with  the  prejudices  and  wants  of  the  governed. 

The  emancipation  of  the  slaves1  throughout  the  British  Empire,  a  measure 
framed  with  the  best  intentions,  was  worked  in  South  Africa  without  discretion 
and  without  fairness.  There  was  a  general  willingness  there  to  abolish  slavery ;  * 
and  measures  were  voluntarily  taken  to  extinguish  it  by  making  all  female 
children  free  at  birth.  But  our  officials  aimed  rather  at  coercion  than  at  persua- 
sion! The  crowning  evil  was  that  of  the  inadequate  sum  allotted  to  the  compen- 
sation of  slave-owners  at  the  Cape — £1,200,000,  instead  of  the  £3,000,000  to 

1  It  may  be  noted  that  when  the  British  first  sought  the  lordship  of  the  Cape  they 
promised  to  maintain  slavery,  as  against  the  French,  who  were  then  proposing  to  abolish  it. 
Comp.  Theal's  "History  of  South  Africa,"  ii.  293-4,  314-5;  iii.  79;  and  his  "History  of  the 
Boers,"  1887,  p.  64. 

1  Theal,  "History  of  the  Boers,"  p.  64. 


*°  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

which  they  would  have  been  entitled  at  market  rates— only  a  fraction  was  really 
paid,  by  reason  of  the  utterly  unjust  method  of  payment.  All  claims  had  to  be 
presented  in  England,  so  that  every  claimant  was  obliged  to  forfeit  a  large 
proportion  to  agents  and  speculators,  and  many  never  received  anything,  some 
disdaining  later  to  accept  the  fractions  offered  them.  The  whole  process  of 
agriculture  was  upset  and  paralysed  by  the  act  of  emancipation,  and  most  of 
the  natives  refused  to  do  any  further  work.  The  Dutch  found  themselves 
deprived  of  the  labour  that  was  necessary  for  the  rearing  of  their  cattle,  and 
they  were  threatened  with  ruin.1 

Within  a  period  of  a  few  years  nearly  ten  thousand  Dutch  left  Cape  Colony 
to  seek  a  new  home  in  an  unknown  land.  Many  of  them  perished  by  the  way 
of  fever  or  starvation  or  at  the  hands  of  natives.  The  greater  number 
crossed  the  Orange  River,  passed  through  the  great  plains  of  the  land  which 
became  afterwards  the  Orange  Free  State,  and  advanced  northward  until  they 
came  in  contact  with  the  Matabele.  With  this  brave  and  savage  tribe  they  had 
many  a  battle,  finally  defeating  and  driving  them  beyond  the  Limpopo  River, 
where  they  set  up  a  new  kingdom  which  lasted  until  its  destruction  in  1893  by 
the  British  South  Africa  Company. 

Of  the  territories  thus  left  vacant  by  the  Matabele,  territories  now  known 
as  the  Transvaal,  the  Boers  took  possession.  Another  body  of  Boers,  under 
the  guidance  of  Pieter  Retief,  made  a  trek  into  the  southeast  of  the  country 
now  known  as  Natal,  and  established  there  a  Dutch  republic.  But  this  action, 
which  gave  the  Dutch  a  dangerous  command  of  the  sea,  alarmed  the  Govern- 
ment at  Cape  Town,  and  the  English  drove  the  Boers  from  these  districts  and 
proclaimed  them  a  British  Colony.1 

The  Boers  who  dwelt  between  the  Orange  River  and  the  Vaal  River, 
and  those  who  made  their  homes  between  the  Vaal  and  the  Limpopo,  gradually 
came  to  form  two  separate  communities,  each  composed  of  still  smaller  commu- 
nities united  by  the  slender  tie  of  mutual  protection. 

The  Southern  Boers  who  bordered  on  the  British  territory  of  Cape  Colony 
were  of  weaker  fibre  than  their  northern  kinsmen,  and  were  unable  to  keep 
order  among  the  natives  who  surrounded  them.  The  English  Governor  held 
that  their  weakness  was  a  menace  to  the  peace  of  Cape  Colony,  and  he  annexed 
their  land  to  the  British  Empire  in  1848,  under  the  name  of  the  Orange  River 
Sovereignty."  But  the  annexation  brought  little  peace,  and,  not  wishing  to  be 
troubled  by  refractory  subjects,  the  Government  in  1854  guaranteed  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  country,  to  which  the  name  of  the  Orange  Free  State  was 
given.'  The  history  of  this  State  up  to  1899  was  one  of  peaceful  progress.  It 
was  fortunate  in  securing  as  its  first  President  a  man  of  great  tact  and  prudence; 
and  it  has  been  always  distinguished  by  the  purity  of  its  administration  and  the 
excellence  of  its  institutions. 

The  Boers  north  of  the  Vaal  were  of  a  more  warlike  and  determined  char- 
acter, and  the  English  Government,  unwilling  to  increase  its  responsibilities, 
determined  to  allow  them  also  to  work  out  their  destiny  alone.  In  1852  the 
Sand  River  Convention  was  concluded,  by  which  the  British  Government  guar- 
anteed independence  to  the  Transvaal  Boers. 

Their  history  is  chequered.  Jealousies  arose  among  them;  and  in  1852 
they  were  divided  into  four  communities  or  republics.  But  self-interest  and 
the  necessity  for  common  action  were  gradually  forming  these  communities  into 

* 

1  Comp.  Theal,  "Hist,  of  South  Africa,"  iii.  413  sq.;  Cloete,  "Hist,  of  the  Great  Boer 
Trek,"  ed.  1900,  pp.  35-58 ;  Theal,  "History  of  the  Boers,"  pp.  60-70. 

2  Of  this  episode  a  full  and  apparently  fair  narrative  is  given  in  "The  Great  Boer  Trek," 
by  Cloete.     Comp.  Theal's  "History  of  the  Boers."  ch.  v. 

*  Theal,  "History  of  South  Africa,"  vol.  iv.  ch.  xlvi. 

4  This  policy  was  only  after  long  dispute  decided  on  by  the  British  Government.     See 
Theal,  iv.  491.     It  was  strongly  opposed  by  many  of  the  Cape  Dutch.     Id.,  p.  534. 


SOUTH  AFRICA  TO  1896.  17 

one;  and  in  1864  M.  W.  Pretorius  was  chosen  as  President  of  the  South  African 
Republic,  while  a  body  of  law  and  a  constitution  were  drafted  and  adopted  by 
the  Volksraad. 

The  white  population  of  the  South  African  Republic  in  1864  was  about  thirty 
thousand;  and  the  ties  that  bound  the  population  together  were  somewhat  loose. 
It  was  difficult  and  almost  impossible  for  the  central  Government  to  collect 
taxes  and  to  carry  on  the  administration  of  the  country.  In  1872  Pretorius 
was  obliged  to  resign  his  office,  and  was  succeeded  by  Mr.  Burgers,  a  Cape 
Dutchman,  a  man  of  upright  life  but  of  little  force  of  character.  The  financial 
position  of  the  country  was  becoming  deplorable;  there  was  little  trade;  and  the 
Kaffirs  at  various  points  menaced  the  sparse  population  with  invasion. 

The  welfare  of  the  Boers  of  the  two  Republics  was  naturally  a  matter  of 
concern  to  the  Dutch  population  of  Cape  Colony.  The  Boers  were  in  many 
cases  their  brothers  and  sisters  or  sons  and  daughters,  and  the  claims  of  blood 
and  race  are  paramount.  On  the  other  hand,  the  English  population  of  Cape 
Colony  regarded  them  with  unconcealed  dislike.  The  Loyalists,  as  those  of 
English  birth  were  called,  formed  the  smaller  section  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
Colony,  and  they  had  not  been  long  enough  resident  in  Africa  to  acquire  a  local 
patriotism.  They  were  therefore  still  in  close  touch  with  English  politicians. 
There  had  always  been  a  rivalry,  tacit  or  expressed,  between  the  English  and 
the  Dutch,  and  this  rivalry  gradually  became  rather  political  than  racial.  On 
the  whole  it  may  be  said  that  the  Loyalist  party  consisted  of  townsmen  engaged 
in  trade,  while  the  Dutch  were  the  country  gentry  and  the  agricultural 
population.  Thus  to  the  cleavage  of  race  there  was  added  a  divergence  of  life 
and  occupation,  and  it  is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind  these  essential  differences, 
for  they  go  far  to  explain  the  unhappy  rivalry  which  has  brought  ruin  on  South 
Africa. 

The  difficulties  of  the  Boers  were  purposely  exaggerated  by  those  colonial 
politicians  who  had  for  some  time  seen  in  the  straits  of  the  Boers  a  ground  for 
intervening  in  their  affairs  and  annexing  their  land.  While  Shepstone  is  charged 
with  telling  the  Boers  that  if  he  "too_k  his  hand  from  the  Zulus"  the  latter  would 
overwhelm  them,  he  has  put  on  record,  by  way  of  disproof  of  the  charge,  the 
statement  that  the  Boers,  to  his  knowledge,  had  no  fear  of  the  Zulus,  consid- 
ering themselves  perfectly  able  to  defeat  any  native  attack.  And  as  it  is  certain 
that  no  considerable  body  of  Boers  ever  petitioned  for  annexation,  the 
summing-up  of  history  must  be  that  the  achievement  of  that  process  by  Sir 
Theophilus  Shepstone,  with  the  reluctant  and  bewildered  consent  of  President 
Burgers,  was  a  result  of  the  sheer  lack  of  organisation  incident  to  the  first 
stages  of  a  pastoral  community  with  an  unpractical  and  unpopular  head,  and 
was  due  neither  to  the  absolute  needs  nor  to  the  avowed  wishes  of  the  people. 

The  annexation  of  the  Republic  in  April,  1877,  was  scarcely  noticed  in  Eng- 
land, and  though  it  was  resented  by  the  Dutch  in  Cape  Colony,  it  seemed  likely 
that  its  results  would  be  those  which  had  followed  a  hundred  similar  actions, 
and  that  our  new  subjects  would  accept  the  situation  and  the  privileges  of 
English  citizenship.  But  the  fatal  ignorance  that  has  generally  dogged  the 
steps  of  English  statesmen  in  their  dealings  with  South  Africa  did  not  permit 
the  English  Ministry  to  see  that  the  Boers  preferred  freedom  and  their  own 
constitution  to  the  most  civilised  government  in  the  world.  A  series  of  mis- 
takes resulted  in  a  dangerous  outbreak.  The  Transvaal  Boers  were  indignant 
that  their  Republic  should  have  been  annexed  without  their  consent  and  against 
their  will.  Their  indignation  increased  when  they  were  refused  the  representa- 
tive institutions  which  Sir  T.  Shepstone  had  definitely  promised;1  and,  moved 
by  a  destiny  which  seems  omnipotent  and  omnipresent  in  our  dealings  witR 

1  See  the  admissions  of  Sir   Bartle  Frere  in  a   letter  of  April  20,   1879.     "Life  of  Sir 
Bartle  Frere,"  1895,  ii.  311.     Comp.  p.  306. 


i8  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

South  Africa,  the  English  Government  had  chosen  as  administrator  of  the 
Transvaal  a  military  officer  who  may  have  had  admirable  qualities  in  his  own 
profession,  but  who  was,  from  his  want  of  sympathy  and  of  adaptability,  totally 
unfit  to  rule  men  of  the  temper  and  character  of  the  Boers.1 

The  new  Liberal  Ministry  of  1880,  though  they  had  opposed  the  annexation 
of  the  Transvaal,  found  themselves  in  a  difficult  position.  They  sought  the 
advice  of  the  South  African  officials,  and  were  assured  by  them  that  the  discon- 
tent in  the  Republic  was  factitious  and  of  no  account.  The  Dutch,  they  were 
told,  were  prone  to  patriotic  meetings,  but  were  quite  unwilling  to  fight;  and  a 
little  timely  severity  and  the  parade  of  a  few  hundred  British  troops  would  soon 
bring  them  to  their  senses.  The  Boers,  therefore,  were  told  that  the  annexation 
of  their  Republic  could  not  be  annulled. 

But  the  English  Government  did  not  know  with  what  men  they  had  to  deal. 
In  December,  1880,  the  Boers  chose  three  leaders,  M.  W.  Pretorius,  Paul 
Kruger,  and  P.  Joubert,  and  proclaimed  the  revival  of  the  South  African 
Republic.  The  Boer  farmers  rose  to  a  man  in  support  of  the  triumvirate,  and 
the  isolated  bands  of  British  troops  were  soon  defeated  or  besieged.  Sir  George 
Colley,  the  Governor  of  Natal,  raised  a  body  of  troops  and  marched  to  the 
border,  but  he  was  defeated  by  Joubert  at  Laing's  Nek,  and  later  on  at  Ingogo. 
On  February  26th  our  forces  were  completely  routed  on  Majuba  Hill,  and 
Colley  himself  was  killed. 

The  British  Government  despatched  considerable  reinforcements  and 
appointed  Sir  Frederick  Roberts  as  Commander-in-Chief.  What  the  final  issue 
would  have  been,  if  the  campaign  had  been  allowed  to  proceed,  it  is  difficult  to 
say.  The  British  troops  were  numerous,  their  commander  was  a  skilful  and 
successful  soldier,  and  the  Boers  were  few  in  number  and  not  used  to  regular 
warfare.  But,  in  spite  of  their  detractors,  they  were  splendid  fighters,  admirable 
marksmen,  filled  with  the  fire  of  patriotic  and  religious  fervour,  and  they  were 
fighting  in  a  country  of  which  they  knew  every  inch.2  It  is  almost  certain  that 
they  would  have  been  assisted  by  their  brothers  of  the  Orange  Free  State;  and 
they  would  undoubtedly  have  received  the  passive,  if  not  the  active,  assistance 
of  their  kinsmen  in  Cape  Colony.  The  English  Ministry,  faced  by  such  a 
resistance,  realised  that  the  annexation  of  the  South  African  Republic  had  been 
undertaken  in  ignorance  and  through  imperfect  information.  They  recognised 
that  the  temporary  conquest  and  submission  of  the  Boers  would  inevitably  lead 
to  permanent  disaffection  in  the  Transvaal,  to  another  rising  in  ten  or  twenty 
years,  and  to  a  dangerous  resentment  among  the  Dutch  in  Cape  Colony.  They 
accordingly  determined  that  a  policy  of  "magnanimity"  was  both  more  prudent 
and  more  honourable  than  the  policy  of  crushing  the  Boers  with  an  overwhelm- 
ing force.  An  armistice  was  arranged,  and  a  fortnight  later  preliminary  terms 
were  settled  by  which  the  Transvaal  State  recovered  its  independence  under  the 
suzerainty  of  the  British  Crown.  These  terms  were  formally  inserted  in  the 
Convention  of  Pretoria  of  1881. 

The  effects  of  this  act  of  "surrender"  are  somewhat  difficult  to  estimate. 
The  supporters  of  Mr.  Gladstone's  policy  have  always  pointed  to  the  danger  of 

1  See  the  admissions  made  by  Mr.  J.  S.  Fitzpatrick  in  "The  Transvaal  from  Within," 
ed.  1900,  pp.  14,  21,  25. 

2  "It  has  been  proved  to  us  that  the  Boers  are  at  all  events  brave  soldiers ;  that  they 
are  skilled  in  the  use  of  arms:  that  they  are  physically  at  least  a  match  even  for  English  sol- 
diers. The  Transvaal  is  a  country  as  large  as  France — a  wild  and  difficult  country — and  it 
is  perfectly  evident  to  every  one  that  if  we  are  to  hold  it  down  by  force  we  must  perma- 
nently maintain  a  number  of  troops  at  least  equal  to  the  number  of  our  possible  opponents. 
Well  we  know  also  that  the  Orange  Free  State,  which  is  a  neighbouring  territory,  would  make 
common  cause  with  their  co-religionists  and  men  of  the  same  nationality  in  the  Transvaal ; 
and  therefore  I  say  that  it  is  perfectly  certain  that  not  less  than  from  15,000  to  20.000 
English  troops  must  be  permanently  stationed  there  if  we  are  to  hold  the  country  by  force 
against  the  will  of  the  inhabitants."  Mr.  Chamberlain,  1881. 


SOUTH  AFRICA  TO  1896.  19 

a  racial  conflict  which  the  Convention  removed;  while  the  opponents  of  the 
Convention  have  deemed  it  a  proof  of  weakness,  a  loss  of  prestige,  and  a  direct 
cause  of  all  the  troubles  which  have  clouded  the  history  of  South  Africa  during 
the  last  twenty  years.1  There  is  much  to  be  said  for  either  view.  On  the  one 
hand,  England,  both  by  tradition  and  sympathy,  has  generally  protected  the 
rights  of  free  communities;  and  it  was  contrary  to  her  ideal  that  she  should 
annex  a  free  nation  against  the  declared  wishes  of  a  vast  majority  of  the  popula- 
tion. Four  facts,  which  confront  us  to-day,  support  the  practical  side  of  the 
"surrender"  policy:  the  extraordinary  strength  of  the  Boers  in  war,  the  support 
of  the  Orange  Free  State,  the  undisguised  sympathy  of  the  Cape  Dutch,  and  the 
difficulty  of  holding  a  vast  and  disaffected  district. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Loyalists  and  their  supporters  in  England  held  that 
England  had  forfeited  her  high  place  among  nations  by  submitting  to  the  dis- 
grace of  Majuba;  that  the  Boers  would  not  appreciate  a  policy  of  magnanimity; 
and  that  every  concession  would  increase  in  the  Boer  minds  the  sense  of  their 
own  importance  and  their  contempt  for  their  English  neighbours.  The  bitterness 
of  this  mortification  has  remained  to  the  present  day;  and  it  has  been  turned 
to  account  with  fatal  effect  by  the  South  African  Press  in  their  support  of  a 
policy  of  "firmness." 

It  is  the  duty  of  a  cool  observer  to  attempt  to  disentangle  facts  from  preju- 
dices, to  allow  sentiment  its  due  weight,  and  above  all  things  to  let  common 
sense  be  the  basis  of  decision.  That  the  policy  of  the  British  Government  was 
a  proof  of  its  weakness  is  scarcely  true.  It  is  too  often  assumed  that  the 
Ministry  did  not  think  of  negotiating  with  the  Boers  until  after  the  disaster  at 
Majuba,  and  that  the  policy  of  generosity  was  born  of  defeat.  This  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  facts.  The  fault  of  the  Gladstone  Ministry  was  that  it  accepted 
too  implicitly  the  assurances  of  Sir  Owen  Lanyon;  but  when  the  Boers  rose  in 
revolt  and  it  was  certain  that  the  Boers  were  in  earnest  in  their  desire  for  inde- 
pendence, the  Government  were  at  once  committed  by  their  pledges  at  the 
General  Election  to  a  policy  of  compromise.  Negotiations  had  begun  even 
before  Laing's  Nek,  and  the  negotiations  after  Majuba  were  not  the  beginning 
of  a  new  policy  but  the  continuation  of  an  old.  It  would  have  been  far  easier 
for  the  Ministers  to  continue  the  war,  to  yield  to  the  pressure  of  the  Loyalists 
in  Cape  Colony  and  of  the  war  party  at  home.  They  chose  the  more  difficult 
part,  and  the  one  which  would  almost  certainly  bring  upon  them  the  greater 
unpopularity.  On  the  whole,  it  seems  that  in  very  difficult  circumstances,  and 
where  the  wisest  could  scarcely  forecast  the  future,  they  arrived  at  the  more 
prudent  decision.  This  opinion  at  the  present  moment  may  be  an  unpopular 
one;  but  it  is  probable  that,  when  the  history  of  the  last  two  years  comes  to  be 
written,  our  embarrassments  will  justify  the  unwillingness  of  the  Gladstone 
Ministry  to  continue  a  policy  which  threatened  to  embroil  the  whole  of  South 
Africa. 

The  history  of  the  South  African  Republic  during  the  next  few  years  is 
chiefly  concerned  with  attempts  on  the  part  of  Boer  adventurers  to  enlarge 
the  territory  of  the  Transvaal  and  to  seek  an  outlet  to  the  sea — attempts  which 
were  in  every  case  successfully  opposed  by  the  British  authorities.  It  was  held 
to  be  necessary  that  the  Transvaal  should  not  be  permitted  to  annex  territory 
which  might  give  her  a  seaport  and  enable  her,  in  union  with  a  European 
Power,  to  become  a  serious  menace  to  British  interests. 

In  1884  a  deputation  of  Boers  came- to  London  to  secure  a  modification  of 
the  Convention  of  1881.  Their  representations  were  successful;  and  Lord 
Derby,  the  Colonial  Secretary,  drew  up,  in  concert  with  them,  a  new  Convention 
which  is  known  as   the  Convention  of   London  of    1884.     In    this    treaty  the 

1  It  is  instructive  to  remember  that  the  repeal  of  the  Stamp  Act  was  regarded  by  the 
foolish  counsellors  of  George  III.  as  a  cause  of  the  American  rebellion. 


20  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

Articles  of  the  Convention  of  1881  were  replaced  by  a  new  set  of  Articles,  in 
which  the  declaration  of  the  control  of  Great  Britain  was  considerably  modified. 

The  most  important  point,  and  the  one  which  bears  most  directly  upon  the 
diplomacy  precedent  to  the  present  war,  is  the  omission  of  the  word 
"Suzerainty"  which  appeared  in  the  preamble  to  the  Convention  of  1881.  It  is 
certain  that  Lord  Derby  absolutely  omitted  that  preamble  and  replaced  it  by  a 
new  preamble.  In  the  draft  of  the  Convention  which  is  now  in  the  possession 
of  the  Transvaal  Government,  and  a  facsimile  of  which  was  printed  in  a 
despatch  from  the  State  Secretary,  Lord  Derby's  ipsissima  verba  are  quoted. 
He  says  that  the  preamble  of  1881,  being  enclosed  "within  a  black  line,"  is 
proposed  to  be  omitted.  Moreover,  the  following  words  in  the  preamble  of 
1881,  "subject  to  the  Suzerainty  of  Her  Majesty,  her  heirs,  and  successors," 
have  been  crossed  through  by  Lord  Derby's  pen.1  This  evidence  is  clear,  and  it 
seems  to  be  an  unanswerable  refutation  of  Mr.  Chamberlain's  argument,  in  his 
despatch  of  October,  1897,  that  Her  Majesty's  Suzerainty  still  existed,  and  that 
it  justified  the  action  of  Great  Britain  and  her  refusal  to  submit  the  questions  at 
issue  to  arbitration.  It  is  necessary  to  lay  stress  on  this  matter,  for  a  study  of 
the  despatches  will  make  it  quite  plain  that  the  claim  of  Suzerainty  and  the 
consequent  fear  and  suspicion  which  such  a  claim  engendered  among  the  Boers 
were  a  powerful  obstacle  in  the  path  of  a  friendly  compromise,  and  of  a  peaceful 
issue  to  the  negotiations. 

In  1885  occurred  an  event  of  cardinal  importance  in  the  history  of  South 
Africa.  The  gold  beds  of  the  Witwatersrand  were  discovered,  and  the  immigra- 
tion of  aliens  made  enormous  strides.  Within  ten  years  from  this  date  there 
were  nearly  one  hundred  thousand  men,  women,  and  children  of  European  or 
American  birth  at  Johannesburg  and  other  mining  towns,  while  the  Boers — 
men,  women,  and  children — hardly  numbered  seventy  thousand  souls.'  An 
influx  so  overwhelming  was  not  welcome  to  President  Kruger  and  to  the  ruling 
class,  while  the  pastoral  Boers  looked  upon  the  new-comers  with  undisguised 
dislike.  They  were  men  of  various  nationalities,  -  shrewd,  keen,  and  pushing. 
It  would  be  extravagant  to  expect  a  high  code  of  social  or  financial  morality 
among  the  inhabitants  of  a  new  mining  town;  and  the  men  who  were  fast 
making  of  Johannesburg  the  greatest  and  richest  town  of  South  Africa  were,  it 
must  be  allowed,  a  somewhat  motley  crew.  The  greater  number  of  them  were 
British  subjects,  a  fact  which  in  itself  was  sufficient  to  alarm  the  Boers,  while 
those  who  came  from  other  countries  were  in  many  cases  men  of  questionable 
antecedents.  Those  of  the  new-comers  who  seemed  likely  to  gain  the  greatest 
influence  and  the  greatest  wealth  were  Jews.  The  Boers  quickly  found  that 
their  officials  and  the  members  of  their  parliamentary  assembly  were  being  cor- 
rupted by  the  money  of  the  new-comers,  and  they  viewed  with  alarm  the  time 
when  the  aliens  should  secure  the  franchise  and  completely  outvote  the  old 
citizens  of  the  Transvaal.  They  could  not  prevent  or  delay  immigration,  and 
they  took  in  self-defence  the  only  step  which  seeemd  to  them  possible.  Altera- 
tions were  made  in  the  franchise,  and  the  term  of  years  which  had  been  neces- 
sary to  qualify  for  this  franchise  was  gradually  extended  until  it  was  impossible 
for  a  stranger  to  acquire  the  full  rights  of  citizenship  before  he  had  been  in  the 
country  fourteen  years.  The  inevitable  results  followed.  The  Outlanders,  as 
they  were  called,  resented  a  legislation  which  was  obviously  aimed  at  them,  and 
they  were  irritated  by  a  number  of  vexatious  restrictions  and  petty  grievances, 
of  which,  though  the  individual  item  might  be  small,  the  aggregate  effect  was 
serious. 

1  See  the  reduced  facsimile  of  the  alterations. 

1  According  to  the  census  of  1890 — imperfect,  but  the  chief  source  of  knowledge — the 
white  population  of  the  whole  Republic  then  was  only  119,128,  of  whom  66,498  were  men,  and 
52,630  women.  Johannesburg  had  only  70,000 — i.  e.,  men,  women,  and  children.  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain puts  it  at  that  figure  in  a  despatch  of  January  15,  1896. 


SOUTH  AFRICA  TO  1896.  21 

Though  the  limitation  of  the  franchise  was  in  no  way  a  contravention  of 
the  Articles  of  the  Convention,1  it  was  an  unfortunate  policy,  and  the  President 
would  have  been  better  advised  if  he  had  allowed  the  inhabitants  of  Johannes- 
burg to  elect  some  members  to  the  Volksraad.  It  is  not  difficult,  however, 
to  appreciate  the  reluctance  of  the  Boers  to  admit  new-comers  to  the  franchise. 
They  distrusted  the  English,  who  had  conquered  their  ancestors  and  driven 
them  out  into  the  wilderness,  who  had  annexed  their  country  and  had  closed 
them  in  from  the  sea.  They  believed,  and  honestly  believed,  that  England 
was  on  the  watch  to  absorb  the  Transvaal  Republic,  and  they  were  unwilling 
that  it  should  be  absorbed  either  by  arms  or  by  the  slower  but  no  less  sure 
process  of  legislation. 

The  difficulties  of  the  situation  increased,  and  the  leaders  of  the  mining 
industry,  for  the  most  part  rich  German  Jews,  endeavoured  to  secure  by  bribes 
that  which  they  could  not  secure  by  constitutional  methods.  Transvaal  officials 
were  corrupted,  and  the  natural  slowness  of  a  primitive  community  to  effect 
reforms  in  sanitation  and  changes  in  its  laws  was  sought  to  be  overcome  by 
financial  pressure  of  all  kinds.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  reform  after  reform  was  car- 
ried; and  it  has  been  avowed  by  many  Outlanders  that  the  Transvaal  laws  for  the 
control  of  natives  were  substantially  in  the  interest  of  the  mine-owners,  and  that 
the  much-debated  liquor  law  was,  on  the  whole,  as  well  worked  during  the  last 
two  years  as  the  difficult  circumstances  permitted.  But  other  grievances  of 
various  sorts  remained.  The  Outlanders  complained  of  heavy  taxes,  of  the 
dynamite  monopoly,  of  the  unjust  railway  charges,  and  of  a  system  of  State 
education  which  made  inadequate  provision  for  the  teaching  of  the  English 
language.2 

The  agitation  was  at  first  confined  to  the  middle  class  of  the  Outlanders,  nor 
did  the  great  capitalists,  until  1895,  take  any  open  part  in  it;  while  it  is  doubtful 
whether  the  English  miners  ever  felt  any  enthusiasm  for  the  franchise  or  much 
resentment  against  their  Boer  rulers.  In  1895,  however,  the  leaders  of  the 
mining  industry  began  to  be  alarmed  by  the  growth  of  a  movement  which  was 
causing  a  dangerous  unrest  in  their  industry.  The  rapid  increase  of  mining 
profits  and  the  growing  hope  that  the  future  would  disclose  even  greater  sources 
of  wealth,  induced  them  to  throw  in  their  lot  with  the  agitators,  to  endeavour 
to  reduce  the  burden  of  taxation,  and  particularly  to  secure  such  regulations  for 
the  control  of  native  labour  as  would  ensure  both  a  plentiful  supply  and  a  lower 
rate  of  payment.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  the  second  reform  was  in  the  eves  of  the 
capitalists  far  more  important  than  the  other,  and  it  is  natural  that  this  should 
be  so.  It  was  calculated  that  by  a  judicious  application  of  force  the  natives 
might  be  obliged  to  work  for  such  low  wages  as  to  increase  the  profits  of  one 
of  the  great  companies  by  at  least  two  millions  a  year. 

The  mine-owners  took  advantage  of  the  growing  quarrel  between  England 
and  the  Transvaal  to  urge  upon  the  English  Ministry  the  necessity  of  an 
unyielding  attitude.  Their  motives  were  obviously  and  naturally  selfish.  Their 
only  ambition,  in  a  word,  was  to  increase  the  profits  of  the  mines.  The  leader 
of  the  financial  group  said  openly  that  he  "did  not  care  a  fig"  for  the  franchise. 
Mr.  Hays  Hammand's  utterance  in  London  on  November  18,  1899,  is 
significant,"  and  Mr.  Rudd,  a  colleague  of  the  above  gentleman,  took  no  pains 

'As  to  this,  it  has  to  be  noted  that  a  new  franchise  law,  effecting  a  restraint,  was  passed 
as  early  as  1882,  under  the  first  Convention,  and  that  no  objection  was  ever  made  to  this 
by  the  "Suzerain"  power. 

1  No  English  children  were  forced  to  be  taught  in  the  Dutch  language. 

*  "There  are  in  South  Africa  millions  of  Kaffirs,  and  it  does  seem  preposterous  that  we 
are  not  able  to  obtain  70,000  or  80,000  Kaffirs  to  work  upon  the  mines.  .  .  .  With  good 
government  there  should  be  an  abundance  of  labour,  and  with  an  abundance  of  labour  then 
will  'be  no  difficulty  in  cutting  down  wages,  because  it  is  preposterous  to  pay  a  Kaffir  the 
present  wages.     He  would  be  quite  as  well  satisfied — in  fact,  he  would  work  longer — if  you 


22  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

to  conceal  the  policy  of  the  capitalists,  a  policy  which  was  practically  a  system 
of  slavery.1 

We  may,  therefore,  without  injustice,  regard  the  wages  question  as  the 
most  powerful  motive  of  an  agitation  which  involved  the  Transvaal  in  the 
calamity  of  the  Jameson  Raid  in  1896  and  in  the  South  African  War  of  1899. 

The  leaders  of  the  capitalist  party  had  intimate  relations  with  Mr.  Cecil 
Rhodes,  who  was  Prime  Minister  of  Cape  Colony,  Managing  Director  of  the 
British  South  Africa  Company,  and  a  Director  and  a  large  shareholder  of  one 
of  the  great  mining  and  finance  companies  of  the  Rand.  Mr.  Rhodes  was 
apparently  encouraged  by  many  Imperial  officers  in  South  Africa,  and,  it  has 
been  persistently  stated,  by  the  English  Colonial  Office.  He  obtained  permission 
from  the  Colonial  Secretary  to  incorporate  a  corner  of  Bechuanaland  into  the 
territory  of  the  Chartered  Company;  and  this  position  was  chosen  as  the  head- 
quarters of  a  body  of  troops  raised  by  the  Company  and  under  the  command  of 
English  regular  officers. 

It  was  arranged  that  the  capitalists  should  gather  together  and  arm  a  force 
of  volunteers  in  Johannesburg,  and  that  on  the  ground  of  a  possible  danger  to 
the  peaceful  inhabitants  an  invitation  should  be  sent  to  the  Imperial  troops.  A 
particularly  nauseous  element  in  the  conspiracy  was  the  concoction  of  a  letter 
some  weeks  before  the  proposed  outbreak,  signed  by  the  principal  conspirators, 
imploring  help  for  the  sake  of  the  defenceless  women  and  children.  This  letter, 
cunningly  calculated  to  appeal  to  the  credulity  and  pity  of  the  English  public, 
was  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  leader  of  the  Imperial  troops  to  be  dated  and 
published  when  occasion  should  serve.  A  touch  of  comedy  was  given  to  the 
tragic  event  by  its  premature  publication  in  an  English  paper.  On  a  given  day 
the  English  troops  were  to  start  from  Pitsani,  ride  rapidly  across  the  Transvaal, 
and  arrive  at  Johannesburg  at  the  moment  when  the  Outlanders  had  arisen  in 
rebellion.  A  coup  d'etat  would  then  be  effected,  the  Boer  oligarchy  would  be 
taken  by  surprise,  and  the  conspiracy  would  meet  with  immediate  success. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  relate  the  circumstances  which  led  to  a  ludicrous  but 
well-deserved  fiasco — how  the  troops  started  before  the  Outlanders  were  ready: 
how  they  were  met  at  Krugersdorp  by  a  small  body  of  Boers,  defeated  in  a  few 
hours,  and  taken  prisoners;  how  the  Outlanders,  who  had  little  courage  and  no 
discipline  and  were  torn  by  internal  dissension,  were  forced  to  surrender 
their  arms. 

Their  leaders  were  arrested,  tried,  convicted  of  treason  and  sentenced  to 
very  moderate  punishment;  while  the  troopers  themselves,  by  the  exercise  of  a 
clemency  on  the  part  of  the  Boer  President  no  less  magnanimous  than  diplo- 
matic, were  handed  over  to  the  English  authorities  on  the  understanding  that 
they  should  receive  a  trial  and  the  proper  punishment  for  their  misconduct. 
They  were  conveyed  to  England,  and  after  a  trial  the  rank  and  file  were  acquitted 
and  the  officers  sentenced  to  short  terms  of  easy  imprisonment  from  which  they 
were  soon  relieved.  The  sympathy  of  the  public  with  the  ill-starred  expedition 
made  it  practically  impossible  for  the  Government  to  impose  any  other  than  a 
nominal  penalty.  An  inquiry  into  the  origin  and  conduct  of  the  Jameson  Raid 
was  made  by  the  Cape  Parliament,  and  it  was  proved  that  Mr.  Rhodes,  in  spite 
of  his  position  as  Prime  Minister  of  Cape  Colony,  had,  without  the  knowledge 

gave  him  half  the  amount.  His  wages  are  altogether  disproportionate  to  his  requirements." 
1  "If  they  could  only  get  one-half  the  natives  to  work  three  months  of  the  year,  it  would 
work  wonders.  He  was  not  pleading  for  the  mines,  or  urging  the  views  of  capitalists,  but 
from  the  point  of  view  of  progress,  agriculture,  public  works,  mines,  and  the  general  pros- 
perity of  the  country.  They  should  try  some  cogent  form  of  inducement  or  practically 
compel  the  native,  through  taxation  or  in  some  other  way,  to  contribute  his  quota  to  the 
good  of  the  community,  and  to  a  certain  extent  he  would  then  have  to  work.  ...  If 
under  the  cry  of  civilisation  we  in  Egypt  lately  mowed  down  10,000  or  20,000  Dervishes  with 
Maxims,  surely  it  cannot  be  considered  a  hardship  to  compel  the  natives  in  South  Africa 
to  give  three  months  in  the  year  to  do  a  little  honest  work." 


SOUTH  AFRICA  TO  1896.  23 

of  his  colleagues,  made  arrangements  for  the  invasion  of  a  friendly  country. 
Another  inquiry  was  instituted  by  the  British  Parliament,  but  little  new 
evidence  was  discovered;  and  various  documents,  which  might  have  thrown 
light  on  the  movements  of  the  organisers  of  the  Raid,  were  withheld  in  spite  of 
the  protests  of  some  of  the  members  of  the  Parliamentary  Committee. 

The  result  of  the  inquiry  was  profoundly  unsatisfactory.  It  was  felt  by 
every  one  that  facts  of  supreme  importance  were  hidden  from  sight ;  and  dissat- 
isfaction was  increased  when  Mr.  Chamberlain,  who  had  concurred  in  the 
condemnation  of  Mr.  Rhodes's  treachery,  rose  in  the  House  of  Commons  to 
deliver  a  eulogy  on  that  gentleman  which  was  inconsistent  with  the  verdict  of 
the  Committee  and  was  apparently  unnecessary. 

It  was  asserted  at  the  time,  and  the  assertion  has  been  persistently  repeated, 
that  the  Jameson  Raid  was  arranged  with  the  cognisance  of  some  of  the  officials 
of  the  Colonial  Office1  and  not  without  the  support  and  sympathy  of  august 
members  of  English  society.  It  was  stated  that  Mr.  Rhodes's  friends  had 
threatened  to  make  known  the  complicity  of  the  Colonial  Office  unless  Mr. 
Chamberlain  consented  to  whitewash  Mr.  Rhodes  in  the  House  of  Commons 
and  to  reinstate  him  in  the  position  which  he  formerly  occupied  in  the  regard 
of  the  British  public.  It  is  impossible  to  separate  facts  from  fiction  in  a 
mystery  so  dark;  but  one  thing  is  certain.  There  was  a  secret  which  it  was 
deemed  impolitic  to  expose,  and  its  concealment  had  the  worst  possible  effect 
in  increasing  the  suspicion  and  resentment  of  the  Transvaal  people. 

Probably  no  event  has  ever  wrought  such  mischief  in  South  Africa  as  the 
Jameson  Raid  of  1896.  Its  immediate  effect  was  the  fall  of  Mr.  Rhodes  from 
power,  the  resignation  of  his  English  Ministry,  and  the  alienation  of  Dutch 
support  and  sentiment.  For  some  years  previous  to  this  event  the  two  races 
had  been  slowly  but  surely  drawing  together,2  and  Mr.  Rhodes,  with  a  prudence 
and  a  tact  which  his  subsequent  error  throws  into  strong  relief,  had  taken  every 
means  to  conciliate  the  Dutch  and  to  secure  the  support  of  the  Afrikander  Bond 
to  his  political  measures.  English  and  Dutch,  though  still  in  some  measure 
distinguished  by  differences  of  temperament,  arising  out  of  different  modes  of 
life,  were  learning  to  respect  one  another,  and  most  observers  thought  it  not 
too  sanguine  to  look  forward  to  the  time  when  the  races  would  be  united  in 
common  political  aims  and  would  consent  to  work  together  for  the  prosperity 
of  South  Africa.  In  a  moment  the  whole  edifice  of  conciliation  was  cast  to  the 
ground;  and  like  a  storm  from  a  summer  sky,  the  sinister  episode  of  the  Raid 
fell  upon  a  quiet  land.  Every  bitter  suspicion,  every  fear,  every  feeling  of 
jealousy,  which  the  events  of  the  last  few  years  had  apparently  laid  to  rest,  was 
reawakened  in  Cape  Colony. 

The  Orange  Free  State,  which  had  for  some  time  consistently  urged  reforms 
upon  President  Kruger,  and  which  was  before  this  date  more  in  sympathy  with 
the  progressive  policy  of  Cape  Colony  than  with  the  policy  of  the  Transvaal 
Ministry,  put  aside  all  its  hesitation  and  concluded  a  defensive  alliance  with  the 
State  which  had  been  so  treacherously  invaded.  In  the  Transvaal  the  Progres- 
sive party,  which  had  long  advocated  the  adoption  of  moderate  reforms,  was 
silenced  by  the  unwarrantable  attack  on  the  liberties  of  their  State.  Mr. 
Kruger  believed,  and  the  majority  of  the  burghers  were  of  his  opinion,  that  the 
Jameson  Raid  was  the  indirect,  if  not  the  direct,  outcome  of  British  policy. 
He  saw  in  it  the  preliminary  to  a  stronger  and  more  dangerous  onslaught,  and 
he  determined  that,  come  what  might,  any  future  attack  should  find  the  Boers 
united,  ready  and  strong.     Fortifications  were  built,  immense  quantities  of  arms 

1  Miss  Flora  Shaw's  evidence  at  the  inquiry  apparently  favours  this  theory. 
'This  is  admitted  by  Mr.  Fitzpatrick,  ed.  cited,  p.  48. 


24  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

were  imported,  and  from  the  beginning  of  1896  till  the  declaration  of  war  in 
1899  the  Transvaal  was  arming  with  quiet  determination.1 

It  cannot  be  denied  that  such  preparations  were  both  prudent  and  reason- 
able. The  Boers  were  justified  in  their  suspicion,  for  no  impartial  man  who 
remembers  that  the  Jameson  Raid  was  organised  by  the  Prime  Minister  of  an 
English  colony;  that  Imperial  officials  of  high  rank  in  South  Africa  were  directly 
implicated;  that  the  troopers  of  the  Chartered  Company  were  under  English 
regular  officers,  and  had  encamped  on  land  which  had  been  granted  by  the 
Colonial  Office  to  Mr.  Rhodes  for  this  special  purpose;  that  the  good-will,  if  not 
the  collusion,  of  the  Colonial  Office  had  been  secured;  that  the  troopers  haa 
been  pardoned  and  the  officers  had  been  punished  with  nominal  penalties;  that 
the  instigator  of  the  conspiracy  had  been  welcomed  with  effusion  by  English 
society  and  defended  with  unction  from  his  place  in  Parliament  by  the  Colonial 
Secretary — no  reasonable  man  can  deny  that  a  chain  of  circumstances  so  strong 
must  inevitably  engender  in  the  minds  of  the  Boers  the  fear  that  England  had 
designs  upon  their  independence.  That  this  fear  was  much  exaggerated  is  true. 
The  British  Government,  as  a  whole,  had  no  wish  to  attack  the  independence 
of  the  Transvaal;  but  that  Mr.  Rhodes  and  the  English  in  South  Africa,  sup- 
ported by  a  powerful  body  of  opinion  in  England,  were  watching  the  opportu- 
nity to  annex  to  the  Empire  the  Transvaal  with  its  gold  mines,  is  equally  true. 

Thus  the  two  powerful  and  fatal  motives  of  hatred  and  suspicion  were  at 
work;  and  every  advance  or  proposal  made  by  the  British  Government  was 
regarded  by  the  Transvaal  rulers  as  either  a  piece  of  hypocrisy  or  a  veiled 
attempt  upon  their  independence.  These  suspicions  proved  the  most  potent 
cause  of  the  misunderstandings  which  have  borne  their  fruit  in  the  war  of  1899. 

1  Some  arming  there  was  shortly  before  the  Raid,  the  "Drifts"  question  having  had  a 
serious  aspect,  and  the  Boer  Executive  having  reason  to  apprehend  some  outbreak;  but  the 
main  process  of  armament  occurred  later.  See  p.  32  and  p.  45.  See  also  Mr.  Fitzpatrick's 
final  admissions,  "The  Transvaal  from  Within,"  p.  98. 


CHAPTER   III. 

SOUTH   AFRICA,    1896-1899. 

IN  1896  the  horizon  seemed  to  be  clearing.  In  Cape  Colony  the  only  serious 
point  at  issue  between  the  Dutch  and  the  Ministry  in  England  was  the  atti- 
tude of  Great  Britain  towards  the  two  Republics.  On  all  other  points  the 
Dutch  were  devoted  subjects  and  good  friends;  and  the  future  of  Cape  Colony 
and  South  Africa  depended  entirely  on  the  willingness  of  the  English  Ministry 
to  take  up  a  conciliatory  attitude  towards  the  Transvaal,  and  to  avoid  every 
suspicion  of  an  encroachment  on  its  rights.  The  Dutch  saw  that  the  Loyalists 
in  South  Africa  were  open  advocates  of  a  coercive  policy  which  might  lead  to 
annexation,  and  they  were  suspicious  of  the  attitude  of  the  English  officials; 
but,  though  the  Colonial  Secretary  was  in  no  favour,  they  had  complete  con- 
fidence in  the  noble  character  of  the  Queen  and  in  the  honour  of  the  English 
Ministry  as  a  whole. 

The  situation  of  the  English  Ministers  was  a  difficult  one.  It  was  believed, 
and  honestly  believed,  that  the  Transvaal  was  too  weak  to  resist  pressure  con- 
tinuously and  firmly  applied;  and  Mr.  Chamberlain  determined  that,  though  it 
would  be  injudicious  and  ungracious1  at  such  a  moment  to  insist  on  a  reorganisa- 
tion of  Transvaal  methods,  he  would  lose  no  opportunity  of  pressing  reforms  on 
the  Boers.  Lord  Rosmead  retired  in  1896,  and  with  the  cordial  approval  of 
both  political  parties  in  England,  the  Colonial  Secretary  appointed  Sir  Alfred 
Milner  to  be  Governor-General  of  Cape  Colony  and  High  Commissioner  of 
South  Africa. 

It  is  not  known,  and  it  probably  never  will  be  known,  what  instructions 
were  given  to  the  new  Governor-General.  He  was  probably  instructed  to 
acquaint  himself  with  the  salient  facts  of  the  situation,  to  find  out  how  strong 
were  the  feelings  of  the  Loyalists,  and  how  far  the  English  Government  could 
safely  go  on  a  path  of  coercion.  He  was  probably  told  that  it  was  time  now  for 
the  English  Government  to  cease  from  ineffectual  criticism  and  protest,  and  to 
take  its  stand  on  its  rights  under  the  Convention  as  the  paramount  power  in 
South  Africa. 

In  the  Transvaal  the  storm  had  apparently  subsided.  The  failure  of  the 
Johannesburg  conspiracy  and  the  punishment  inflicted  on  the  ringleaders  pre- 
vented for  some  time  any  further  extension  of  the  capitalist  agitation.  But 
fierce  fires  were  burning  under  the  quiet  surface.  The  financiers  who  controlled 
the  gold  mines  of  the  Rand  were  not  inclined  to  overlook  any  means  which 
might  make  their  industry  more  profitable.  Armed  conspiracy  had  proved  a 
dangerous  method,  and  they  now  turned  to  two  other  courses,  which  were  in 
the  end  fatal  to  peace.  They  determined  to  secure  the  support  of  the  South 
African  Press  and  with  it  of  the  English  Press,  and  to  obtain  the  sympathy  and 
influence  of  the  new  Governor-General  of  Cape  Colony,  and,  through  him,  of  the 
English  Ministry. 

The  financial  leaders  of  Johannesburg  were  men  not  only  of  considerable 
business  capacity:  they  were  absolutely  unscrupulous.  They  were  determined 
to  gain  their  ends  by  any  means  within  their  power,  and,  though  it  would  be 

*  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Mr.  Chamberlain  cabled  to  Sir  H.  Robinson  (Lord  Rosmead)  on 
January  7,  1896,  that  the  Ministry  were  considering  the  advisability  of  sending  considerable 
forces  to  South  Africa. 


26  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

ungenerous  to  accuse  them  of  indifference  to  the  loss  of  thousands  of  human 
lives,  it  is  certainly  true  to  say  that  the  risk  of  a  terrible  war  did  not  affect  their 
calculations.  Most  of  them  were  cosmopolitan  financiers,  and,  being  men  of  no 
country,  it  was  natural  that  they  should  not  regard  with  much  compunction  the 
risk  of  a  war  which  might  involve  the  ruin  of  the  whole  of  South  Africa,  and 
might  plunge  England  into  a  struggle,  the  end  of  which  no  one  could  foresee. 

The  control  of  the  South  African  Press  gave  the  capitalists  an  enormous 
advantage.  It  was  the  policy  of  Mr.  Rhodes  and  the  Rand  leaders  to  buy  -up  the 
established  newspapers  in  Cape  Colony,  Natal,  and  the  Transvaal,  or  to  found 
others,  in  order  that  their  political  views  might  be  promulgated.  Editors  were 
appointed  and  instructed  to  press  for  reforms,  especially  for  the  removal  of  the 
present  burden  of  taxation  and  for  the  better  regulation  of  native  labour.  In 
order  that  these  demands  might  be  supported  and  that  the  public  both  in  Eng- 
land and  in  South  Africa  might  be  informed  of  the  enormities  of  the  Transvaal 
Government,  every  grievance  was  exaggerated,  and  petty  acts  of  misconduct 
on  the  part  of  the  Boers  were  magnified  into  gross  outrages  on  British  subjects. 
It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  during  the  nine  months  before  the  outbreak  of 
the  war  the  South  African  Press  became  a  manufactory  of  outrages.  No  story 
was  too  absurd  or  too  improbable  to  be  printed  with  an  appropriate  com- 
mentary; and  passions  were  excited  to  a  dangerous  point. 

It  is  also  to  be  noticed  that  the  editors  of  the  newspapers  owned  by  the 
capitalists  were  in  many  cases  the  South  African  correspondents  of  the  great 
London  newspapers.  Each  outrage,  therefore,  served  a  double  purpose.  It 
inflamed  public  opinion  in  South  Africa,  and  it  was  telegraphed  over,  with 
indignant  protests,  by  the  South  African  editors  to  the  English  Press,  where 
its  recital  prepared  the  minds  of  the  public  for  Mr.  Chamberlain's  diplomacy. 

The  next  development  of  the  situation  was  the  successful  attempt  of  the 
mining  leaders  to  secure  the  adhesion  of  the  Imperial  officials  in  Cape  Colony. 
In  many  cases  such  support  had  been  long  secured.  There  is  probably  no  country 
in  the  world  in  which  "influence"  plays  so  powerful  a  part  as  in  South  Africa. 
The  natural  instinct  of  loyalty  and  nationality,  the  resentful  memory,  still  acute, 
of  the  "surrender"  of  1881,  and  the  social  power  which  can  be  exerted  by  rich 
men  who  will  allow  no  obstacle  to  frustrate  their  ambitions,  were  sufficient  to 
predispose  the  English  officials  in  favour  of  the  demands  of  the  capitalists.  The 
latter  were  able  to  employ  all  the  arguments  of  patriotism  to  support  the  claims 
of  finance.  They  painted  in  strong  colours  the  intolerable  grievances  of  the 
Outlanders,  the  growing  contempt  of  the  Boers,  the  dangerous  unrest  of  the 
Transvaal,  which  would  certainly  bring  in  its  train  a  corresponding  disquietude 
in  the  surrounding  colonies.  Their  editors  pictured  an  England  of  waning  pres- 
tige, flouted  by  a  Dutch  Republic  of  100,000  souls,  and  exposed  to  the  jeers  of  a, 
scornful  world. 

The  negotiations  which  had  been  passing  between  Mr.  Chamberlain  and 
the  Boer  Government  since  the  Jameson  Raid  had  therefore  little  practical 
result.  Suspicion  and  misunderstanding  were  rife  on  both  sides.  In  1897  the 
Colonial  Secretary  made  a  false  step  which  had  the  most  fatal  results.  In 
answer  to  a  despatch  from  the  Transvaal  Government,  offering  to  submit  the 
various  points  at  issue  to  arbitration,  he  claimed  that  it  was  impossible  that  a 
Suzerain  Power  should  submit  to  arbitration  matters  at  issue  between  herself 
and  her  vassal.1  To  those  who  remember  the  negotiations'  which  preceded 
the  annulment  of  the  Convention  of  1881  in  favour  of  the  Convention  of  1884, 
the  general  claim  of  Suzerainty  must  appear  preposterous,  and  it  is  difficult  to 
understand  by  what  arguments  Mr.  Chamberlain  could  justify  the  assertion  of 
such  a  claim.     Nothing  can  be  clearer  than  that  Lord  Derby  cancelled  the 

'Bluebook  C.  8,721,  No.  7,  October,  1897. 
*  See  Note,  pp.  19-20. 


SOUTH  AFRICA,  1896-1899.  27 

preamble  of  1881  in  which  the  statement  of  Suzerainty  occurred.  The  word 
itself  was  crossed  through  by  his  pen,  and  the  whole  preamble  was  definitely 
omitted.  For  Mr.  Chamberlain  to  reclaim  Suzerainty  in  the  face  of  such 
evidence  of  its  withdrawal  was  to  convict  himself  either  of  ignorance  or  of  insin- 
cerity. It  was,  as  Sir  Edward  Clarke  declared,  a  claim  "made  in  defiance  of 
fact,  and  a  breach  of  national  faith." 

Driven  from  this  position,  Mr.  Chamberlain  claimed  that  Suzerainty  was. 
though  not  mentioned  in  the  Convention  of  1884,  carried  over  from  the  Conven- 
tion of  1881  into  the  second  Convention.  Such  a  claim. can  be  justified  only  by 
a  quibble  which  to  the  ordinary  mind  seems  not  only  foolish  but  dishonest. 
Even  if  the  claim  of  Suzerainty  could  be  sustained,  it  is  guite  clear 
that  such  Suzerainty  related  only  to  the  power  of  the  Republic 
to  make  treaties  with  foreign  nations,  and  that  its  power  is  limited  by  the  fourth 
article  of  the  second  Convention.  Even  if  the  word  "Suzerainty"  had  occurred 
in  the  preamble  of  the  second  Convention  (and  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  was  care- 
fully eliminated  by  Lord  Derby),  its  use  would  have  afforded  no  justification 
for  any  interference  with  the  internal  politics  and  arrangements  of  the  Trans- 
vaal, and  the  British  Government  in  several  despatches  expressed  their  opinion 
that  it  possessed  no  such  right.1 

The  Colonial  Secretary,  finding  that  the  assertion  of  this  claim  had  pro- 
duced a  most  unfortunate  effect,  and  finding  also  that  it  was  impossible  to 
sustain  it  in  international  law,  did  not  press  it.  But  the  effect  remained,  and  it 
was  to  the  Boers  another  proof  of  the  intention  of  the  English  Ministry  to 
interfere  with  their  Government  and  to  undermine  their  independence. 

For  some  time  the  public  heard  little  of  the  new  Governor-General,  and 
it  was  hoped  that  the  grievances  of  the  Outlanders  and  the  suspicions  of  the 
Boers  were  being  allayed  by  mutual  consideration.  Sir  Alfred  Milner,  to  whom 
the  friends  of  peace  looked  with  eager  hopes,  returned  to  England  in  1898,  and 
his  interviews  with  Mr.  Chamberlain  evidently  resulted  in  instructions  from  the 
British  Government  to  take  strong  measures  and  to  insist  with  firmness  and,  if 
necessary,  with  menace,  on  the  removal  of  grievances  and  the  necessity  of 
reform.  When  Sir  Alfred  Milner  returned  to  South  Africa  it  was  easy  to  see 
that  his  new  instructions  were  likely  to  be  carried  out  to  the  letter.  He  seemed 
like  a  man  determined  to  provoke  a  quarrel.  His  attitude  to  the  Dutch  in  Cape 
Colony  became  critical  and  even  unfriendly.*  Soon  he  threw  himself,  without 
reserve,  into  the  arms  of  the  Loyalist  party.  He  listened  to  their  advice,  and 
in  his  despatches  quoted  their  journals  as  oracles  of  colonial  wisdom.  He 
eagerly  snatched  at  the  tittle-tattle  of  officials  and  Loyalists,  and  embodied  their 
gossip  in  his  letters  to  the  Colonial  Office.  Sir  Alfred  Milner's  "diplomatic" 
correspondence  with  the  Transvaal  Ministry  was  becoming  more  embittered, 
and  in  the  beginning  of  1899  the  situation  was  evidently  one  of  tension  and 
growing  danger.  On  the  one  hand,  the  Cape  Dutch  resented  the  partisan 
attitude  of  the  Governor-General,  while  the  Transvaal  Boers  held  firmly  to  the 
belief  that  he  was,  in  conjunction  with  the  capitalist  conspirators  of  Johannes- 
burg, preparing  new  methods  of  sapping  the  independence  of  the  Transvaal. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  English  in  Johannesburg  were  humiliated  by  the  failure 
of  the  Jameson  Raid,  and  irritated  by  the  non-removal  of  their  grievances;  while 
the   Loyalists   in    Cape  Colony  and    Natal,  moved   by   sympathy   with  fellow- 

1  See  Mr.  Chamberlain's  express  statements  in  his  speeches  of  February  13  and  April  12, 
1896.  Even  under  the  first  Convention  Lord  Kimberley  declared  that  "entire  freedom  of 
action  will  be  accorded  to  the  Transvaal  Government"  apart  from  the  rights  "expressly 
reserved  to  the  Suzerain  power." 

*  Comp.  the  letter  of  the  Cape  Town  correspondent  of  the  Daily  Chronicle,  published 
July  27,  1899,  and  the  statement  by  Mr.  James  Molteno,  M.L.A.,  as  to  Sir  Alfred's  avowed 
determination  to  "break  the  dominion  of  Afrikanderdom."  These  words  the  Governor  has 
officially  repudiated,  but  they  express  his  clear  and  declared  policy. 


28  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

Englishmen,  suspicious  of  Dutch  ambitions,  and  maddened  by  the  ferocious 
incitements  of  the  capitalist  newspapers,  were  urging  Sir  Alfred  Milner  to  make 
fresh  and  stronger  demands.  They  assured  him  and  the  English  Ministry  that 
the  Boers  had  become  lazy  and  effete,  that  their  military  system  was  antiquated 
and  useless,  that  their  older  men  had  forgotten  and  their  younger  men  did  not 
know  how  to  handle  the  rifle.  The  Boers,  they  repeated,  would  yield  to 
pressure,  and  certainly  to  a  display  of  force.  They  were  cowards  and  corrupt, 
and  at  the  firm  touch  of  Mr.  Chamberlain's  hand  the  whole  rotten  edifice  of 
Transvaal  misgovernment  would  fall  to  the  ground. 

At  the  beginning  of  1899  Sir  Alfred  Milner  had  openly  undertaken  the  cham- 
pionship of  the  Outlanders,  and  in  March  a  petition  was  presented  to  the  Queen, 
through  him,  signed  by  over  21,000  British  residents,  reciting  their  grievances 
<and  praying  Her  Majesty  to  intervene  for  their  removal.  A  counter-petition, 
signed  by  as  many  Outlanders,  expressing  themselves  satisfied  with  their  position, 
was  presented  to  the  Transvaal  Government.  Probably  a  large  number  of  signa- 
tures were  obtained  on  either  side  by  bribery,  and  it  would  be  wise  not  to  attach 
decisive  importance  to  either  petition. 

It  is  undeniable  that  many  of  the  grievances  were  vexatious,  and  that  a  wise 
government  would  have  removed  them.  But  the  Transvaal  Government  was  not 
a  wise  one.  It  was  obstinate,  narrow,  and  to  a  certain  extent  corrupt.  The 
municipal  administration  of  Jahannesburg  was  inefficient,  and  there  were  numer- 
ous petty  burdens  which  were  both  irritating  and  unnecessary.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  the  majority  of  the  Outlanders  did  not  desire  the  franchise,  per  se;  and  a  large 
number  would  not  have  taken  it.  They  asked  for  it  in  order  that  they  might, 
by  pressure  in  the  Volksraad,  be  able  to  remove  some  of  the  minor  grievances 
which  weighed  upon  them  in  their  daily  life.  Those  of  the  Outlanders  who 
Jcared  nothing  for  the  franchise  and  only  wanted  to  make  money  under  an 
efficient  administration  were  driven  to  agitate  for  a  franchise  which  they  despised. 
The  chief  grievances  of  the  Outlanders  were  therefore  such  as  might  have  been 
removed  by  any  clear-sighted  Government  with  a  business  capacity.  It  was 
absurd  for  the  President  to  say  that  the  Outlanders  need  not  come  unless  they 
liked,  or  that  they  knew  what  to  expect  when  they  did  come.  He  was  trying  to 
make  the  best  of  two  worlds,  to  get  all  that  he  could  out  of  the  Outlanders  and 
to  refuse  them  the  privileges  which  most  civilised  States  would  have  granted 
them.  He  was  unwilling  to  learn  the  lessons  of  history,  and  to  recognise  the 
fact  that  misgovernment  is  generally  more  fatal  to  the  governor  than  to  the 
governed. 

On  the  other  hand,  those  who  will  take  the  trouble  to  put  themselves  in 
President  Kruger's  place  will  admit  that  he  might  reasonably  fear  trouble  from  the 
sudden  admission  to  the  franchise  of  a  large  number  of  Outlanders,  many  of  whom 
had  openly  avowed  their  hope  that  the  British  flag  would  again  fly  over  Pretoria. 
The  situation,  in  short,  was  made  the  worst  of  on  both  sides,  the  Outlanders 
showing  no  consideration  for  the  difficulties  of  a  small  State  confronted  by  a 
perplexing  problem,  and  the  Boer  Government  failing  to  realise  the  danger  of 
delay  in  solving  that  problem.  It  is  impossible  to  acquit  President  Kruger  of 
a  very  considerable  share  in  the  responsibility  for  the  events  which  preceded  and 
followed  the  Conference  and  for  the  hostilities  which  ensued.  But  if  we  are  to 
apportion  the  responsibility,  it  is  difficult  not  to  assign  the  greater  weight  of  it 
'to  the  English  negotiators,  or  to  deny  that  Mr.  Chamberlain's  diplomacy  was 
either  ignorant  or  insincere.  He  had  a  good  case,  but  he  preferred  to  spoil  it 
by  over-statement,  by  a  want  of  proportion,  and  by  an  apparently  wilful  ignorance. 

That  the  general  administration  of  the  South  African  Republic  was  faulty 
and  below  the  standard  of  some  European  countries  is  true.  But  it  was  a  little 
State,  and  it  has  been  very  poor.  The  administration  of  justice  was  good,  and 
the  educational  system  was  advancing  swiftly.  The  Transvaal  Government  was 
able  to  point  out  to  Mr.  Chamberlain  that  though  the  gold  industry  was  heavily 


SOUTH  AFRICA,  1896-1899. 


29 


taxed,  at  all  events  the  burden  of  taxation  was  much  lighter  in  the  Transvaal 
than  in  the  territories  of  the  Chartered  Company,  where  the  mines  were  liable  to 
be  taxed  by  a  royalty  of  50  per  cent.,  or  even  in  England,  where  the  small  amount 
of  gold  produced  in  Wales  some  years  ago  was  taxed  by  a  royalty  of  25  per  cent. 
The  taxation  in  the  Transvaal  was  not  more  than  5  per  cent,  on  admitted  profits, 
or  about  one-seventieth  of  the  total  value  of  the  annual  output.  In  like  manner, 
when  Mr.  Chamberlain  complained  of  the  excessive  cost  of  the  necessities  of 
life,  the  Transvaal  Secretary  met  his  statement  by  the  crushing  rejoinder  that 
whereas  in  the  Transvaal  the  duties  on  bread  stuffs  were  only  about  "j\  per  cent., 
the  duties  imposed  in  Cape  Colony  were  at  least  30  per  cent.  He  also  pointed 
out  that  the  charges  of  the  Netherlands  Railway  and  the  heavy  price  of  dynamite 
had  been  considerably  reduced. 

On  May  5,  1899,  Sir  A.  Milner  sent  to  Mr.  Chamberlain  a  long  and  sensa- 
tional cablegram,  in  which  he  set  forth  the  grievances  of  the  Outlanders,  the 
necessity  of  a  reform  in  the  Transvaal  franchise,  and  the  intolerable  position  of 
Englishmen,  who  were  treated  as  "helots."  He  demanded  from  the  Queen's 
Government  "a  striking  proof"  of  their  paramount  power  in  South  Africa. 

On  May  10th  Mr.  Chamberlain,  in  the  course  of  a  despatch  to  Sir  Alfred 
Milner,  laid  before  the  Transvaal  Government  his  opinion  of  the  political  situation 
and  called  for  a  removal  of  the  grievances  of  which  the  Outlanders  complained. 
He  suggested  that  a  meeting  should  be  arranged  between  President  Kruger  and 
Ithe  High  Commissioner  in  order  that  the  situation  might  be  discussed  "in  a 
Conciliatory  spirit."  The  invitation  was  accepted  by  the  President,  and  a  con- 
ference was  held  at  Bloemfontein  on  May  31st. 

The  legal  position  of  the  British  Government  was  a  somewhat  difficult  one. 
In  the  first  place,  the  Convention  of  1884  entitled  her  to  complain  if  any  articles 
of  that  Convention  had  been  broken  to  the  prejudice  of  her  subjects,  and  she 
had  the  right  to  remedy  such  contravention  by  force.  But  it  is  clear  that  most 
of  the  grievances  of  which  the  Outlanders  complained  did  not  come  under  the 
scope  of  any  of  the  articles  of  that  Convention.  They  were  vexatious,  and  it 
js  possible  that  the  burdens  laid  on  the  mining  industry  were  too  heavy.  Life ' 
land  property,  however,  were  practically  as  safe  in  Johannesburg  as  in  London; 
and  it  was  somewhat  ludicrous  that  capitalists  who  were  making  millions  out 
of  gold  mines,  and  were  living  in  Corinthian  luxury  at  Johannesburg,  that  traders 
and  miners  who  were  making  money  and  earning  wages  which  enabled  them  to 
live  in  comfort,  should  complain  of  the  intolerable  burdens  which  a  corrupt  Govern- 
ment imposed  upon  them. 

The  only  title  which  England  possessed  was  the  right  which  any  nation 
possesses  of  protesting  against  a  state  of  unrest  at  its  very  gates.  If  political  or 
social  agitation  were  to  assume  an  acute  form  on  the  French  frontier  of  Germany, 
and  were  to  threaten  similar  unrest  in  a  German  province,  the  German  Govern- 
ment would  be  quite  within  its  rights  in  protesting  against  the  continuance  of 
such  a  state  of  affairs.  It  would  earnestly  counsel  the  French  Government  to 
take  measures,  not  only  for  its  own  safety,  but  for  the  safety  of  its  neighbors; 
and  if  the  French  Government,  through  apathy  or  impotence,  were  to  allow  a  con- 
tinuance of  anarchy,  the  German  Ministers  would  be  entitled  to  take  such  measures 
for  self-defence  as  seemed  to  them  necessary. 

In  the  same  way,  the  English  Government  were  entitled  to  protest  against  a 
state  of  affairs  in  the  Transvaal  which  were  productive  of  unrest,  and  which 
threatened  to  produce  an  agitation  dangerous  not  only  to  the  interests  of  the 
South  African  Republic,  but  to  peace  and  good  feeling  in  the  adjoining  English 

1  The  importance  of  the  Edgar  case  has  been  ludicrously  exaggerated.  The  facts  are 
simple.  Edgar,  an  English  Outlander,  had  quarrelled  with  another  Outlander,  and  had 
struck  him  blows  so  severe  that  he  died.  Edgar  was  pursued  into  his  house  by  the  police,  and 
attacking  them  with  a  life-preserver,  was  by  them,  in  self-defence,  shot.  It  was  an  unfortunate 
incident,  but  to  call  it  murder  is  foolish. 


30  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

territories.  How  far  the  English  Government  were  justified  in  following  up  their 
protests  by  military  action,  whether  their  vague  rights  as  to  the  paramount  power 
entitled  them  to  make  war  upon  the  Transvaal  if  their  protests  were  unheeded, 
is  a  question  which  probably  most  men  will  answer  in  accordance  with  their 
political  or  racial  sympathies.  It  was,  however,  pre-eminently  a  question  of  pru- 
dence, and  it  was  absolutely  necessary  for  the  British  Government,  in  making 
such  protests  and  following  them  up  by  energetic  action,  to  remember  that  it 
was  a  great  Power  dealing  with  a  small  Power,  and  that  this  small  Power  had 
been  recently  and  unjustly  attacked  by  English  soldiers  and  officials.  Above  all, 
England  had  to  remember  that  the  great  attraction  of  the  Transvaal  was  its  gold, 
and  that  any  attack  made  by  the  Empire  on  the  Boers  would  be  at  once  and  natu- 
rally interpreted  by  every  foreign  nation  as  a  move  for  the  possession  of  gold  mines, 
rather  than  for  the  redress  of  grievances.  It  was  her  manifest  duty  and  interest  to 
see  that  she  did  not  confirm  the  suspicions  of  her  malicious  rivals.  There  was,  too, 
it  must  be  confessed,  some  lack  of  humour  in  Mr.  Chamberlain's  demand.  We 
who,  before  the  great  Reform  Bill,  had  taxed  our  own  citizens  of  Manchester  and 
Birmingham  without  giving  them  representation,  were  demanding  of  the  Trans- 
vaal Government  at  the  point  of  the  sword  the  extension  of  its  franchise  to  a 
cosmopolitan  band  of  adventurers.  British  Columbia  has  drawn  to  it  a  sudden 
influx  of  American  miners.  Would  the  American  Government  be  justified  in  our 
eyes  if  they  demanded  from  them  with  threats  the  franchise  of  the  Canadian 
Dominion  ? 

One  thing  is  certain:  England  had  no  right,  either  by  the  Convention  of 
1884  or  by  any  claim  of  paramountcy,  to  insist  on  a  reform  of  the  Transvaal 
franchise.  She  therefore  took  up  a  position  which  it  was  extremely  difficult  to 
sustain,1  for  if  a  demand  for  the  reform  of  the  franchise  could  be  urged  by  England 
only  as  friendly  counsel,  it  is  clear  that  she  could  not  morally  or  legally  enforce 
her  counsel  by  a  threat  of  war  or  by  war  itself. 

In  spite  of  these  obvious  considerations,  and  perhaps  because  they  could  not 
sustain  some  of  their  other  important  criticisms,  the  British  Government  deter- 
mined to  make  a  reform  of  the  franchise  their  specific  demand  and  the  test  of  their 
paramountcy.  But  in  pursuance  of  the  haphazard  methods  which  distinguished 
Mr.  Chamberlain's  diplomacy,  no  clear  statement  of  the  British  demands  was  laid 
before  the  Boer  Government,  and  no  basis  of  discussion  at  the  Conference  of 
Bloemfontein  was  arranged.  It  was  reasonable  to  suppose  that  Sir  Alfred  Milner 
and  President  Kruger  were  to  negotiate  concerning  the  points  of  difference  and 
difficulty,  but  Mr.  Chamberlain  had  determined  that  only  one  matter  should  be 
discussed,  and  that  nothing  less  than  an  absolute  surrender  on  the  part  of  the  Boers 
on  this  point  should  be  accepted. 

As  we  have  seen,  it  was  impossible  for  an  alien  to  obtain  the  franchise  under 
a  residence  of  fourteen  years,  and  the  High  Commissioner  demanded  at  the  Con- 
ference that  a  law  should  be  passed,  enabling  the  Outlanders  to  become  full  citizens 
after  a  residence  of  five  years.  President  Kruger,  with  that  genius  for  bargaining 
which  has  always  distinguished  the  Dutch,  offered  a  term  of  seven  vears.  But 
Sir  Alfred  Milner  refused,  in  language  the  reverse  of  "conciliatory,"  to  discuss 

1  "We  did  not  claim,  and  never  have  claimed,  the  right  to  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs 
of  the  Transvaal.  The  rights  of  our  action  under  the  Convention  are  limited  to  the  offering 
of  friendly  counsel,  in  the  rejection  of  which,  if  it  is  not  accepted,  we  must  be  quite  willing 
to  acquiesce."  Mr.  Chamberlain,  May  8,  1896. 

"A  war  in  South  Africa  would  be  one  of  the  most  serious  wars  which  could  possibly 
be  waged.  It  would  be  in  the  nature  of  a  civil  war.  It  would  be  a  long  war,  a  bitter  war, 
and  a  costly  war.  As  I  have  pointed  out,  it  would  leave  the  embers  of  a  strife  which  I 
believe  generations  would  hardly  be  long  enough  to  extinguish.  To  go  to  war  with  Presi 
dent  Kruger,  to  force  upon  him  reforms  in  the  internal  affairs  of  his  State,  in  which  Secre 
taries  of  State,  standing  in  this  place,  have  repudiated  all  right  of  interference — that  wouM 
be  a  course  of  action  as  immoral  as  it  would  have  been  unwise." 

Mr.  Chamberlain,  August,  1896. 


SOUTH  AFRICA,  1896-1899.  31 

the  matter  any  further  or  to  enter  into  a  consideration  of  any  other  points  in 
dispute.    The  Conference  was  abruptly  closed. 

The  chief  responsibility  for  the  failure  of  this  Conference  must  fall  upon  the 
English  Government,  which  had  laid  down  no  basis  of  discussion,  and  had  sent  its 
envoy  into  the  Conference  with  instructions  to  make  a  demand  which  could  not 
be  justified  under  the  Convention,  and  to  retire  from  the  Conference  if  that  demand 
were  not  at  once  granted. 

The  Boers  are  by  nature  suspicious  bargainers.  They  enjoy  haggling  over  a 
matter  which  most  Englishmen  would  settle  in  five  minutes,  and  in  the  present 
instance  it  is  only  reasonable  to  allow  that  they  had  substantial  gruonds  for  their 
suspicion.  The  whole  history  of  South  Africa,  from  1802,  seen  through  their 
eyes,  was  one  long  narrative  of  the  duplicity  and  oppression  of  the  British.  They 
recalled  their  conquest  in  1802,  the  injustice  they  had  suffered  at  the  hands  of 
English  officials,  and  their  long  and  lonely  trek  into  the  desert.  They  repeated  to 
.themselves  countless  acts  of  violence ;  how  Natal,  which  they  had  conquered  from 
the  natives,  had  been  taken  from  them;  how  their  country  had  been  annexed 
against  the  wishes  of  the  vast  majority  of  their  nation  ;  how  the  solemn  guarantees 
of  representative  government  had  been  broken  by  the  English.  Above  all,  they 
remembered  the  Jameson  Raid  of  1895,  the  complicity  of  the  British  officials  and  of 
a  Colonial  Prime  Minister,  and  the  attempt  which  Mr.  Chamberlain  made  to 
impose  upon  them  the  status  of  a  vassal. 

The  Conference  having  thus  failed,  the  situation  was  obviously  more  danger- 
ous than  before.  Such  a  failure  was  disastrous  for  the  cause  of  peace,  and  it 
made  the  gulf  between  the  two  parties  wider  than  ever.  But  it  was  unhappily  a 
source  of  pleasure  to  the  agitators  in  Johannesburg  and  in  Cape  Colony.  They  had 
now  come  to  the  conclusion  that  further  negotiation  was  futile,  and  that  the  knot 
^could  be  loosened  only  by  the  sword.  Sir  Alfred  Milner,  inspired  by  his  con- 
viction that  the  Boers  would  shrink  before  a  firm  and  consistent  pressure,  urged 
an  unyielding  policy  and  a  display  of  force.  Every  misunderstanding  and  check 
in  the  negotiations  was  welcomed  by  the  organs  of  the  capitalists  in  South 
Africa  and  in  England. 

When  the  English  Ministry  found  that  they  were  likely  to  be  involved  in  a 
war  for  which  they  could  give  no  rational  cause,  they  were  forced  to  seek  other 
grounds.  They  manufactured  the  fable  of  a  Dutch  conspiracy.  They  asserted 
and  they  encouraged  the  Press  to  argue  that  a  fight  for  supremacy  in  South  Africa 
had  been  long  "inevitable,"  that  it  was  President  Kruger's  ambition  to  make  of 
South  Africa  a  Dutch  Republic,  and  "to  drive  the  English  into  the  sea."  The 
negotiations,  they  said,  had  all  along  been  unreal,  and  the  real  question  was 
whether  the  Dutch  or  the  English  were  to  have  the  upper  hand  in  South  Africa. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  discuss  at  great  length  a  statement  which  rests  on  no 
evidence.  It  is  true  that  the  statement  has  been  made  again  and  again ;  and  men 
who  repeat  an  assertion  to  themselves  a  hundred  times,  at  length  begin  to  believe 
in  its  authenticity.  Here  it  is  only  necessary  to  say  that  a  charge  of  such  tre- 
mendous import  needs  to  be  supported  by  convincing  evidence.  Of  such  evidence 
there  is  no  sign.  Those  who  bring  the  charge,  when  asked  for  proof,  make  it 
a  fresh  grievance  against  the  Dutch  that  they  are  cunning  enough  to  conceal  every 
trace  of  universal  conspiracy.  Of  documentary  proof,  or  of  relevant  testimony 
there  is  not  a  shred. 

On  the  contrary,  the  evidence  is  on  the  other  side.  As  we  have  said 
before,  up  to  the  year  1895  the  Dutch  had  gradually  grown  more  ready  to  accept 
the  rule  and  customs  of  the  English.  Mr.  Rhodes,  English  of  the  English,  was 
supported  by  the  Afrikander  Bond.  The  Cape  Assembly  had  voted  a  considerable 
sum  for  Imperial  purposes.  The  narrow  policy  of  the  Transvaal  rulers  had  alien- 
ated the  sympathy  of  the  Cape  Dutch,  who  resented  the  decision  of  Mr.  Kruger 
to  employ  officials  from  Holland  rather  than  kinsmen  from  Cape  Colony  in  the 
public  service  of  the  Transvaal.    The  leaders  of  the  Dutch  Afrikander  party  had 


32  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

strongly  urged  upon  Mr.  Kruger  the  advisability  of  making  concessions  to  the 
Outlanders,  and  it  is  clear  that  if  they  wished  for  war  they  were  adopting  the 
worst  methods  of  hastening  it.  The  President  of  the  Free  State  and  his  advisers 
were  also  urgent  in  the  cause  of  peace.  It  is  surely  no  proof  of  a  Dutch  conspiracy 
jthat  after  the  Jameson  Raid  the  Raads  of  the  two  Republics  urged  upon  the 
British  Government  the  advisability  of  placing  under  the  direct  rule  of  Great 
Britain  the  territory  of  the  Chartered  Company. 

The  theory  of  a  gigantic  Boer  conspiracy  received  a  very  simple  test  and  a  very 
ample  refutation  in  December.  After  the  three  reverses  of  Stormberg,  Magersfon- 
tein,  and  Colenso,  the  English  troops  were  absolutely  at  the  mercy  of  the  Boers  and 
their  Dutch  sympathisers.  If  the  Dutch  in  the  Colony  had  risen,  the  position  of  our 
armies  would  have  been  precarious  in  the  extreme,  and  in  a  few  months  the  Dutch 
could  have  swept  the  whole  Colony  from  end  to  end.  But  with  the  exception 
of  a  few  hundred  rebels  on  the  frontier,  and  in  spite  of  the  strong  sympathy  which 
blood  brings,  the  Dutch  remained  passive  and  peaceful. 

It  may  be  that  some  of  the  Dutch  had  entertained  dreams  of  a  United  South 
African  Republic,  in  which  the  Dutch  element  would  be  preponderant  both  in 
population  and  political  influence.  But  there  is  no  evidence  to  show  that  such 
dreams  had  ever  inspired  a  considerable  fraction  of  the  race  with  a  desire  to  break 
away  from  English  rule,  and  it  would  be  as  absurd  to  mistake  the  bombast  of  a  few 
vapouring  Dutchmen  for  the  sober  ideals  of  a  nation  as  it  would  be  to  mistake  the 
.theories  and  menaces  of  Sir  Ellis  Ashmead  Bartlett  for  the  settled  policy  of  the 
majority  of  Englishmen. 

The  Boers  themselves  had  nothing  to  gain  from  the  war  and  everything  to 
lose.  They  disliked  war,  as  they  disliked  everything  that  took  them  from  the 
tranquil  life  of  their  farms.  It  was  only  the  overmastering  belief  that  England  had 
designs  upon  their  independence  which  induced  them  to  take  up  arms  in  defence 
of  their  country. 

The  statement  that  the  Boers  had  been  secretly  arming  for  many  years  before 
the  Raid  is  disproved  by  numerous  witnesses.  Colonel  Younghusband,  who  was 
in  Johannesburg  in  December,  1895,  states  that  the  Boers  had  no  serious  arma- 
ment ;  and  Major  White,  who  took  part  in  the  Raid,  and  had  made  secret  inquiries, 
has  given  a  list  of  the  few  guns  possessed  by  the  Boers  in  1895.  Dr.  Jameson 
himself  made  a  similar  statement  *  at  Kimberley  a  few  months  ago.  A  report  on 
•the  military  resources  of  the  Boer  Republics  was  compiled  by  the  Intelligence 
Department  of  the  English  War  Office  in  June,  1899,  and  portions  of  it,  the  authen- 
ticity of  which  has  not  been  questioned,  have  been  published.  This  official  report 
states  that — 

"Of  the  enormous  quantity  of  rifles  now  in  possession  of  the  South  African 
Republics,  only  some  13,500  Martini-Henry  rifles  were  in  the  country  before  the 
Jameson  Raid.  The  whole  of  the  remainder  have  been  purchased  since  that  date 
'm  England,  France,  Germany,  and  Belgium"  (p.  11).  The  report  also  states  that 
in  January,  1896,  the  strength  of  the  Staats  Artillerie  was  nine  officers  and  one 
hundred  men,  with  a  reserve  of  fifty  men,  but  that  "immediately  after  the  Raid 
the  corps  was  increased  in  strength  to  about  four  hundred,"  with  a  larger  reserve. 

Further  proposals  followed,  but  the  despatches  on  both  sides  were  awkwardly 
worded,  and  serious  misunderstandings  arose.  Every  day  increased  the  dangers 
of  the  situation.  The  demand  for  a  speedy  and  final  surrender  was  being  urged 
on  the  Transvaal  Government.  The  English  Government  did  not  desire  war, 
but  they  determined  to  enforce  their  demands  by  war.  It  is  clear  from  the 
statements  of  Lord  Wolseley  in  the  House  of  Lords,  in  March,  1901,  that  war 
was  regarded  as  likely,  and  a  definite  plan  of  campaign  was  in  June,  1899,  laid 

1  "Apart  from  the  rifles  in  the  hands  of  the  burghers,  the  whole  armoury  of  the  Trans- 
vaal was  contained  in  the  so-called  Pretoria  Fort,  guarded  by,  he  believed,  three  Staats 
Artillerie  men,  and  its  sole  protection  a  broken-down  corrugated  iron  fence." 


SOUTH  AFRICA,  1896-1899.  33 

before  the  English  Ministry,  by  which  the  subjugation  of  the  two  Republics  was 
to  be  effected  by  November  of  that  year.  The  Cabinet  was  driven  by  the  suc- 
cessive errors  of  the  Colonial  Secretary  into  a  position  from  which  retreat  on  its 
part  became  impossible  without  humiliation ;  and  a  violent  end  could  be  avoided 
only  by  the  surrender  of  the  Transvaal  Ministry. 

In  July  the  Transvaal  Government  offered  a  seven  years'  retrospective  fran- 
chise, and  Mr.  Chamberlain  was  inclined  to  accept  the  concession.  But  the  Loyal- 
ists and  Sir  Alfred  Milner  were  inflexible. 

Finally  the  Transvaal  Government  offered  a  five  years'  franchise  on  certain 
conditions,  the  most  important  of  which  was  that  the  British  Government  should 
make  no  further  attempt  to  interfere  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  the  Transvaal.  The 
conditions  were  reasonable,  but  the  prospect  of  a  compromise  was  displeasing  to  Sir 
Alfred  Milner,  to  the  South  African  Loyalists,  and  to  the  advocates  of  violence 
in  England.  Sir  Alfred  Milner  cabled  a  demand  for  "extreme  measures,"  and  the 
Press  urged  that  the  concessions  should  be  rejected.  Mr.  Chamberlain,  yielding  to 
;the  clamor  of  the  war  party,  appeared,  in  an  ambiguous  despatch,  to  decline  the 
terms  and  the  conditions.  How  ambiguous  the  despatch  was  may  be  judged  from 
the  fact  that  the  Boer  Government  interpreted  it  as  a  refusal  of  their  offer ;  while 
the  Colonial  Secretary  regarded  it  as  a  qualified  acceptance.1  By  a  studied  refer- 
ence to  the  Conventions  rather  than  to  the  Convention  which  gave  England  her 
right  to  interfere,  he  again  put  forward  the  claim  of  Suzerainty  which  had  tacitly 
been  allowed  to  lapse.  Shortly  after  sending  this  despatch,  Mr.  Chamberlain 
delivered  a  violent  speech  at  Highbury  in  which  he  compared  Mr.  Kruger  to 
a  sponge,  out  of  whom  concessions  had  to  be  squeezed.  Such  a  speech  could 
only  lead  the  Boers  to  think  that  Mr.  Chamberlain  was  set  on  war.  On  September 
1 2th  he  telegraphed  that  his  Government  must  now  "reserve  to  themselves  the  right 
to  reconsider  the  situation  de  novo,  and  to  formulate  their  own  proposals  for  a 
final  settlement,"  which  proposals  they  would  communicate  to  the  High  Com- 
missioner in  a  later  despatch. 

This  despatch  was  in  essence  an  ultimatum,  and  as  such  the  Boer  Government 
regarded  it.  In  the  meantime  the  English  Ministers  summoned  Parliament  for 
the  granting  of  supplies,  the  reserves  were  called  out,  an  army  corps  mobilised, 
and  a  large  number  of  transports  were  chartered  to  convey  troops  to  South  Africa. 
The  days  passed,  and  the  Boer  Government  could  obtain  no  definite  reply  to 
their  inquiries  as  to  the  meaning  of  Mr.  Chamberlain's  last  despatch.  The  Boers, 
irritated  by  the  concentration  of  a  large  force  of  English  troops  on  the  Natal 
border,  and  learning  that  an  army  corps  was  embodied  and  ready  to  sail,  deter- 
mined to  take  the  only  step  which  a  weak  nation  can  take  against  a  great  one 
threatening  force.  It  issued  an  ultimatum,  couched  in  peremptory  terms,  claiming 
that  Her  Majesty's  troops  should  be  withdrawn.  Mr.  Chamberlain  refused  to 
acknowledge  the  Boer  ultimatum,  and  hostilities  commenced  on  October  9th. 

The  Boer  ultimatum  made  escape  from  war  impossible ;  it  was  a  despatch 
which  no  Government  could  accept.    But  though  its  terms  were  arrogant,  it  would 

1  Mr.  Chamberlain  :  The  hon.  member  harps  on  the  word  acceptance.  He  must  remem- 
ber he  asked  me  the  question  what  we  intended.  I  myself  should  have  thought  that  the 
Boers  would  have  taken  it  as  an  acceptance,  but  I  suppose  it  may  be  properly  described  as 
a  qualified  acceptance.  We  did  not  accept  everything,  but  we  accepted  at  least  nine-tenths 
of  the  whole. 

Sir  E.  Clarke:  Really  this  becomes  more  and  more  sad.  (Loud  Opposition  cheers.) 
It  is  dreadful  to  think  of  a  country  of  this  kind  entering  upon  a  war,  a  crime  against  civilisa- 
tion, when  this  sort  of  thing  has  been  going  on.  (Opposition  cheers.)  Why,  in  the  very  next 
sentence  the  right  hon.  gentleman  says:  "It  is  on  this  ground  that  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment have  been  compelled  to  regard  the  last  proposal  of  the  Government  of  the  South  Afri- 
can Republic  as  unacceptable  in  the  form  in  which  it  has  been  presented." 

Mr.  Chamberlain  :    In  the  form. 

Sir  E.  Clarke:    It  is  a  matter  of  form?  - 

Mr.  Chamberlain:    Yes. 

{House  of  Commons,  Oct.,  1899.) 


34  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

be  unfair  to  say  that  they  were  in  their  essence  unreasonable.  Mr.  Chamber- 
lain, in  his  despatch  of  September  22nd,  had  broken  off  negotiations  and  had  told 
the  Boer  Ministers  that  he  would  now  formulate  his  demands  and  his  scheme  for 
a  final  settlement  of  the  issues.  It  was  impossible  for  the  Boers  to  mistake  the 
significance  of  the  English  despatches  and  our  warlike  preparations.  They 
could  only  mean  that  England  had  determined  to  make  peremptory  demands, 
and  to  back  up  these  demands  with  a  large  army  and  a  declaration  of  war. 
There  were,  in  fact,  two  ultimatums,  the  first  one  from  Mr.  Chamberlain,  con- 
taining a  menace  that  warlike  measures  would  be  shortly  taken;  the  second  from 
the  Boers,  who  were  determined  not  to  await  the  advent  of  an  overwhelming 
force.  The  Transvaal  doubtless  made  a  diplomatic  mistake  in  issuing  its  ulti- 
matum, but  the  step  was  one  which  would  probably  have  been  taken  by  any 
other  States  in  the  civilised  world,  similarly  placed. 

The  Boers  had  made  concessions  which  were,  in  fact,  genuine,  and  substan- 
tial. Mr.  Chamberlain  had  rejected  these  concessions,  and  had  threatened,  in 
no  ambiguous  phrase,  new  demands.  These  demands  he  refused  to  disclose 
until  an  English  Army  Corps  was  ready  to  enforce  them.  Would  any  State  wait 
patiently  while  hostile  forces  were  gathering  to  crush  its  independence?  It  is 
clear,  therefore,  that  war  was  forced  upon  the  Transvaal  Government,  and  the 
chief  responsibility  of  the  tragedy  must  fall  upon  the  English  Ministers.1 

There  were,  as  is  always  the  case,  grave  faults  on  both  sides.  On  the  one 
hand,  the  Boer  Government  allowed  its  suspicions  to  prevent  the  frank  and  full 
acceptance  of  the  English  demands  which  they  were  afterwards  willing  to  grant. 
On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Chamberlain,  who  neither  by  education  nor  tempera- 
ment is  fitted  to  carry  on  a  delicate  diplomacy,  despised  the  position  and  the 
resources  of  the  Transvaal.  He  was  unable  or  unwilling  to  make  his  meaning 
clear,  and  he  adopted  an  attitude,  a  method  of  argument,  and  an  insulting  form 
of  words,  which  were  unpalatable  to  a  proud  and  stubborn  people,  and  which  no 
free  Colony  of  ours  could  have  borne  for  a  day.  He  thought,  and  he  assured 
the  Opposition,  that  the  Transvaal  would  yield  to  pressure;  and  he  honestly 
believed  that  the  despatch  of  an  army  corps  would  bring  the  Boers  to  their 
senses.  In  spite  of  the  warnings  of  those  who  knew  South  Africa  better  than  he 
did,  he  refused  to  believe  that  the  Transvaal  would  resist,  and  that  the  Free 
State  would  help  her  sister.  He  had  determined  to  crush  the  Boers  and  sooner 
or  later  to  bring  them  under  the  British  flag.  Of  a  diplomacy,  conducted  in 
such  a  spirit,  war  was  obviously  an  "inevitable"  result.  The  farewell  words  of 
Sir  Alfred  Milner  at  Cape  Town  on  May  7,  1901,  are  significant  of  the  aims  of  the 
two  statesmen,  and  prove  that  no  concessions  on  the  part  of  the  Boers  would 
have  availed." 

It  is  certain  that  even  at  a  late  period  of  the  negotiations  there  was  little  to 
prevent  the  success  of  the  diplomacy,  and  it  seemed  that  negotiations  were 
broken  off  because  President  Kruger  would  not  yield  all  that  Mr.  Chamberlain 
demanded.  Mr.  Chamberlain  himself  allowed  in  the  House  of  Commons  that 
of  the  final  proposals  of  the  Boers,  nine-tenths  were  satisfactory  to  him,  and 

1  Neither  is  the  opinion  of  some  of  the  schoolmen  to  be  received,  that  a  war  cannot 
justly  be  made,  but  upon  a  precedent  injury  or  provocation;  for  there  is  no  question  but  a 
just  fear  of  an  imminent  danger,  though  there  be  no  blow  given,  is  a  lawful  cause  of  war. 

Francis  Bacon,  Essay  on  Empire. 

'Flinching  from  no  sacrifice  and  turning  a  deaf  ear  to  people  whose  endeavour  was  ever 
tending  to  confine  and  smother  the  one  cardinal  point  in  a  mass  of  side  issues,  the  British 
people  had  gone  straight  upon  the  way  on  which  they  had  set  out  from  the  first,  to  makt 
an  end  of  the  business  once  and  for  all,  to  make  South  Africa  one  country  under  one 
Hag  and  with  one  system  of  law  and  government. 

Sir  Alfred  Milner  at  Cape  Town,  May  7,  1901. 


SOUTH  AFRICA,  1896-1899.  35 

that  the  other  one-tenth  was  not  worth  fighting  for.1  His  diplomatic  methods 
were  so  inept  that  he  was  obliged  to  allow  in  the  House  of  Commons  that, 
though  he  meant  to  accept  the  Boer  proposal,  he  sent  a  reply  which  could  be 
interpreted  as  a  refusal.  His  despatches  were  wanting  in  frankness,  and  several 
of  them  contained  a  hint  or  menace  of  further  demands  which  would  follow  when 
the  points  under  immediate  discussion  had  been  gained. 

Mr.  Bryce  justly  points  out  that  the  British  Government  went  into  the  war 
without  having  formulated  a  casus  belli.  They  had  not  demanded  redress  of 
the  grievances  of  which  the  Outlanders  complained,  and  they  could  not  make 
the  restricted  franchise  a  cause  for  war.  They  had  not  presented  any  demands, 
but  had  made  vague  menaces.  They  had  thereby  exposed  their  country  to  the 
malicious  comment  of  foreign  nations,  and  had  brought  on  a  war  without  any 
definite  grounds. 

The  Transvaal  Ministers,  therefore,  remembering  the  attempt  which  had 
been  made  upon  their  independence,  in  which  the  Colonial  Office,  justly  or 
unjustly,  had  been  held  to  be  an  accomplice,  sincerely  believed  that  Mr.  Cham- 
berlain's diplomacy  was  empty  and  insincere,  and  that  it  was  both  an  attempt  to 
assert  a  Suzerainty  which  they  denied,  and  a  pretext  to  gain  time  for  the  prepa- 
ration of  an  overwhelming  military  force. 

The  attitude  of  the  South  African  and  English  Presses  during  the  negotia- 
tions had  been  significant.  The  capitalists,  through  their  editors  and  the  South 
African  League  and  the  Outlander  Council  of  Johannesburg,  added  new 
demands  to  the  old  ones,  and  openly  expressed  their  hope  that  the  negotiations 
would  be  vain  and  that  force  would  take  the  place  of  conciliation.  The  final 
failure  of  diplomacy  was  hailed  with  relief  in  England;  and,  just  as  George  III. 
welcomed  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  in  America  as  the  close  of  an  intolerable 
position,  so  many  of  the  leaders  of  public  opinion- in  South  Africa  and  in  Eng- 
land expressed  their  satisfaction  that  the  negotiations  had  failed,  and  that  the 
sword  would  now  have  the  opportunity  of  doing  what  the  pen  and  the  tongue 
had  failed  to  effect.' 

1  On  October  25,  1899,  the  following  conversation  took  place  in  the  House  of  Commons : — 

Mr.  Courtney  :  My  right  hon.  friend  sent  an  answer  intended  to  be  an  acceptance.  (An 
Hon.  Member:  No,  no!)  My  right  hon.  friend  is  quite  equal  to  denying  my  statement  if 
it  is  wrong. 

Mr.  Chamberlain:  Oh,  well,  then,  I  will  deny  it.  I  did  not  think  it  worth  while  to 
interrupt  my  right  hon.  friend  because  he  must  know  that  I  have  said  over  and  over  again  a 
"qualified  acceptance,"  and  he  always  omits  the  adjective. 

Mr.  Courtney:  You  said  nine-tenths.  Is  a  question  as  to  one-tenth  worth  war?  Tell 
us  what  the  tenth  is. 

Mr.  Chamberlain  :    I  do  not  think  it  was  worth  war. 

Mr.  Courtney  :    Tell  us  what  the  one-tenth  was. 

Mr.  Chamberlain  :    Why  did  not  President  Kruger  give  way? 

Mr.  Courtney:  Because  you  did  not  explain  the  despatch.  It  was  never  explained  to 
him.  The  whole  point  is,  Are  we  to  go  to  war  on  the  tenth  part?  As  to  that,  history  will 
judge.    I  am  too  confident,  unfortunately,  of  what  the  result  will  be. 

*  Mr.  Chamberlain  has  more  than  once  expressed  his  pride  in  the  war,  and  has  stated 
that  if,  as  his  opponents  asserted,  he  was  the  author  of  the  war,  such  an  exploit  would  be  "a 
feather  in  his  cap." 


CHAPTER    IV. 


THE     CAMPAIGN. 


IT  is  not  necessary  for  our  purpose  to  narrate  in  any  detail  the  events  of  the- 
Boer  war.  It  falls  naturally  into  three  divisions.  In  the  first  the  Boer 
invaders  were  everywhere  successful,  and,  inflicting  on  us  three  defeats  in 
one  week,  might  have  carried  their  victorious  arms  to  the  sea  but  for  a  lack  of 
enterprise  natural  to  a  citizen  force  and  for  the  heroic  defence  of  the  garrison 
of  Ladysmith.  The  second  is  the  period  of  our  success  to  the  occupation  of 
Pretoria.  The  third,  and  the  most  painful  of  all,  is  the  period  of  stubborn  and 
tedious  warfare  which  has  lasted,  without  any  considerable  success  on  our  side, 
from  August,  1900,  to  the  present  time. 

The  first  period  of  the  war  was  a  lamentable  one  for  our  armies.  It  would 
be  ungenerous  to  criticise  the  strategy  of  Sir  Redvers  Buller,  for  it  was  thrust 
on  him  by  circumstances,  and  was  not  his  free  choice,  and  the  force  which  was 
entrusted  to  him  was  utterly  inadequate  to  its  task.  The  expectation  held  out 
to  the  public  by  a  thoughtless  Press  and  shared  by  a  thoughtless  Government,, 
that  General  Buller's  army  corps  would  be  able  to  advance  through  the 
Republics,  to  sweep  aside  any  resistance  that  the  Boers  might  offer,  to  occupy 
Pretoria  and  Bloemfontein,  and  after  a  few  easy  successes  to  dictate  terms  of. 
peace,  is,  in  the  light  of  our  later  experience,  seen  to  be  ludicrous,  and  can  only 
be  compared  with  the  parallel  hope  of  Mr.  Rhodes  in  1895,  that  Dr.  Jameson, 
with  his  five  hundred  troopers,  would  overthrow  the  Republic. 

The  mistakes  which  General  Buller  made  were  due  to  political  misdirection 
and  to  political  necessity  rather  than  to  any  miscalculation  on  his  own  part. 
The  beginning  of  the  mischief  in  Natal  was  the  Government's  promise  to  defend 
the  Colony  with  the  whole  force  of  the  Empire.  This  promise  held  Sir  George 
White  to  the  defence  of  Dundee,  and  this  in  its  turn  made  the  siege  of  Lady- 
smith  inevitable.  If  the  cry  of  Ladysmith  could  have  been  resisted — and  it  could 
not — the  promise  would  still  have  compelled  General  Buller  in  honour  to  go  to 
Natal.  The  knots  in  the  fatal  entanglement  of  Ladysmith  were  thus  tied  by  the 
politicians,  not  by  the  soldiers.  It  was  the  same  in  Kimberley.  Mr.  Cecil 
Rhodes  was  besieged  in  the  town,  quarrelling  with  the  military  officers  in  com- 
mand. Needs  must  be,  therefore,  that  a  body  of  English  troops  should  at  once 
set  out  to  its  relief.  The  disaster  of  Magersfontein  was  the  result.  The  Min- 
istry had  rushed  into  war  without  making  adequate  preparations  for  the  defence 
of  its  own  frontier  in  Cape  Colony,  and  Kimberley  and  Ladysmith  between  them 
had  deprived  Sir  William  Gatacre  of  his  due  share  of  the  army  corps.  He 
attempted,  with  inadequate  forces,  to  drive  back  the  Boer  invaders.  The 
tragedy  of  Stormberg  was  the  result. 

The  second  period  of  the  war  began  in  January,  1900,  when  at  last  the 
Ministers  became  alive  to  the  danger  of  the  situation.  Lord  Roberts  and  Lord 
Kitchener,  with  an  enormous  force,  which  ultimately  increased  our  army  to 
250,000  men.  were  sent  out  to  retrieve  the  errors  of  our  politicians  rather  than  the 
mistakes  of  our  generals.  Then  followed  a  series  of  successes.  Kimberley  and 
Ladysmith  were  relieved,  Cronje's  force  surrendered,  and,  by  a  rapid  movement, 
Lord  Roberts  was  able  to  occupy  Bloemfontein  without  much  serious  resistance. 

The  Government  had  now  its  golden  opportunity.  We  had  driven  the 
Boers  from  our  territories,  we  had  avenged  the  insult  of  their  ultimatum,  one- 


THE  CAMPAIGN.  37 

of  their  capitals  was  in  our  hands  and  the  other  would  soon  be  at  our  mercy. 
Their  army  was  in  flight,  and  their  citizens  were  demoralised. 

Our  Ministry  professedly  went  to  war  either  to  relieve  the  grievances  of  the 
Outlanders  or  to  secure  for  them  the  rights  of  the  franchise,  or  to  assert  British 
supremacy  in  South  Africa.  We  did  not  go  to  war  in  the  first  instance  to  annex 
the  two  Republics  or  to  take  from  them  their  gold  mines.  But  whatever  was 
the  motive  of  the  Ministers,  there  was,  after  the  fall  of  Bloemfontein,  no  reason 
to  doubt  that  they  had  secured  each  and  all  of  the  possible  objects  of  the  war. 
It  was  therefore  the  duty  of  the  conqueror  to  impose  certain  terms  on  the  con- 
quered, and  it  was  in  accordance  with  the  dictates  both  of  reason  and  humanity 
that  these  terms  should  be  possible  ones. 

The  two  Boer  Presidents  saw,  after  the  capture  of  Cronje  and  the  fall  of 
Bloemfontein  and  the  relief  of  Ladysmith,  that  it  was  no  longer  possible  for  the 
Boers  to  contend  on  equal  terms  with  Great  Britain.  They  therefore,  in  a  joint 
telegram  to  Lord  Salisbury,  sued  for  peace,  and  begged  to  know  what  terms  the 
English  Government  proposed.  It  would  have  been  right  and  reasonable  of  the 
English  Ministry  to  have  answered  this  appeal  by  laying  down  certain  terms 
which,  though  they  might  have  been  severe,  would  have  preserved  to  the  Boers 
their  national  life,  their  laws  and  customs  and  representative  institutions.  They 
might  have  demanded  that  the  armaments  which  the  Boers  had  accumulated 
during  the  last  few  years  should  be  given  up,  that  the  grievances  of  the  Out- 
landers should  be  at  once  and  wholly  abolished,  and  that  an  indemnity  should  be 
paid;  nor  would  any  reasonable  man  have  opposed  the  suggestion  that  the  two 
Republics  should  pass  as  protected  States  under  the  supremacy  of  the  British 
flag. 

When  a  State  is  at  war  with  another  State,  it  is  not  usual  for  the  conqueror, 
even  when  his  enemy  has  declared  war  upon  him,  to  annex  the  whole  of  his 
territories  and  to  declare  that  in  the  future  his  enemy  shall  cease  to  exist  as  a 
nation.  There  is,  except  the  case  of  Poland,  no  example  in  modern  history 
of  the  policy  which  we  have  to  our  sorrow  pursued.  But  the  English  Ministers, 
puffed  up  by  success  and  urged  forward  by  the  passionate  outcry  of  their  igno- 
rant advisers  in  South  Africa  and  at  home,  refused  to  listen  to  the  Boer  appeal. 
Lord  Salisbury  told  the  Presidents  that  there  could  be  no  discussion  of  terms, 
that  the  two  Republics  must  make  an  unconditional  submission  and  must  accept 
whatever  fate  the  English  Ministry  accorded  them.  He  added  further  that  no 
result  would  be  satisfactory  to  England  which  left  to  the  Boers  a  shred  of  inde- 
pendence. 

The  inevitable  result  followed.  The  Boers  were  made  desperate  by  Lord 
Salisbury's  threats.  They  saw  that  they  were  fighting,  not  against  defeat  by  an 
ordinary  foe,  not  against  disarmament,  not  against  the  demands  of  the  mine- 
owners;  they  were  fighting  for  their  national  existence.  The  English  Ministers 
and  English  public  must  have  been  whollv  blind  not  only  to  the  dictates  of  com- 
mon sense,  but  also  to  the  traditions  of  their  own  glorious  history,  if  they  did 
not  see  that  their  enemy  would  fight  desperately  and  would  be  right  in  fighting 
to  the  death  for  the  noblest  of  all  causes. 

But  when  passion  and  prejudice  obscure  the  vision,  it  is  almost  useless  to 
ask  men  to  see  facts  as  they  are.  The  evil  genius  which  has  inspired  our  Gov- 
ernment from  the  beginning  still  tracked  its  footsteps,  and  the  opportunity  was 
lost.  From  the  infatuated  policy  of  the  English  Ministers,  difficulties  and  dis- 
asters followed  thick  and  fast.  The  enemy,  who  had  before  this  shown  signs  of 
wavering,  at  once  grew  firm  and  unanimous  in  their  determination.  Shortly 
after  the  rejection  of  the  Presidents'  overtures,  Sanna's  Post  made  De  Wet 
famous.  Already  at  Bloemfontein  the  difficulties  of  the  army  were  so  great  that 
nearly  two  months  went  by — months  of  mishaps  and  regrettable  incidents — 
before  a  further  advance  to  Pretoria  was  possible.  Again  the  advance  was  suc- 
cessful.    Lord  Roberts  rushed  his  army  through  the  northern  part  of  the  Free 


38  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

State,  still  leaving  a  population  in  his  flanks  and  rear  unsubdued  and  hostile. 

Again  the  error,  we  may  assume,  was  rather  political  than  military.  Sir 
Alfred  Milner  has  confessed  in  his  despatch  of  February  6,  1901,  that  the  great 
object  of  Lord  Roberts  was  to  save  the  gold  mines,  which,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
were  in  little  danger.  It  must  be  remembered  that  Lord  Roberts  has  never 
before  served  against  a  white  foe,  and  that  all  his  triumphs  have  been  won 
against  the  semi-barbarous  peoples  of  India  and  Afghanistan.  But  he  is  a 
brilliant  soldier  and  he  recognised  the  risks  of  his  rash  strategy.  He  knew  that 
among  the  rules  of  warfare  none  are  more  important  than  those  which  warn  a 
general  not  to  lose  his  line  of  operations,  to  keep  his  troops  well  together,  not 
to  march  about  in  small  bodies  or  to  hold  small  garrisons  at  great  distances 
from  his  centre.  To  proceed  in  a  haphazard  way  without  a  proper  centre,  and 
to  risk  the  loss  of  his  communications,  or  to  risk  the  constant  breaking  of  those 
communications,  is  in  Napoleon's  opinion  to  be  guilty  of  a  crime.  That  master 
of  war  advised  his  generals  always  to  place  their  troops  in  such  a  way  that,  what- 
ever the  enemy  might  do,  they  might  be  able  to  have  their  forces  united  in  a  few 
<lays.  Lord  Roberts  knew  all  this;  but  he  failed  to  see  that  Lord  Salisbury's 
declaration  had  completely  changed  the  whole  character  of  the  war;  that  we 
were  no  longer  fighting  Governments,  but  a  people,  and  that  what  we  had  now 
to  subdue  was  not  the  capitals  but  the  spirit  of  freedom  in  the  heart  of  the 
individual  Boer.  There  was  a  time  when  the  occupation  of  Pretoria  might 
have  ended  the  war,  but  that  was  before  Lord  Salisbury's  declaration. 

The  consequence  was  that  the  rapid  march  of  Lord  Roberts  and  the  occu- 
pation of  Pretoria  only  involved  our  army  in  further  difficulties.  Our  huge  force 
now  found  itself  in  the  heart  of  a  hostile  country  dependent  for  its  very  exist- 
ence on  thousands  of  miles  of  railway  open  to  the  attacks  of  an  active  foe.  The 
Boers  again  and  again  attacked  our  communications  and  swooped  down  upon 
isolated  posts.  Once  more  De  Wet  appeared  as  Nemesis.  We  had  already 
annexed  the  Free  State,  and  the  Transvaal  was  presently  to  follow;  but  the 
annexation  was  on  paper,  and  had  no  effective  value  until  we  could  occupy  the 
whole  of  these  territories  and  until  we  had  defeated,  killed  or  captured  the  strong 
and  determined  bodies  of  the  enemy  who  were  defying  and  harassing  us. 

When  the  attacks  on  his  flanks  and  communications  began,  Lord  Roberts 
at  Pretoria  was  in  an  anxious  and  difficult  situation.  It  was  an  exact  reproduc- 
tion of  the  dangerous  position  of  our  army  in  the  American  War  of  Independ- 
ence. The  Commander-in-Chief  had  staked  almost  everything  on  the  chance 
of  ending  the  war  at  Pretoria.  For  some  time  he  clung  to  the  idea  that  it  was 
over,  despite  the  facts.  He  had  rushed  through  the  country  in  his  rear ;  instead 
of  leaving  garrisons  he  had  imposed  an  oath  of  neutrality  on  those  burghers 
who  had  not  gone  north  with  the  main  Boer  army;  he  had  thrown  over  the 
slower  methods  of  formal  conquest;  and  now  the  country  was  up  in  his  rear  and 
on  his  flanks.  The  Governments  of  the  two  Republics  were  not  unreasonable 
in  regarding  the  oath  of  neutrality  as  unpatriotic  and  as  taken  under  compul- 
sion, and,  therefore,  as  void;  and  since  the  English  troops  were  not  able  to 
occupy  the  country  effectively,  it  became  a  regular  occurrence  for  an  English 
force  to  leave  a  town  on  one  day  and  for  a  Boer  commando  on  the  next  day  to 
appear  and  force  the  unfortunate  burghers  to  join  it.  The  weakness  01  our 
position  deprived  us  of  the  power  to  protect  those  burghers  on  whom  we  had 
forced  the  oath  of  neutrality.  The  whole  fabric  of  our  military  power  in  South 
Africa,  hurriedly  raised,  as  we  have  seen,  under  complete  political  misapprehen- 
sion, began  to  crumble  at  its  base.  The  occupation  of  Pretoria  marked  the 
climax  of  our  power:  from  that  date  it  began  to  ebb  and  wane. 

The  spectacle  of  our  unfulfilled  hopes  and  prophecies  drove  us  to  the  absurd 
conclusion  that  the  resistance  of  the  Boers  was  confined  to  the  scum  of  the 
population  or  to  foreign  mercenaries.  Our  pride  refused  to  allow  that  the 
-entire  population  of  the  Republics  was  united  against  our  wish  to  make  them 


THE  CAMPAIGN.  39 

British  citizens.  We  had  deceived  ourselves;  but  anxious  to  find  a  scapegoat, 
we  declared  that  we  had  been  deceived.  And  now  began  the  cry  for  personal 
chastisement  of  the  Boers.  At  first  directed  only  against  those,  Boers  who 
had — in  the  majority  of  cases,  as  Lord  Roberts  has  admitted,  unwillingly — 
violated  their  oaths  of  neutrality,  our  indignation  gradually  became  more  and 
more  collective,  until  it  threatened  to  visit  all  Boers  without  distinction. 

Bewildered  and  embarrassed,  Lord  Roberts  began  to  wage  war  by  procla- 
mations. It  was  perhaps  the  most  fatal  mistake  of  all,  and  again  it  was  political, 
not  military,  in  its  origin.  Many  in  number  and  inconsistent  in  policy,  they 
proceeded  from  clemency  to  sternness  and  from  sternness  to  clemency.  The 
earlier  proclamations  were  in  accord  with  the  rules  of  civilised  warfare;  but  the 
later  ones  breathed  a  spirit  of  anger  and  revenge  utterly  opposed  to  the  views 
which  the  English  delegates  had  put  forth  at  the  Hague  Conference  of  1899. 
Sir  John  Ardagh,  at  that  Conference,  had  brought  in  a  motion,  asserting  that  it 
is  the  right  of  the  "population  of  an  invaded  country  to  fulfil  its  duty  of  opposing 
the  invaders  by  all  lawful  means  by  the  most  patriotic  resistance."  Nothing  can 
be  clearer  than  this  statement,  which  represented  the  traditional  policy  of  a  free 
England,  ever  ready  in  its  sympathy  with  the  cause  of  small  nations.  But  in  a 
proclamation  dated  from  Johannesburg  on  July  1,  1900,  Lord  Roberts  warns  all 
the  inhabitants  of  the  Orange  River  Colony  who  should  be  found  in  arms  four- 
teen days  after  the  date  of  the  proclamation  that  they  would  be  liable  to  be  dealt 
with  as  rebels  and  to  suffer  in  person  and  property  accordingly.  Lord  Roberts 
and  the  Ministers  probably  argued  that,  the  Orange  Free  State  having 
been  annexed  to  the  Crown  of  England,  every  citizen  still  opposing  the  English 
army  became,  by  the  mere  issue  of  a  proclamation,  a  rebel  and  a  traitor.  It  is 
not  necessary  to  comment  further  on  this  proclamation,  because  on  September 
1st  the  Ministers  and  Lord  Roberts  acknowledged  its  illegality  and  repealed  it.' 

Other  proclamations  described  the  penalities  to  which  the  Boers  rendered 
themselves  liable  by  the  continuance  of  the  struggle  for  independence.  It 
became  the  custom  first  of  all  to  burn  farms  from  which  a  treacherous  attack 
was  made  upon  our  troops,  then  to  burn  all  farms  within  a  radius  of  ten  miles 
from  any  point  on  the  railway  at  which  an  attack  was  made  by  the  enemy,  then 
to  confiscate  or  burn  anything  which  was  the  property  of  any  Boer  fighting  for 
his  country."  These  measures  are  harsh  and  inconsistent  with  the  traditions  of 
the  British  army,  and  nothing  has  shown  more  clearly  the  want  of  intelligence 
on  the  part  of  our  Ministers  and  civil  and  military  advisers  than  this  policy  of 
devastation.  If  anything  has  been  proved  in  history,  it  is  that  such  a  policy 
cannot  be  followed  up  by  a  free  nation  fighting  another  free  nation.  It  might 
be  pursued  by  Russia  against  Central  Asian  babarians;  but  we  are  not  Russians, 
and  England  has  noble  and  generous  traditions.  The  same  blind  fury  which 
animated  Lord  North's  Ministry  and  his  generals  in  1777  has  animated  our  Min- 
istry during  this  unhappy  war.  We  have  had  no  fixed  policy,  but,  like  a  foolish 
mother,  we  turn  from  blandishment  to  menace,  and  from  stripes  to  caresses. 
We  forget  that  which  in  our  reason  we  should  readily  allow:  that  nothing  makes 
men  more  irreconcilable  than  to  see  their  houses  burnt,  their  private  property 
looted  or  confiscated,  and  their  women  turned  out  homeless  and  defenceless. 
The  devastation  was  unwise  on  other  grounds.  Our  great  army  found  itself 
tied  to  the  railway,  unable  to  move  quickly  through  a  district  where  many  of  the 

1  Lord  Roberts  unsuccessfully  pursued  a  similar  policy  and  issued  a  similar  procjamation, 
against  the  Afghans  in  1879.  His  action  was  severely  criticised  in  a  petition  signed  by 
various  eminent  men,  among  whom  was  Mr.  J.  Chamberlain. 

'According  to  a  Parliamentary  Paper  just  issued,  the  number  of  farms  and  houses 
burnt  in  the  Republics,  from  June,  1900.  to  January,  1901.  was  630.  The  return  is  obviously 
incomplete,  and  the  number  must  be  at  least  double.  Of  this  number  189  were  burnt  in 
October,  and  226  in  November,  when  the  war  was  "over."  A  large  number  of  the  farms 
were  burnt  because  the  owners  were  on  commando. 


40  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

houses  had  been  burnt,  much  of  the  food  destroyed,  and  the  cattle  driven  away. 
Our  columns  could  not  move  without  large  convoys  and  their  mobility  was  lost. 
As  our  difficulties  increased,  it  became  clear  to  our  advisers  that  their  severe 
policy  was  having  an  effect  contrary  to  their  hopes,  and  by  subsequent  procla- 
mations in  November,  1900,  the  Commander-in-Chief  promised  that  for  the 
future  promiscuous  farm-burning  should  be  stopped,  while  the  regulation  of 
compelling  residents  to  travel  in  military  trains  had  been  long  before  repealed. 

It  would  be  unjust  and  untrue  to  charge  against  the  honour  of  the  army  the 
policy  and  the  scenes  of  desolation  which  have  been  one  of  the  most  unfortunate 
features  of  this  campaign.  The  policy  had  a  political  rather  than  a  military 
inspiration.  It  was  unutterably  odious  to  thousands  of  our  soldiers,  and  it 
increased  their  disgust  with  a  campaign  which  was  now  being  carried  on  by 
methods  contrary  to  the  high-spirited  traditions  of  the  British  army.  Even 
after  the  horrors  of  the  Indian  Mutiny  our  soldiers  spared  the  farms  and  villages 
of  the  enemy,  and  the  houses  and  supplies  which  a  hasty  and  angry  general 
might  have  destroyed,  saved  many  of  our  columns  from  distress.  We  know 
that  our  officers  and  soldiers  are  men  of  generous  instincts  and  chivalrous 
demeanour.  This  war  has  left  us  few  illusions,  but,  at  all  events,  let  us  retain  the 
faith  that  our  soldiers  are  just  and  merciful,  that  they  do  not  of  their  own  initia- 
tive make  war  on  women  and  children,  and  that  it  is  no  part  of  a  British  soldier's 
duty  or  pleasure  to  lay  desolate  the  houses  and  towns  of  the  enemy  whom  he 
cannot  capture.  We  must  seek  the  origin  of  this  ruthless  policy  in  the  civilian 
mind.  The  same  error  which  appears  to  have  debauched  the  minds  of  so  many 
respectable  citizens  both  in  South  Africa  and  in  England,  and  which  assured  us 
that  the  Boers  were  cowards  who  would  yield  and  bandits  and  murderers  wno 
must  be  shot  like  vermin,  doubtless  impressed  upon  our  Government  that,  as 
vermin  could  not  be  killed  until  their  nests  were  destroyed,  so  we  should  never 
conquer  the  Boers  until  we  laid  low  their  habitations,  made  their  country  a 
desert,  and  carried  their  women  and  children  into  captivity.  Let  us  then  hold 
the  army  innocent. 

It  was  stated  on  some  authority  that  before  the  severe  proclamations  of  Lord 
Roberts  we  had  at  least  one-third  of  the  Free  State  burghers  on  our  side  and 
willing  to  submit.  Lord  Roberts's  change  of  policy  immediately  turned  the 
majority  of  these  men  into  bitter  opponents.  Every  day  increased  our  difficulties 
and  hardened  the  determination  of  our  enemy.  Every  act  of  harshness  was  car- 
ried, coloured,  and  monstrously  exaggerated  to  our  Dutch  subjects  in  Cape  Colony. 
The  two  Republics  were  become  deserts  with  blackened  farms  and  ruined  towns, 
and  in  Cape  Colony  the  old  loyalty  towards  the  English  Crown  was  fast  dying  out 
and  was  being  replaced  by  a  sullen  hatred  which  might  burst  at  any  moment  into  a 
dangerous  flame.  But  the  path  of  folly  ever  leads  downward,  and,  as  the  dangers 
and  the  difficulties  grow,  the  unfortunate  traveller  finds  that  to  step  back  is 
impossible  and  that  to  grope  blindly  in  the  darkness  is  his  only  course. 

The  war  on  private  property  failed,  as  the  policy  of  a  rapid  advance  on  the 
enemy's  capitals  had  failed.  The  position  of  our  army  was  becoming  dangerous, 
and,  though  Lord  Roberts  after  a  long  wait  at  Pretoria  threw  out  columns  and 
seized  the  Delagoa  railway,  he  was  unable  to  advance  any  substantial  distance 
north  of  the  railway  line.  More  than  half  the  Transvaal  remained  untraversed 
by  our  troops,  and  the  main  Boer  army,  with  its  Commander-in-Chief  and  the 
Ministers  of  the  late  Republic,  were  left  free  to  move  about  at  their  will. 

At  length  the  Government  and  Lord  Roberts  began  to  understand  that  they 
had  completely  misunderstood  both  the  character  of  the  Boers  and  the  difficulties 
of  their  own  position.  The  English  public,  too,  grew  sensitive  about  the  policy 
of  devastation  in  which  our  premature  advance  and  annexation  had  involved  us ; 
and  Lord  Kitchener,  who  in  the  beginning  of  December,  1900,  succeeded  Lord 
Roberts,  was  instructed  to  issue  a  proclamation  by  which  an  amnesty  was  offered 
to  all  who  undertook  to  surrender.    It  was  promised  that  there  should  be  no  more 


THE  CAMPAIGN.  41 

indiscriminate  burning  of  farms — for  indiscriminate  it  had  become,  thanks  not  so 
much  to  the  deliberate  policy  of  Lord  Roberts  as  to  the  series  of  irreconcilable 
proclamations  which  confused  a  dozen  policies ;  and  it  was  further  recognised  that 
we  had  no  right  to  exact  an  oath  of  neutrality  and  penalties  for  its  violation  unless 
we  offered  those  who  took  it  adequate  protection.  As  it  was  impossible  to  give 
this  protection  to  burghers  in  the  country,  a  new  system  of  refugee  camps  at 
various  points  on  the  lines  of  communication  was  started. 

Into  these  camps  were  gathered  women  and  children  from  the  country  dis- 
tricts, and  all  the  burghers  who  surrendered  voluntarily.  In  effect,  the  new  plan 
was  the  concentration  system  of  General  Weyler  in  Cuba,  with  this  distinction,  that 
we  undertook  the  responsibility  of  feeding  the  refugees.  The  advantage  of  this 
system  was  that  it  enabled  us  to  distinguish  between  combatants  and  non-com- 
batants, and  to  devastate  the  country  outside  the  refugee  camps  with  a  clearer 
conscience.  But  the  strain  on  the  railways  was  greatly  increased  by  the  new 
responsibility. 

Another  serious  and  obvious  disadvantage  was  that,  with  all  the  good  will  in 
the  world,  it  was  difficult  to  feed  and  care  for  the  numerous  occupants  of  these 
camps.  Hosts  of  delicate  women  and  children  were  living  under  insanitary  con- 
ditions and  on  bad  or  insufficient  food,1  and  Lord  Kitchener  added  to  the  danger 
by  lowering  this  poor  standard  of  comfort  and  placing  on  reduced  rations  the 
women  and  children  of  the  burghers  who  were  still  in  the  field  against  us.2  Even 
under  improved  conditions  the  mortality  is  appalling.  Since  February,  of  the  20,000 
occupants  of  these  camps  the  deaths  were — men,  41;  women,  80;  children,  261." 
If  this  system  of  reconcentration  is  continued  for  two  years,  a  considerable  portion 
of  the  non-combatant  population  of  the  two  Republics  will  be  dead.  It  is  hardly 
necessary  to  say  that  the  effects  of  such  a  policy  if  continued  will  be  disastrous  to 
our  good  name. 

But  the  third  policy  of  the  Government  was  as  unsuccessful  as  the  former  two 
policies.  The  Government  appears  to  have  been  inspired  throughout  this  cam- 
paign by  the  madness  which  it  is  said  the  gods  inflict  on  those  whom  they  intend 
to  ruin.  It  was  still  unable  to  grasp  the  difference  between  unconditional  sub- 
mission and  submission  on  reasonable  and  honourable  terms.  They  imagined  that  to 

1  The  following  is  the  official  report  of  the  Medical  Officer : — 

"Johannesburg, 

"January  gth. 

"This  is  to  certify  that  I  have  carefully  examined:  (a)  a  sample  of  mealie  meal  num- 
bered 1 ;  (b)  a  sample  of  mealie  meal  numbered  2;  and  (c)  a  sample  of  sugar  numbered  3. 

"Sample  I  is  mouldy,  contains  mite,  and  is  unfit  for  human  consumption. 

"Sample  2  contains  mite,  but  I  could  not  discover  in  it  living  mite.  It  is,  however, 
dangerous  as  human  food. 

"Sample  3  is  a  moist  sample  of  brown  sugar.  The  smell  is  somewhat  sour,  but  micro- 
scopically I  could  not  find  ferment  or  other  foreign  matter  except  water.  The  sugar  is 
unfit  for  the  use  of  young  children. 

"If  the  meal  and  the  sugar  from  which  the  samples  are  taken  are  used  as  human  food, 
they  are  liable  to  produce  diarrhoea,  especially  to  children.    I  have  sealed  the  samples  with  my 

seal  after  examining  them.  

"D.  W.  Johnston,  F.R.C.S.,  D.P.H.,  &c." 

1  Mr.  John  Ellis  asked  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  whether  the  women  and  children 
confined  in  camps  were  placed  on  full  rations  if  they  voluntarily  surrendered,  but  on  reduced 
rations  if  the  husbands  and  fathers  did  not  surrender. 

Mr.  Brodrick — I  am  in  communication  with  Lord  Kitchener  on  this  subject.  The  diffi- 
culty of  feeding  the  very  large  number  of  persons  coming  into  these  camps  is  very  great; 
and  I  understand  that  a  distinction  has  been  drawn  between  those  who  surrendered  with 
their  husbands  and  fathers  and  those  who  come  in  to  be  fed  while  their  relations  are  still 
in  the  field  ("Oh.")  The  information,  however,  at  my  disposal  is  not  sufficient  to  enable 
me  to  give  an  exact  answer  at  this  moment.  [Mr.  Brodrick  has  since  informed  the  House 
that  this  odious  method  of  conquest  has  been  repealed— obviously  m  deference  to  the  protests 
of  honourable  men.] 

'Mr.  Brodrick  in  the  House  of  Commons,  May,  1901. 


42  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

annex  two  countries  and  peoples  was  to  secure  the  surrender  of  their  armies,  and 
they  vacillated  between  a  policy  of  devastation  and  a  policy  of  sugar-plums.  They 
made  the  further  mistake  of  attempting  to  use  the  refugees  to  sow  dissension 
amongst  the  burghers  in  the  field;  and  the  bitterness  of  the  struggle  was  ex- 
asperated by  the  execution,  real  or  alleged,  of  some  of  these  so-called  "peace 
envoys"  by  the  Boer  leaders. 

Though  it  could  no  longer  be  concealed  that  the  military  position  in  South 
Africa  was  steadily  growing  worse  the  Government  determined  to  end  the  war 
on  paper  and  to  conquer  the  Boers  by  a  General  Election  and  by  rhetoric  on  the 
hustings.  Lord  Roberts  was  rash  enough  to  proclaim  that  the  war  was  over, 
and  the  Government,  urging  the  electors  that  a  Ministerial  victory  would  smother 
the  dying  embers  of  warfare,  obtained  a  great  majority.  It  is  not  easy  to  under- 
stand by  what  arguments  Lord  Roberts  pursuaded  himself  that  the  active  cam- 
paign was  at  an  end.  To  unprejudiced  eyes  it  was  clear  that  the  enemy  was  still 
unconquered,  and  that  our  army  was  in  difficulties  was  proved  shortly  after  Lord 
Roberts's  departure  by  the  evacuation  of  many  of  the  posts  our  troops  had  been 
holding.  In  his  despatch  of  February  6,  1901,  Sir  Alfred  Milner  points  out  that 
the  six  months  after  July,  1900,  had  been  months  of  military  "retrogression,"  and 
Lord  Roberts's  optimism  in  December — at  least  four  months  after  that  "retrogres- 
sion" had  commenced — was  clearly  founded  on  no  sound  basis.  His  declaration  is 
only  to  be  explained  first  by  his  characteristic  tendency  to  look  on  the  brighter 
side  of  events ;  secondly,  by  his  wish  to  comfort  the  Government  and  the  public ; 
and  thirdly,  by  a  not  unnatural  desire  to  prove  to  the  world  that  he  had  completed 
the  work  which  he  had  not  been  allowed  to  complete  "nineteen  years  ago."  But 
such  a  declaration  was  eminently  unfair  to  his  successor,  who  would  be  held  by 
the  public  to  have  failed  in  the  easy  task  which,  according  to  Lord  Roberts,  had 
been  left  him.  Lord  Kitchener  indeed  deserves  the  sympathy  of  all  generous  men. 
His  difficulties,  caused  in  a  great  degree  by  the  rash  strategy  of  his  predecessor, 
have  been  enormous,  and  if  he  fails  the  fault  will  not  be  his. 

The  military  methods  of  the  Government  were  therefore  as  unsuccessful  as 
their  political  efforts.  They  believed  what  they  wished  to  believe,  and  assuming 
that  the  war  was  practically  over,  they  neglected  to  feed  their  wearied  army  with 
a  steady  flow  of  drafts  and  recruits.  A  considerable  number  of  soldiers  were  with- 
drawn from  South  Africa,  and  in  December  the  position  of  our  forces,  which  had 
been  growing  steadily  worse  since  the  occupation  of  Komati  Poort,  began  to  be 
most  serious. 

After  the  fall  of  Pretoria,  it  was  hoped  that  the  enemy  would  submit ;  the 
Boer  forces  seemed  to  be  scattered  and  to  have  lost  their  capacity  for  sustained 
or  concentrated  movement.  But  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  campaign  has  ever 
presented  the  true  form  of  guerilla  warfare.  That  class  of  warfare  is  confined  to 
the  action  of  small  bodies  under  independent  leaders,  possessing  no  cohesion  and 
displaying  no  organised  methods  for  the  attaining  of  a  common  end.  Moreover, 
guerilla  warfare  is  almost  invariably  accompanied  by  great  cruelty  on  the  part  of 
the  guerillas  and  by  an  ostentatious  neglect  of  the  honourable  conventions  of  war. 
Those  who  have  followed  intelligently  the  course  of  the  campaign  since  the  fall  of 
Pretoria  will  allow  that  the  Boer  plan  of  campaign,  far  from  being  the  fortuitous 
product  of  independent  bands,  has  been  inspired  not  only  by  remarkable  boldness 
and  originality  but  by  strategical  skill  and  methodical  aims. 

The  Boers,  who  had  at  the  commencement  of  the  war  been  wanting  in  dis- 
cipline and  initiative,  were  becoming  veterans,  seasoned,  bold,  and  able  to  take 
the  offensive  without  hesitation.  Although  their  food  supplies  must  have  been 
very  scanty  and  their  ammunition  could  not  have  been  superabundant,  they 
seemed  to  have  enough  food  and  enough  ammunition  to  continue  a  campaign  which 
was  exhausting  and  dangerous  to  our  army.  Their  generals  began  to  display,  in 
addition  to  the  extraordinary  mobility  which  had  always  characterized  them,  a 
tactical  and  a  strategical  skill  which  extorted  the  unwilling  admiration  of  their 


THE  CAMPAIGN.  43 

enemy.  In  fine,  the  proposition  in  January,  1901,  was  in  its  essence,  if  not  in  its 
outward  aspect,  more  dangerous  than  the  position  in  January,  1900.  At  the  latter 
date  we  had  not  exhausted  our  regular  forces,  we  had  still  200,000  men  on  whom 
we  could  draw,  we  had  still  in  reserve  the  skill  and  the  prestige  of  Lord  Roberts 
and  the  administrative  ability  of  Lord  Kitchener. 

The  greater  part  of  our  army  consisted  of  infantry,  and  out  of  200,000  men 
whom  we  had  in  South  Africa  100,000  must  have  been  tied  down  to  the  railway 
and  the  important  strategical  points,  while  perhaps  20,000  or  25,000  were  sick  of 
fever  and  of  the  fatigue  which  a  long  campaign  inevitably  brings.  We  probably 
had  no  more  than  20,000  mounted  men  to  throw  upon  the  Boers  at  any  given  point, 
and,  in  a  word,  our  great  army,  which  outnumbered  the  Boers  by  ten  to  one,  was 
thrown  on  the  defensive.  In  January,  1901,  our  regular  reserves  were  exhausted, 
Lord  Roberts  had  returned,  and  Lord  Kitchener  seemed  embarrassed  by  the  coil 
of  untoward  circumstances.  We  had  only  the  patriotism  of  our  citizens  and 
of  our  colonies  to  depend  upon ;  and  if  the  supply  of  volunteers  were  to  fail,  we 
should  be  left  impotent  in  the  presence  of  the  greatest  military  danger  that 
England  has  ever  faced. 

The  military  situation  was  in  the  middle  of  December  made  worse  by  the 
sudden  irruption  of  several  Boer  commandoes  into  Cape  Colony.  It  is  not  at 
present  clear  what  object  the  Boers  had  in  this  invasion ;  but  we  may  without  much 
risk  assume  that  they  were  determined,  by  enlarging  the  area  of  the  war,  to  draw 
a  great  portion  of  our  army  from  Pretoria  to  the  south.  The  Boers  had  countless 
sympathisers  in  the  Colony,  and  they  probably  knew  quite  clearly  what  their 
reception  was  likely  to  be.  They  did  not  expect  to  be  reinforced  by  a  large 
number  of  Colonial  Dutch,  though  some  recruits  were  certain  to  join  their  forces. 
Their  chief  objects  were  to  collect  supplies  and  horses  and  to  raise  a  new  campaign 
in  Cape  Colony,  a  thousand  miles  from  the  main  body  of  our  troops  in  the  Trans- 
vaal, and  to  force  the  English  general  to  choose  between  abandoning  the  Colony 
and  abandoning  the  Transvaal. 

They  argued  that  Lord  Kitchener,  whose  troops  were  barely  sufficient  to  hold 
their  present  positions  with  success,  would  certainly  not  be  able  to  continue  the 
campaign  in  the  Transvaal  and  to  offer  any  resistance  to  them  in  Cape  Colony. 
By  this  extraordinary  and  brilliant  feat  the  Boers  at  once  practically  doubled  the 
area  of  the  war,  and  an  army  which  was  impotent  to  hold  the  two  Republics  was 
obviously  incapable  of  entering  into  serious  offensive  measures  against  the  Boers 
both  in  Cape  Colony  and  in  the  northern  Transvaal.  From  Cape  Colony  we  have 
not  yet  been  able  to  drive  the  invaders,  and  our  inability  to  capture  or  defeat 
them  is  a  measure  of  our  weakness. 

The  tactics  of  the  Boers  became  more  daring.  Every  day  some  point  of  the 
railway  was  cut,  small  posts  were  overwhelmed,  and  the  casualty  lists  became 
alarming  in  their  length.  Enteric  fever  and  the  diseases  which  come  of  exhaus- 
tion and  insufficient  food  began  to  tell  upon  our  army.  The  men  were  growing 
"stale"  and  dissatisfied.  But  the  Government  made  no  sign.  Whether  they 
still  hoped  that  Lord  Kitchener,  by  a  supreme  effort,  would  be  able  to  shake  off  his 
indefatigable  foes,  or  whether  they  believed  that  the  sudden  activity  of  the  Boers 
was  but  the  last  flicker  of  the  lamp  before  extinction,  we  do  not  know. 

The  one  fatal  and  radical  error  of  the  Government  is  that  they  have  been 
without  a  definite  policy  from  the  beginning,  unless  we  dignify  by  that  term 
their  threat  to  force  the  Boers  to  unconditional  submission.  It  is  the  business 
of  Ministers  to  have  a  serious  plan  of  settlement,  but  no  vestige  of  such  plan 
has  been  vouchsafed  to  us  by  Lord  Salisbury  and  his  colleagues.  To  put  the 
matter  briefly,  ever  since  the  occupation  of  Pretoria  the  Ministry  has  been  drifting. 
The  one  thing  which  the  Ministers  ought  to  have  done,  if  they  still  remained 
firm  in  their  demand  for  unconditional  submission,  they  did  not  do.  It  was  their 
obvious  and  absolute  duty  to  send  out  to  Lord  Kitchener  such  large  reinforce- 
ments of  mounted  men  as  would  take  the  place  of  those  soldiers  who  were  becom- 


44  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

ing  useless  from  fatigue,  and  would  enable  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  assume 
the  offensive.  It  is  impossible  for  a  large  army  to  remain  for  an  indefinite 
period  on  the  defensive,  exposed  to  the  galling  attacks  of  an  active  foe  whom  it 
cannot  pursue,  and  devastated  by  the  inroads  of  disease. 

At  length,  seriously  alarmed  by  the  activity  of  the  Boers  and  the  impotence  of 
our  army,  the  Government  in  the  early  days  of  February  called  for  more  volun- 
teers and  announced  to  the  public  that  they  were  about  to  send  out  to  Lord 
Kitchener  30,000  mounted  troops.  At  the  end  of  the  same  month,  too,  the  demand 
for  unconditional  surrender  was  relaxed.  Despairing  of  bringing  the  war  to  an 
early  close,  and,  as  we  may  believe,  actuated  by  a  genuine  desire  to  bring  peace  to 
South  Africa,  Lord  Kitchener  proposed  to  General  Botha,  through  his  wife,  that 
a  meeting  should  take  place  to  discuss  terms  of  surrender.  The  meeting  took  place 
on  February  28th,  and  Lord  Kitchener  laid  before  General  Botha  the  various 
conditions  which,  in  his  opinion,  the  English  Ministry  would  impose  upon  the 
Boers.  These  terms  were,  from  Lord  Kitchener's  standpoint,  generous,  and, 
though  General  Botha  pleaded  for  complete  or  modified  independence,  he  seemed 
not  unwilling  to  recommend  Lord  Kitchener's  suggestions  to  his  Government. 
Unfortunately,  these  suggestions,  when  referred  to  the  English  Ministry,  were 
altered  and  hardened  to  such  an  extent  that  they  held  out  to  the  Boers  no  hope 
of  anything  but  despotic  rule  for  an  indefinite  number  of  years.  The  terms,  thus 
modified,  were  proposed  to  General  Botha,  who  summarily  rejected  them,  and  the 
fair  hopes  of  all  who  were  working  for  peace  were  rudely  dashed  to  the  ground. 

To  enumerate  and  explain  the  causes  of  the  failure  of  our  army  in  South  Af- 
rica would  be  a  difficult  and  painful  task.  The  causes  are  many  and  various.  They 
are  moral  and  physical,  political  and  military.  The  first  two  factors  we  will  discuss 
later.  Of  the  latter  two  it  may  without  hesitation  be  asserted  that  the  blunders 
of  our  Government  have  cost  us  far  more  than  the  errors  of  our  soldiers  or  the 
difficulties  of  the  invaded  lands. 

Of  the  military  causes  of  our  failure  it  is  too  early  to  speak  in  definite 
language.  Our  generals  and  our  soldiers  have  done  their  best,  and  it  may  be  that 
no  other  European  army  would  have  achieved  a  greater  success.  At  the  same 
time,  it  would  be  insincere  to  conceal  the  fact  that  the  strategy  of  Lord  Roberts 
was  founded  on  a  false  estimate  of  his  enemy's  strength  and  was  disastrous  in  its 
ultimate  effects.  His  rapid  march  to  Bloemfontein  was  attractive  to  the  super- 
ficial observer,  but  it  was  wrong  in  principle,  and  could  only  have  been  justified  by 
its  results.  He  lost  nearly  the  whole  of  his  convoy,  and  he  exposed  his  men  to  the 
risk  of  starvation.  It  was  impossible  in  such  a  rapid  movement  to  carry  with 
him  the  proper  medical  equipment,  and  the  burden  of  fatigue  which  was  laid 
upon  the  army  was  a  direct  cause  of  that  terrible  outbreak  of  disease  which  swept 
away  the  men  in  hundreds.  The  "regrettable  incidents"  which  followed  in  quick 
succession  were  the  necessary  outcome  of  a  movement  which,  brilliant  as  it 
seemed,  was  the  negation  of  military  prudence.  The  advance  on  Pretoria,  under- 
taken in  the  same  rash  spirit,  produced  similar  results.  We  entered  the  town,  but 
we  did  not  capture  the  forces  of  the  enemy.  Again,  our  flanks  and  rear  were 
left  open  to  the  Boers,  and  it  was  impossible  properly  to  feed  a  force  which  ad- 
vanced more  rapidly  than  its  supplies.  As  Lord  Roberts  has  himself  confessed, 
for  a  day  it  seemed  that  the  army  would  have  to  choose  between  starvation  and 
retreat. 

The  very  high  estimate  which  the  public  has  formed  of  the  achievements 
of  Lord  Doberts  in  South  Africa  has  undoubtedly,  and  not  unnaturally,  been 
founded  on  the  immense  change  which  his  advent  at  the  head  of  an  enormous  army 
wrought  in  the  military  position  in  the  early  days  of  1900.  The  nation  had  passed 
through  an  ordeal  of  suspense  and  sorrow,  and  it  was  profoundly  grateful  to  the 
general  who  had  so  quickly  transformed  the  aspect  of  affairs.  Courteous  and 
brave,  he  is  the  most  popular  soldier  of  the  last  fifty  years,  but  the  historian  will  be 
forced  to  explain  this  popularity  on  the  grounds  we  have  suggested,  and  by  the 


THE  CAMPAIGN.  45 

fascination  of  his  personality,  rather  than  by  the  lasting  success  of  his  strategy.  The 
full  history  of  the  campaign  will  not  be  written  for  many  years,  and  the  natural 
tendency  of  the  military  chronicler  to  minimise  ugly  facts,  to  gloss  over  mistakes, 
and  to  explain  defeats,  may  perhaps  conceal  the  full  measure  of  our  failure.  The 
greatest  commanders  of  history  have  not  seldom  possessed  the  highest  political 
instinct,-  but  Lord  Roberts  was  unable  to  appreciate  the  political  factors  of  the 
situation;  while  the  military  risks  which  he  deliberately  accepted  were  so  dis- 
proportionate to  their  possible  advantages  and  so  disastrous  in  their  results,  that 
it  is  impossible  for  the  cool  observer  to  deny  that  the  career  of  Lord  Roberts  in 
South  Africa  has  been  unequal  to  his  renown. 

But  let  it  not  be  forgotton  that  our  failure  in  South  Africa  has  been  a  political 
rather  than  a  military  failure.  The  politicians  have  set  the  soldiers  to  do  a  work 
of  enormous  difficulty  with  insufficient  material.  The  ill-informed  criticisms  which 
were  showered  on  our  army  during  the  period  of  our  disasters,  the  attacks  on  our 
artillery — the  very  branch  of  the  army  whose  services  have  been  most  heroical  and 
distinguished — on  our  officers  and  our  soldiers,  do  not  touch  the  root  of  the 
matter.    If  the  soldier  has  failed,  it  is  because  the  politician  has  blundered. 

We  have  seen  how  the  insistence  on  unconditional  submission  has  prolonged 
this  war;  it  is  not  less  evident  that  its  early  disasters  were  due  to  political  in- 
capacity. The  Government  entered  upon  this  war  in  wilful  blindness.  For  many 
months  it  must  have  been  clear  to  them  that  in  insisting  upon  a  reform  of  the 
franchise  in  the  Transvaal  they  were  offering  to  the  Boers  an  ultimatum,  and 
that  it  would  be  necessary  for  them,  if  their  proposals  were  declined,  to  enforce 
them  by  armed  measures.  That  they  prepared  for  a  warlike  issue  we  have  re- 
cently from  the  lips  of  Lord  Wolseley,  who  has  told  us1  that  in  June,  1899,  he 
frequently  and  earnestly  urged  upon  the  Government  the  necessity  of  seizing 
Delagoa  Bay,  and  of  preparing  a  large  force  to  protect  Natal  from  invasion. 

In  June,  1899,  four  months  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  an  interesting 
little  volume  was  issued  by  the  Intelligence  Department  of  the  War  office  to 
a  considerable  number  of  officers.  This  book  is  entitled  "Military  Notes  on  the 
Dutch  Republics  of  South  Africa."  It  contains  119  pages,  and  is  divided  into 
twelve  chapters. 

One  of  the  most  remarkable  features  of  this  little  book  is  its  accuracy. 
Its  conclusions  are  often  wrong;  but  as  a  collection  of  facts — and  after  all  the 
business  of  an  Intelligence  Department  is  to  provide  trustworthy  materials  for 
judgments,  and  not  relieve  all  the  other  departments  of  State  from  the 
necessity  of  thinking — the  book  is  beyond  praise.  We  have  been  assured  by 
the  Government  that  they  were  completely  surprised  by  the  warlike  attitude  of  the 
Boers,  by  their  strength,  and  by  the  perfection  of  their  armaments.  Yet  this  book, 
which  is  the  official  publication  of  the  Intelligence  Department  of  the  War  Office, 
estimates  that  the  Boer  forces  would,  in  the  case  of  war,  number  about  56,000 
men.  This  number  is,  if  we  regard  only  the  forces  of  the  two  Republics,  somewhat 
exaggerated;  but  if  in  it  we  include  a  considerable  portion  of  the  Outlanders 
fighting  for  the  Boers,  it  has  been  proved  moderately  accurate. 

Lord  Salisbury  has  told  us  that  the  Government  was  astonished  at  the  exist- 
ence of  modern  guns  among  the  Boers,  and  that  he  presumed  they  had  been 
smuggled  into  the  Transvaal  in  boilers  and  locomotives  and  piano  cases.  This  little 
book,  however,  gives  full  details  of  the  Boer  artillery,  and  of  its  origin  and 
manufacture.  It  is  interesting  to  read  the  statement  that  only  some  13,000  rifles 
were  in  the  country  before  the  Jameson  Raid  and  that  the  whole  of  the  remainder 
have  been  purchased  since  that  date  in  England,  France,  Germany,  and  Belgium. 

When  war  seemed  imminent,  the  Prime  Ministers  of  our  Colonies  made  to  the 
Colonial  Office  offers  of  patriotic  assistance.  The  Government  acknowledged  these 
offers  in  suitable  terms,  and  stated  that  unmounted  men  would  be  preferred. 

1  House  of  Lords,  March,  1901. 


46  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

Three  months  after  the  war  had  begun,  Mr.  Balfour  stated  in  terms  of  pathetic 
astonishment  the  astounding  fact  that  the  Boers  had  horses.  It  is  clear  that  the 
Ministry  had  taken  no  trouble  to  learn  the  lessons  drawn  from  the  last  war 
by  the  Intelligence  Department,  who  were  in  no  ignorance  of  the  advantages 
possessed  by  the  Boers  as  an  army  of  mounted  infantry.  Mr.  Balfour  had  evidently 
not  read  the  following  passage : — 

"As  regards  mobility,  it  may  be  recollected  that  the  force  which  was  defeated 
at  Laing's  Nek  and  Ingogo  was  operating  on  foot,  with  practically  no 
mounted  men,  against  men  whose  hunting  experience  had  taught  them  to 
get  the  utmost  advantage  out  of  the  use  of  their  horses  in  approaching, 
surprising,  and  surrounding  large  herds  of  antelopes.     Moreover,  South 
Africa  is,  of  all  countries,  the  most  dangerous  in  the  world  for  infantry  to 
operate  in  without  a  screen  of  mounted  troops  in  their  front  and  on  their 
flanks.    The  tactics  employed  by  the  Boers  were,  in  fact,  such  as  they  had 
learned  by  hunting  experience  on  the  veldt.    Alike  in  attack  and  defence, 
they  acted  on  the  same  principle.     Containing  the  enemy's  front  with  a 
thin  but  well-posted  body  of  skirmishers,  they  utilised  every  fold  of 
ground  to  gallop  unseen  round  his  flanks,  and  then,  leaving  their  horses, 
which  are  trained  to  stand  without  holders,  under  cover,  gradually  con- 
centrated a  ring  of  overwhelming  fire  on  their  objective." 
Mr.  Balfour,  at  the  end  of  November,  1899,  stated  that  if  he  had  been  asked 
two  months  ago  whether  it  was  likely  that  they  would  be  at  war  with  the  Orange 
Free  State,  he  would  have  answered,  "You  might  as  well  expect  us  to  be  at  war 
with  Switzerland."    The  little  book  of  the  Intelligence  Department  issued  in  the 
previous  June  would  have  instructed  his  amiable  simplicity.    Here  it  is  distinctly 
stated — 

"There  can  be  no  question  that  if  war  ensues  between  the  Transvaal  and  the 
Suzerain  Power  as  a  result  of  the  differences  made  apparent  at  the  Bloem- 
fontein  Conference  (1899),  the  Free  State,  who  has  already  declared  by 
the  mouth  of  her  Raad  that  she  entirely  approves  of  President  Kruger's 
proposals,  will  undoubtedly  throw  in  her  lot  with  the  sister  Republic." 
What  an  Iliad  of  woes  sprang  from  the  neglect  of  this  plain  warning! 
Mr.  Balfour,  in  January,  1900,  described  the  entanglement  of  Ladysmith  as 
being  beyond  the    reasonable  calculations  of   the  Government.     The    Military 
Notes  would  have  given  him  definite  warning  on  this  point,  for  in  them  it  is 
distinctly  stated  that  the  Transvaal  Boers  intended  to  concentrate  with  the  Free 
State  force  west  of  the  Drakensberg  and  to  advance  on  Ladysmith  through  Van 
Reenen's  Pass. 

The  Government  have  excused  the  miserable  imperfection  of  their  medical 
equipment  on  the  ground  that  no  reasonable  person  could  have  expected  a 
grave  outbreak  of  enteric  fever.  The  Military  Notes  contain  a  distinct  warning 
that  enteric  fever,  which  had  been  in  past  campaigns  prevalent  among  our 
troops,  was  a  danger  against  which  every  precaution  should  be  taken. 

I  have  made  these  quotations  from  the  Military  Notes  because  they  go  far 
to  prove  the  statement  that  the  failure  of  our  campaign  has  been  due  rather  to 
the  ignorance  and  blindness  and  carelessness  of  our  Government  than  to  the 
blunders  of  our  army.  There  is  in  the  Cabinet  a  small  body  of  men  called  the 
Defence  Committee.  It  is  the  duty  of  these  Ministers  to  meet  from  time  to 
time,  to  consider  those  measures  which  are  necessary  to  safeguard  the  military 
and  naval  interests  of  our  Empire  and  to  lay  before  the  Cabinet  the  various  pro- 
posals which  seem  to  them  necessary.  It  is  therefore  reasonable  to  expect  that 
this  Committee,  before  engaging  in  a  war  with  another  Power,  should  acquaint 
itself  with  the  obvious  facts  of  the  military  situation  and  with  the  resources  of 
the  Governments  opposed  to  us.  If  Mr.  Balfour  and  his  colleagues  did  not 
make  themselves  acquainted  with  the  warnings  and  the  statements  contained 
in  the  official  Notes  of  the  Intelligence  Department,  or  if,  having  read  them, 


THE  CAMPAIGN.  47 

they  failed  to  appreciate  and  to  act  upon  them,  they  have  been  guilty  not  only 
of  a  blunder  but  also  of  a  crime,  and  on  them  must  fall  the  greater  portion  of 
the  responsibility  for  the  disasters  and  the  prolongation  of  this  unhappy  war. 

But  we  have  had  to  combat  foes  more  terrible  than  the  errors  of  our 
politicians  or  than  the  skill  and  courage  of  the  Boers.  To  the  invader  of  a 
country  the  forces  of  Nature  have  generally  been  more  deadly  than  the  forces 
of  man.  The  Transvaal  and  the  Free  State  form  together  an  enormous 
territory — rugged,  desolate,  sparsely  peopled,  with  few  good  roads  and 
few  large  towns.  A  hostile  army  cannot  live  in  such  a  country.  It 
is  therefore  dependent  for  its  very  existence  on  its  lines  of  communi- 
cation, and  such  lines  must  be  guarded  with  the  utmost  care.  The  strength  of 
these  lines  is  the  strength  of  their  weakest  part,  and  a  temporary  interruption 
may  involve  a  month's  delay  in  the  advance  of  the  army  or  the  semi-starvation 
of  thousands  of  troops;  and  no  communication  is  more  delicate  than  2,000  miles 
of  a  single  railway  line  which  is  the  sole  means  of  feeding  an  enormous  force. 

The  climate,  benign  to  the  native  of  the  country,  is  unkind  to  the  stranger, 
and  foreign  troops  can  ill  bear  the  sudden  changes  from  heat  to  cold,  from 
deluges  of  rain  to  parching  drought.  The  enormous  labours  of  a  protracted 
campaign  in  such  a  country  lower  the  physical  strength  of  the  soldiers  and  bring 
in  their  train  fever  and  dysentery  and  languid  depression.  Nor  are  the  horses 
less  liable  to  disease  than  the  men,  and  the  horse  sickness  of  South  Africa  is  so 
deadly  that  75  per  cent,  of  the  animals  attacked  perish  of  the  malady.  We  have 
been  fighting  Distance  and  Disease,  and  these  two  foes  have  often  conquered 
the  conquering  invader. 

A  country  so  vast  can  therefore  be  defended  by  a  relatively  small  force,  and 
can  only  be  effectively  occupied  by  an  enemy  if  it  possesses  an  immense  army. 
The  issue  of  a  campaign  of  this  character  is  not  decided  by  the  aggregate  num- 
bers of  the  invading  force,  but  by  the  rapidity  with  which  they  can  bring  at  a 
given  moment  a  considerable  number  of  men  to  bear  on  a  given  point.  To  dis- 
tribute a  large  force  evenly  over  an  immense  surface  is  to  lose  effective  power 
and  the  ability  to  crush  your  foe. 

The  magnitude  of  the  task  of  our  troops  in  South  Africa  may  be  realised 
from  the  following  figures  of  the  areas  included  in  the  theatre  of  war : — 

Square  Miles. 

Cape  Colony 277,151 

Transvaal 113,640 

Orange  River  Colony 48.326 

Natal  ' 18,913 

Total  458,030 

Any  one  who  will  take  a  large  scale  map  and  will  measure  the  distances  in 
miles  between  the  various  small  towns  and  villages  which  we  have  occupied  and 
held  will  appreciate  the  immense  difficulties  which  our  army  has  experienced 
in  protecting  and  feeding  the  posts  distant  from  the  main  lines  of  communica- 
tion. We  have  destroyed  the  food  which  otherwise  might  have  sustained  our 
troops;  we  have  therefore  to  despatch  at  frequent  intervals  convoys  of  food, 
which,  slowly  and  laboriously  moving,  are  ever  liable  to  the  attacks  of  the 
mobile  Boers.  The  detachments  which  hold  the  outlying  posts  are  constantly 
on  short  rations  and  always  in  a  tense  and  nervous  strain.  Wherever 
there  is  a  British  post,  there  a  mile  or  so  off  hovers  a  shadowing  commando. 
After  some  months  the  position  becomes  intolerable,  and,  to  save  a  breakdown 
of  the  garrison,  the  town  is  evacuated  and  the  troops  are  moved  to  a  position 
of  greater  security.  At  the  beginning  of  1901  a  large  number  of  the  towns 
formerly  held  by  our  troops  were  evacuated  and  the  immense  districts  round 
them  passed  again  into  the  hands  of  our  enemy.  This  process  of  evacuation  is 
styled  "concentration,"  and,  though  the  policy  which  dictates  it  is  a  sound  and 


48  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

a  prudent  one,  it  is  also  a  definite  proof  that  we  are  endeavouring  to  occupy  a 
half-conquered  country  with  a  diminishing  and  hopelessly  inadequate  force. 

No  event  is  the  outcome  of  a  single  antecedent  circumstance.  We  may 
blame  the  incapacity  of  our  Government  and  the  errors  of  our  generals,  our 
want  of  mounted  troops,  the  vast  distances,  sickness  and  climate.  But  causes 
are  moral  as  well  as  physical;  and  we  must  not  forget  the  moral  causes — our 
own  pride  and  the  character  of  the  Boer.  With  a  flippancy  and  shallowness  that 
cannot  be  too  strongly  condemned,  the  Government  assumed  that  the  enemy 
was  not  really  in  earnest,  that  he  did  not  mean  what  he  said,  and  could  not  do 
what  he  would.  A  nation  cannot  dispense  with  the  quality  of  pride;  but  the 
pride  which  disdains  facts  and  prefers  to  run  it  head  against  any  obstacle  rather 
than  to  use  its  eyes,  always  has  led  and  always  will  lead  to  disaster.  It  was 
pride  of  this  kind  that  caused  us  to  misjudge  the  character  of  the  Boer,  to 
underestimate  his  resources,  and  to  decry  his  military  skill. 

We  may  justly  assume  that  British  infantry  have  suffered  no  considerable 
deterioration  since  the  days  of  Wellington,  and  we  must  seek  in  the  qualities 
of  our  foe  one  of  the  causes  of  our  failure.  The  extraordinary  mobility  of  the 
Boers,  their  rapidity  of  movement,  and  their  skill  in  the  management  and 
'preservation  of  their  horses,  have  proved  of  enormous  advantage  to  them. 
They  are  born  hunters  and  soldiers.  It  is  a  simple  fact  that  only  twice  in  our 
history  have  British  infantry  been  unequal  to  the  task  assigned  them.  In  1775 
our  army  was  defeated  again  and  again  by  a  force  of  farmers  who  had  had  no 
military  training  and  little  experience  of  warfare.  A  hundred  and  twenty-five 
years  later  the  same  infantry  again  met  an  army  of  warlike  farmers,  inferior  to 
numbers  to  our  American  colonists  and  outnumbered  by  us  in  the  proportion  of 
ten  to  one,  and  our  army  again  proved  unequal  to  its  task. 

To  forecast  the  future  of  the  campaign  would  be  foolish  and  presumptuous. 
It  may,  however,  not  be  out  of  place  to  offer  a  general  estimate  of  its  probable 
course:  later  we  will  examine  the  expenditure  in  money  which  it  must  necessi- 
tate. In  the  first  place,  we  may  assume  that  the  only  thing  that  can  bring  the 
war  to  a  speedy  end  is  the  general  surrender  of  the  Boers,  either  unconditionally 
under  compulsion,  or  through  the  offer  to  them  by  the  British  Ministry  of  such 
terms  as  they  will  accept.  It  is  not  rash  to  dismiss  each  of  these  alternatives 
as  unlikely.  General  Botha's  rejection  of  Mr.  Chamberlain's  proposals  was 
definite  and  summary,  and  Mr.  Chamberlain  is  not  likely  at  present  to  stultify 
himself  by  making  a  more  generous  offer  to  the  Boers.  He  might  indeed — and 
we  hope  that  he  will — keep  the  door  open  for  negotiations  on  the  lines  already 
laid  down;  and  no  doubt  if  we  are  able  to  keep  up  the  pressure  on  the  Boers  the 
time  may  come  sooner  or  later  when  they  would  accept  the  terms  they  have 
rejected.  But  there  is  a  powerful  feeling  that  the  rejection  by  the  Boers  of  our 
terms  should  be  made  an  excuse  for  withdrawing  all  such  offers  for  the  future. 
If  that  spirit  prevails  we  have  to  face  the  indefinite  prolongation  of  this  war. 

The  factors  of  failure  of  success  are  uncertain.  We  do  not  know  how  far 
the  national  spirit  of  the  Boers  will  carry  them  and  to  what  extent  their  stock 
of  ammunition,  food,  and  horses  has  been  exhausted.  On  the  other  hand,  we  do 
not  know,  and  we  are  not  likely  to  hear,  except  through  indirect  sources,  what 
further  hardships  our  own  army  can  endure  without  breaking  under  the  strain. 
The  duration  of  the  war,  therefore,  depends  on  conditions  which  it  is  impos- 
sible to  define.  One  thing  seems  clear.  We  shall  make  no  real  progress 
towards  peace  until  we  can  effectively  occupy  the  country.  Annexation  on 
paper  is  of  no  practical  value.  It  places  us  in  a  ridiculous  and  humiliating  posi- 
tion. We  occupy  a  town  and  hold  it  for  four  or  five  days.  Circumstances  then 
force  us  to  evacuate  the  town  and  to  move  to  some  other  point.  A  Boer  com- 
mando follows  close  on  our  heels  and  takes  our  place  until  it  in  its  turn  is 
succeeded  by  another  British  detachment,  which,  after  a  stay  of  a  few  weeks, 
gives  way  to  a  Dutch  force.     Thus  the  war  goes  on  revolving  on  its  own  axis. 


THE  CAMPAIGN.  49 

At  times  the  momentum  seems  less,  but  no  sooner  have  we  vowed  that  the  war 
is  at  last  going  to  stop  than  the  revolutions  begin  again  and  the  old  familiar 
names — Lindley,  Wepener,  Rustenburg,  Zeerust — fly  round  faster  than  ever. 
There  is  no  ordered  march  towards  peace,  no  steady  reduction  of  difficulties,  no 
gradual  contraction  of  the  area  of  war. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  a  lengthy  campaign  in  a  foreign  country  is  not 
always  terminated  by  a  decisive  victory  of  one  side.  One  of  our  gravest  errors 
has  been  to  compare  in  our  own  minds  our  struggle  against  the  Boers  with  a 
war  which  Germany  might  wage  against  France,  or  Italy  against  Austria.  We 
have  hoped  that  the  flight  of  the  enemy's  main  bodies  or  the  occupation  of  their 
capitals  would  imply  their  submission  or  subjugation  as  a  nation.  But  the 
Boers  are  not  a  European  nation.  Their  order  of  civilisation  is  not  that  of  a 
European  country  where  the  chief  population  is  gathered  in  towns  and  where 
to  capture  the  great  cities  is  to  annihilate  the  resistance  of  the  Governments. 
The  Boers  are  farmers,  and  to  capture  Pretoria  or  Bloemfontein  is  not  to  sever 
a  main  artery  and  destroy  the  life  of  the  State.  In  a  highly  developed  State 
organism  the  life  of  the  parts  depends  on  the  centre.  Not  so  in  the  Boer 
Republics.  Each  part  as  it  is  severed  seems  capable  of  separate  life,  and  our 
task  is  comparable  to  the  labour  of  Hercules  in  his  bouts  with  the  Hydra.  Nor 
has  the  resource  of  Hercules  availed  us  much.  We  have  indeed  destroyed  the 
greatest  number  of  their  farms  and  attempted  to  clear  their  lands  of  cattle  and 
standing  crops,  just  as  Iolas  in  the  fable  applied  the  burning  iron  to  the  wounds 
of  the  Hydra  as  each  head  was  cut  off.  But  it  is  impossible  to  kill  all  the 
sources  of  life,  and  it  is  probable  that  there  still  remains  in  the  two  territories 
sufficient  to  feed  the  Boers  for  several  years. 

If  a  man  asks  what  reasonable  hope  we  can  form  of  ending  the  war  without 
negotiations  within  a  definite  period,  we  are  bound  to  answer  that  our  final 
victory  must  be  measured  by  the  annihilation  of  the  Boers.  While  a  thousand 
Boers  remain  with  bandoliers  full  and  biltong  enough  to  keep  body  and  soul 
together,  so  long  will  they  resist  our  occupation  and  so  long  will  our  victory  be 
incomplete.  If  we  are  to  estimate  the  resisting  power  of  our  foes  we  must,  to 
a  certain  extent,  calculate  by  the  methods  of  arithmetic.  Most  of  the  prisoners 
whom  our  flying  columns  have  lately  captured  have  been  old  men  or  boys  or  non- 
combatant  Boers;  but  let  us  assume  that  we  catch  or  kill  300  fighting  Boers  in 
a  month,  and  to  this  number  let  us  add  a  further  150  incapacitated  by  wounds 
or  disease.  If  we  multiply  450  by  12  we  arrive  at  a  total  of  5,400;  and  if  we 
assume  that  the  number  of  Boers  still  in  arms  against  us  is  15,000  men,  we  find 
that  at  the  end  of  a  year  we  shall  have  accounted  for  about  a  third  the  number 
of  our  enemy.  Nor  must  we  forget  that  the  operations  of  small  bodies  of  Boers 
are  almost  as  dangerous  and  disconcerting  to  the  peace  of  the  country  as  the 
movements  of  larger  bodies. 

In  estimating  the  duration  of  Boer  resistance,  we  must  be  careful  not  to 
adopt  the  standards  which  we  should  apply  to  a  European  race.  The  Boer  is 
not  an  Englishman  or  a  Frenchman;  he  can  live  where  an  Englishman  would 
starve.  Wellington  said  that  an  English  soldier  moved  on  his  stomach;  but  the 
Boer  can  carry  in  his  saddlebag  sufficient  food  for  a  fortnight.  He  can  ride  all 
day  or  all  night  without  tiring  his  horse,  and  can  keep  it  going  for  a  fortnight. 
He  is  accustomed  to  a  life  of  hardship  in  the  open  air.  Nor  must  we  place  too 
much  confidence  on  the  probable  failure  of  his  food  or  ammunition. 

The  Boers  have  not,  indeed,  operated  in  considerable  bodies,  but  their 
generals  have  commanded  and  are  commanding  in  several  places  forces  which 
number  from  2,000  to  4,000  men,  and  as  the  whole  force  of  the  two  Republics 
did  not,  in  the  first  instance,  number  more  than  45,000  men,  and  as  their  forces 
are  now  spread  over  a  large  extent  of  country,  it  is  not  incorrect  to  say  that  a 
force  of  2,000  Boers  is,  in  relation  to  the  numbers  at  their  disposal,  as  regular 
and  substantial  a  body  of  men  as  an  army  corps  would  be  in  relation  to  the 


So  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

aggregate  forces  of  France  or  Germany.  That  this  war,  if  it  is  continued,  will 
degenerate  into  a  guerilla  war  is  true.  But  it  does  not  follow  that  because 
it  will  so  degenerate  it  will  become  less  difficult.  It  is  a  historical  fact  that  no 
war  is  so  difficult  to  suppress  as  the  irregular  warfare  which  the  population  of 
a  vast  country,  fighting  for  its  independence,  is  able  to  carry  on  against  the 
invader. 

A  guerilla  war  can  be  extended  for  an  indefinite  period  by  a  brave  and 
hardy  race  without  any  visible  means  of  subsistence.  Food  and  ammunition 
find  their  way  through  a  hundred  unknown  approaches.  Sympathisers  at  home 
and  abroad  never  cease  to  send  the  necessaries  of  life  and  warfare,  and  hundreds 
ot  willing  and  adventurous  hands  will  furnish  the  foes  of  England  the  means 
which  they  require.  The  country  is  enormous,  the  population  is  sparse,  and  the 
difficulties  of  policing  it  will  be  almost  insuperable.  The  Boers  will  have  three 
great  factors  in  their  favour.  They  will  have  time,  and  distance,  and  the  char- 
acter of  their  people.  Time  will  exhaust  our  army  through  disease  and  weari- 
ness; distance  may  increase  our  difficulties  to  the  breaking  point;  and  the 
character  of  their  people  will  preserve  in  their  hearts  the  undying  hope  of 
freedom.  Against  them  are  the  fewness  of  their  numbers  and  their  isolation 
from  the  rest  of  the  world. 

The  recent  examples  of  such  warfare  are  ominous  ,and  the  fact  that  the 
Minister  of  War  thought  it  necessary  to  mention  these  examples  in  December 
is  evidence  that  the  Ministry  have  at  last  begun  to  take  a  serious  view  of  the 
prospects  of  a  speedy  pacification  of  the  two  provinces.  The  war  which  Spain 
waged  for  many  years  in  Cuba  and  the  Philippines  had  no  result  save  that  of 
exhaustion  for  Spain.  Napoleon  in  Spain  found  it  impossible  to  suppress  a  war 
which  the  guerillas  waged  without  cessation  against  his  finest  troops;  and  the 
third  Napoleon  saw  his  army  consume  away  under  the  incessant  attacks  of  the 
Mexicans  and  the  slow  inroad  of  disease.  America  is  experiencing  the  humil- 
iating difficulties  which  we,  if  we  are  unwise,  are  likely  to  experience  in  South 
Africa.  It  is  true  that  the  Russians  were  able  to  subdue  and  to  hold  Poland; 
and  that  Austria,  after  many  efforts,  has  pacified  Bosnia;  and  that  England 
holds  Ireland  in  comparative  peace.  But  the  conditions  which  obtain  in  these 
instances  are  absent  in  the  case  of  South  Africa.  Poland  is  on  the  frontier  of 
Russia,  Bosnia  is  on  the  frontier  of  Austria,  and  Ireland  is  but  a  few  hours 
distant  from  England.  The  three  subject  territories  can  therefore  be  invaded 
at  a  few  hours'  notice  by  the  conqueror,  and  the  army  of  occupation  can  be  fed 
and  reinforced  with  as  little  difficulty  as  London  can  send  provisions  to  Edin- 
burgh. The  two  annexed  territories  are  not  on  our  confines.  The  land  which 
borders  them  on  the  south  is  now  disloyal  and  hostile,  and  the  two  Republics 
and  Cape  Colony  are  6,000  miles  from  our  shores. 

What  is  now  the  military  situation  in  South  Africa?  In  spite  of  the  opti- 
mistic telegrams  of  correspondents  and  the  hopeful  outlook  of  Ministers,  it 
cannot  be  denied  that  the  situation  is  dangerous.  The  simplest  test  of  our 
success  is  our  power  of  effective  occupation.  There  is  little  practical  value  in 
the  seizure  of  a  town  or  position  by  an  army  if  that  army  is  obliged  to  evacuate 
it  in  a  short  time;  nor  was  it  necessary  to  have  Sir  Alfred  Milner's  confirmation 
of  our  worst  fears  to  know  that  we  hold  now  in  the  two  Republics  far  less  terri- 
tory than  we  held  in  August,  1900. 

The  simple  fact  is  that,  as  our  two  maps  will  show,1  with  a  few  exceptions, 
the  only  posts  held  by  us  in  the  Transvaal  and  the  Free  State  are  our  positions 
on  the  various  railway  lines,  and  a  belt,  a  few  miles  wide,  on  each- 
side.  The  northern  portion  of  the  Free  State,  in  which  are  situated 
such  important  towns  as  Heilbron,  Winburg,  Vrede,  Lindley,  Lichten- 
burg,    and    Hoopstad,    is    obviously    in    the    possession    of   the    Boers;  and 

1  These  maps  can,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  be  only  approximately  accurate. 


50a 


< 
2 


THE  CAMPAIGN.  51 

though  these  districts  are  at  intervals  visited  by  flying  columns  of  British 
troops,  they  are  three  weeks  out  of  four,  for  all  practical  purposes,  under  Boer 
jurisdiction  and  are  administered  by  Boer  commandants.  The  southern  district 
of  the  same  State  contains  such  towns  as  Wepener,  Helvetia,  Smithneld,  Philip- 
polis,  and  Fauresmith;  and  we  have  been  informed  in  successive  despatches  that 
all  these  places  have  been  evacuated  by  British  troops,  and  that  the  British 
magistrates  have  been  superseded  by  Boer  landdrosts. 

In  the  Transvaal,  where  there  is  obviously  a  greater  force  of  British  troops, 
there  is  probably  a  somewhat  more  effective  occupation,  but  even  here  our  posi- 
tion is  extraordinary  and  somewhat  ludicrous.  We  have  been  told  that  under 
the  new  civil  administration  of  Sir  Alfred  Milner,  resident  magistrates  will  bef 
established  in  Pretoria,  Potchefstroom,  Johannesburg,  Krugersdorp,  and  Boks- 
burg.  These  five  towns  are  important,  and  to  the  casual  reader  it  might 
appear  satisfactory  that  we  are  now  in  a  position  to  make  them  centres  for  our 
magistrates;  but  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  the  motive  of  their  choice.  They  are 
all  on  the  railway  and  are  therefore  under  the  protection  of  the  British  troops 
which  guard  that  railway.  The  other  chief  towns  of  the  Transvaal,  important 
either  for  local  or  strategical  causes,  such  as  Ventersdorp,  Bethel,  Rustenburg, 
Zeerust,  and  Lichtenburg,  are  either  in  the  possession  of  the  Boers,  or  their 
British  garrisons  are  besieged  by  the  Boers.  Our  present  forces,  even  in  their 
full  fighting  strength,  are  not  numerous  enough  to  hold  a  country  so  vast,  so 
hostile,  and  so  sparsely  peopled;  exhausted  as  they  are  by  disease,  by  constant 
marching,  exposure,  and  want  of  food,  they  are  unable  to  do  much  more  than 
hold  the  railways,  which  are  to  them  the  indispensable  conditions  of  their 
existence. 

Lord  Kitchener  has,  indeed,  a  certain  number  of  mounted  troops  whom  he 
can,  after  certain  periods  of  rest  and  refreshment,  send  forth  against  the  too 
mobile  forces  of  the  Boers.  What  success  these  operations  have  attained,  any 
one  who  has  carefully  followed  the  events  of  the  last  three  months  may  easily 
appreciate.  We  know  now  that  General  French's  great  converging  movement 
in  the  Eastern  Transvaal  was,  from  the  military  point  of  view,  a  failue.  He  failed 
to  surround  the  main  body  of  the  Boers,  and  in  spite  of  his  enormous  captures 
of  stock,  the  enemy  still  manages  to  subsist  in  the  districts  he  denuded.  The 
same  thing  has  taken  place  in  the  south-east  corner  of  the  Orange  State.  Our 
failed  to  capture  De  Wet  and  his  commandoes  is  not  exceptional,  but  typical. 
We  have  won  isolated  triumphs  against  De  La  Rey  and  other  Boer  leaders;  and 
we  are  constantly  capturing  or. receiving  the  surrender  of  small  bodies.  But  of 
victory  on  a  large  scale,  of  the  gradual  envelopment  of  the  chief  fighting  forces 
of  our  enemy,  there  is  no  sign. 

We  are  winning,  but  can  we  afford  to  win  so  slowly?  What  will  be  the  state 
of  our  own  army  at  the  end  of  another  year  of  unceasing  warfare?1  That  is  a 
question  which  few  men  are  able,  and  some  would  not  dare,  to  answer;  but  we 
must  face  it.  We  are  losing  now  by  death,  wounds,  and  sickness  from  2,000  to 
3,000  men  a  month.'  Nor  will  the  approach  of  winter  be  greatly  in  our  favour. 
The  growing  exhaustion  of  the  army  will  render  it  more  susceptible  to  disease, 
which,  working  on  weakened  constitutions,  the  cold  intensifies.  We  do  not 
know  how  many  of  our  250,000  soldiers  are  efficient,  but  we  do  know  that  20,000 

'It  is  bare  justice  to  say  that  at  one  time  quite  alone  among  a  chorus  of  optimistic 
prophets  one  military  critic  has  from  the  first  foretold  the  dangers  of  this  campaign.  Colonel 
H.  B.  Hanna,  in  various  letters  and  articles,  was  wise  enough  and  courageous  enough,  eve« 
at  the  time  of  our  triumphant  advances,  to  say  that  our  elation  was  premature,  and  that 
distance,  disease,  and  depression  were  foes  more  difficult  to  conquer  than  the  Boers.  He 
pointed  out  that  the  invaded  territory  was  one  which  it  would  be  impossible  effectively  to 
occupy  without  an  enormous  army,  and  that  in  a  land  so  vast  and  hostile  it  would  be 
impossible  for  an  indefinite  period  to  feed  such  an  army. 

*  The  following  table  gives  the  total  number  of  casualties  reached  month  by  month  from 


52  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

are  in  hospital;  we  may  assume  that  100,000  are  guarding  the  line9,  and  that 
hundreds  are  being  incapacitated  every  week  by  despair  and  weariness  for  the 
performance  of  those  labours  which  are  only  possible  to  men  of  unimpaired 
physique  and  undaunted  spirit.  We  know  that  Lord  Kitchener  is  eager  that  this 
war  should  cease  on  terms  honourable  to  the  Boers.  He  knows  what  his  army 
can  do;  he  knows  what  it  cannot  do. 

If  this  war  is  to  end  in  a  complete  victory  for  our  forces  we  must  recruit 
those  forces  with  substantial  reinforcements.  It  is  useless  to  send  out  men  in 
hundreds,  for  the  wastage  of  our  army  proceeds  at  such  a  rapid  rate  that  even 
if  we  despatch  3,000  men  on  a  given  day,  they  will  not  be  sufficient  to  fill  the 
gaps  caused  by.  sickness  in  the  army  while  they  are  on  the  high  seas.  War  is 
not  altogether  a  sum  in  arithmetic.  The  most  deadly  foe  of  an  army  is  one 
whom  we  cannot  see  and  whom  no  words  can  adequately  describe.  It  is  called 
by  many  names — exhaustion,  weariness,  depression,  heartsickness,  staleness; 
but  by  whatever  name  it  is  known,  it  is  invincible.  If  it  is  true  that  this  enemy 
has  found  an  entrance  into  the  hearts  of  the  British  army  in  South  Africa,  we 
may  be  sure  that  no  general  of  ours  can  conquer  it.     It  can  only  be  cured  or 

the  beginning  of  the  war  to  April,  1901.  In  this  table  the  prisoners  recovered  are  deducted 
from  the  totals : — 

Missing 
Killed  in     Died  of  and  Died  of    Sent  home 

action.        wounds,    prisoners,      disease,      invalided.         Total. 

Oct.,  1899,  to  Feb.,  1900 1,652  264  3,244  723  2,306  8,237t 

March 2,130  461  3,476  1,207  4.004  11,687 

April 2,221  533  3,958  1,909  6,149  14.824 

May 2,369  588  4,526  3,173  n,343  22,045 

June 2,634  657  1,687*  4,100  17,142  26,298 

July 2,731  732  2,818  4,867  23,655  34,803 

August 2,880  811  2,833  S.363  28,497  40,561 

September 3,037  911  819*  5,903  31,626  42,296 

October 3,204  982  829  6,270  34,499  45,784 

November 3,329  1,044  x,25o  6,719  37,009  49,728 

December 3,540  1,132  903*  7,181  38,624  51,687 

1901. 

January 3,680  1,184  937  7,793  40,798  54,724 

February 3,824  1,284  800  8,385  42,357  56,95° 

March :.  3,936  1,301  775*  8,893  45,426  60,625 

April 4,022  1,345  781*  9,181  47,739  63,498 

*  Reduction  in  number  of  prisoners  due  to  release. 

t  The  discrepancy  between  these  totals  and  the  sum  of  the  items  given  is  due  to  the 
deaths  from  accidents,  which  have  not  been  set  out  in  detail. 

t  The  total  of  prisoners  taken  during  the  war,  not  deducting  those  recovered,  is  8,703. 

Note — The  war  in  South  Africa  has  added  over  $1,000,000,000  to  the  taxation  of  Great 
Britain,  and  is  costing  at  the  present  time  over  $1,000,000  per  day  to  support  troops  in  the 
field  and  the  Boer  prisoners  at  St.  Helena,  Ceylon  and  the  Bermuda  Islands.  The  failure 
of  the  British  army  to  open  the  Kimberley  and  Johannesburg  mines  has  deprived  British  stock- 
holders of  dividends  on  securities  listed  at  $850,000,000,  reduced  the  output  of  diamonds 
and  gold  $284,000,000.  These  tremendous  sums  subtracted  from  British  resources  have 
resulted  in  the  impairment  of  the  values  of  many  kinds  of  securities  dealt  in  by  London 
stockbrokers,  and  are  the  superinducing  cause  of  numerous  bankruptcies  in  British  financial 
circles.  The  diamond  and  gold  mines  are  idle ;  they  are  not  producing  a  dollar.  Sir  Michael 
Hicks-Beach,  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  in  presenting  the  budget  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  April  17,  1901,  said :  "The  war  can  no  longer  be  considered  a  small  affair,  as  it 
has  cost  the  government  £146,567,000  ($732,835,000),  double  the  cost  of  the  Crimean  War, 
and  the  end  is  not  yet. 

Since  the  beginning  of  the  war  Great  Britain's  loss  in  killed,  wounded,  died  of  disease 
and  invalided  home  exceeds  100,000  troops,  not  including  25,000  prisoners  that  have  been 
captured  by  the   Boers. 

British  Consols  in  1900  were  rated  above  par  (104),  and  although  bolstered  up  by  manipu- 
lation stand  to-day  (November,  1901)  at  <B|:  while  French  Rents  are  above  par  and  United 
States  bonds   are  at   120.  a  - 


THE  CAMPAIGN.  53 

vanquished  by  the  despatch  of  new  bodies  of  men  to  take  the  place  of  those 
worn  out  by  its  attack,  by  the  exhilaration  which  comes  of  winning  definite  vic- 
tories, by  better  food,  by  rest,  and  by  the  ceasing  of  the  aimless  pursuit  of  a 
phantom  foe. 

The  review  of  the  whole  situation,  of  the  lessons  of  the  past  and  of  the 
prospects  of  the  future,  forces  us  to  conclude  that  unless  the  Boers  surrender  in 
a  body,  or  unless  we  are  able  by  a  succession  of  striking  victories  to  capture 
their  main  commandoes,  we  shall  be  obliged  to  avoid  the  exhaustion  of  our  own 
forces  by  offering  to  the  Boers  such  terms  as  may  induce  them  to  lay  down  their 
arms.  In  theory  we  can  continue  the  war  indefinitely  until  every  Boer  is  either 
dead  or  in  prison.  But  in  practice  such  a  process  may  demand  sacrifices  so 
enormous  that  the  tardy  conqueror  may  well  ask  himself  whether  the  result  will 
be  worth  the  cost. 

It  is  impossible  that  the  present  situation  can  last  indefinitely.  Sucn  a 
situation  does  not  automatically  improve:  on  the  other  hand  it  automatically 
becomes  worse.  Time  solves  many  problems;  but  is  time  really  on  our  side  in 
this  war?  When  every  week  of  war  means  the  loss  from  one  cause  or  another 
of  five  hundred  men  and  of  more  than  a  million  and  a  half, of  money,  bids  fair 
to  ruin  three  British  Colonies,  decreases  the  efficiency  and  popularity  of  the 
army,  aggravates  the  difficulty  of  working  our  voluntary  military  system,  and 
maims  our  policy  in  all  parts  of  the  world — will  ultimate  victory  be  other  than 
Cadmean? 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE     ENEMY. 

NO  nation  can  be  just  to  its  foes.  The  passions  of  war  inflame  our  minds, 
and  prejudice  obscures  the  truth.  Thus  we  have  conjured  up  for  our- 
selves a  fantastic  and  outrageous  image  which  we  call  a  Boer.  This 
savage  being  was  hideous  in  form,  unkempt  and  unwashed,1  violent,  hypocritical, 
a  persecutor  and  an  assassin2  of  the  English.  He  abused  the  white  flag,  he  used 
explosive  bullets,  and  he  was  altogether  outside  the  pale  of  civilised  nations,  a 
swindler,  a  coward,  a  brigand. 

A  paper  of  the  highest  position  described  the  Boers  as  "brigands," 
"dacoits,"  "marauders,"  "ruffians,"  "filibusterers,"  "banditti,"  "mobs  of  despera- 
does," "midnight  marauders,"  "squads  of  caterans." 

Another  paper  asserted  that  the  Boer  was  a  semi-savage;  another  com- 
pared him  to  a  pickpocket  or  a  burglar;  yet  another  spoke  of  the  Boers  as 
"hounds,"  and  of  their  conduct  as  "devilish." 

Inflamed  and  maddened  by  the  telegrams  of  excitable  correspondents, 
irritated  by  the  prolongation  of  a  war  which  had  long  passed  its  allotted  span  of 
six  months,  alarmed  by  thejiumerous  disasters  which  we  could  only  assign  to 
malign  influences,  the  public  began  to  clamour  for  severity."  The  unexpected 
difficulties  which  followed  the  occupation  of  Pretoria  and  the  extraordinary 
activity  of  the  Boers  excited  some  of  our  advisers  to  further  violence.  The 
public  was  told  that  too  much  leniency  had  been  shown,  that  war  is  not  made 
with  rose-water,  and  that  a  ruthless  policy  is  in  the  long  run  the  most  merciful.4 
Lord  Roberts  and  Lord  Kitchener  were  urged  to  proclaim  a  policy  of  "No 
quarter"  and  to  "shoot  at  sight"  as  a  rebel  every  Boer  who  fell  into  their  hands.5 

'A  great  London  newspaper  printed  a  description  of  the  surrender  of  Cronje,  in  which 
his  followers  were  described  as  "cowardly,"  "shuffling,"  "unpatriotic,"  "cunning,"  "boorish," 
"ungrateful,"  "shifty-eyed,"  "clod-hopping,"  "cruel,"  "clumsy,"  "greedy,"  "cheating,"  "mean," 
"underhand,"  "foxy,"  "savage,"  "dull-witted,"  "misshapen,"  "treacherous,"  and  "brutal," 
and  they  were  compared  with  pig-dealers,  money-lenders,  oxen,  and  orang-outangs. 

*  A  circumstantial  description  was  circulated  in  the  daily  papers  of  the  slaughter  of 
refugee  women  and  children  during  the  first  few  days  of  the  war,  followed  by  an  account 
of  the  murder  by  the  Boers  at  Harrismith  of  an  Englishman  named  M'Lachlan  who  was  shot 
for  refusing  to  fight  against  England.  M'Lachlan  was  in  excellent  health  six  months  after 
this.  It  was  stated  in  a  weekly  journal  that  the  Boer  women  made  a  practice  of  killing  the 
wounded.  It  was  stated  in  another  paper  that  Mr.  Kruger  had  wedged  a  young  girl  between 
two  pieces  of  wood  and  had  sawed  both  the  wood  and  the  girl  through  with  his  own  hands. 

*  "Not  only  should  he  be  slain,  but  slain  with  the  same  ruthlessness  that  they  slay 
a  plague-infected  rat.  Exeter  Hall  may  shriek,  but  blood  there  will  be,  and  plenty  of  it, 
and  the  more  the  better.  The  Boer  resistance  will  further  this  plan  and  enable  us  to  find 
that  Imperial  Great  Britain  is  fiercely  anxious  for  the  excuse  to  blot  out  the  Boers  as  a 
nation,  to  turn  their  land  into  a  vast  shambles,  and  remove  their  name  from  the  muster-roll 
of  South  Africa." 

*  A  well-known  paper  censured  the  mildness  of  Lord  Roberts's  policy  and  advised  that 
the  whole  country  should  be  cleared,  and  that  women  should  be  "transported  or  despatched." 
Many  months  ago,  a  correspondent  in  a  well-known  paper  suggested,  with  editorial  approval, 
that  the  war  should  be  "smothered  with  women." 

*A  great  paper  in  October  denied  that  the  Boers  in  the  field  were  entitled  to  the  rights 
of  combatants.  They  were  brigands;  and  they  were  compared  to  the  agrarian  murderers  in 
Ireland.    It  was  stated  that  a  point  had  now  been  reached  when  the  services  of  the  Provost 


THE  ENEMY.  5S 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  few  of  the  grosser  charges  which  have  been 
brought  against  the  Boers  have  been  confirmed  or  justified.  There  have,  no 
doubt,  been  instances  of  brutality  and  treachery,  of  the  use  of  expansive  bullets, 
and  the  abuse  of  the  white  flag.'  But  we  must  remember  that  the  whole  Boer 
population — high  and  low,  virtuous  and  vicious — has  been  in  the  field,  and  every 
nation  holds  some  villains.  On  the  whole,  the  Boers  have  observed  the  hon- 
ourable traditions  of  warfare,  they  have  not  shot  our  prisoners,  and  nearly  every 
piece  of  evidence  which  comes  to  us  from  a  respectable  quarter  proves  that  if 
there  is  one  virtue  in  the  Boer  character,  it  is  their  tender  care  of  the  wounded." 

It  is  significant  that  in  very  few  cases  have  English  soldiers  been  guilty 
of  calumny  towards  a  brave  foe  fighting  against  enormous  odds."  Gallant  and 
chivalrous  Englishmen  have  not  been  backward  in  defending  their  stubborn 
adversaries.  General  Porter,  who  has  recently  returned  from  the  front,  bears 
this  witness:  "The  Boers  are  a  brave  nation  who  fight  gallantly  and  well. 
They  have  treated  British  prisoners  with  every  consideration,  and  the  wounded 
with  the  same  care  as  they  would  their  own.  On  a  few  occasions  the  white  flag 
was  abused,  but  in  what  large  community  would  they  not  find  a  few 
miscreants?" 

Mr.  Conan  Doyle,  who  was  with  Lord  Roberts  during  the  early  part  of  the 
war,  speaks  thus  of  the  Boers: — 

"Whatever  else  may  be  laid  to  the  charge  of  the  Boer,  it  can  never  be 
truthfully  said  that  he  is  a  coward  or  a  man  unworthy  of  the  Briton's  steel.  The 
words  were  written  early  in  the  campaign,  and  the  whole  Empire  will  indorse 
them  to-day.     Could  we  have  such  men  as  willing  fellow-citizens,  they  are  worth 

Marshal  were  necessary,  and  when  the  prompt  and  ruthless  punishment  of  every  insurgent 
burgher  caught  in  delicto  was  required. 

A  popular  paper,  commenting  on  the  rumour  that  Lord  Kitchener  had  issued  orders 
that  no  quarter  was  to  be  given,  remarked,  "We  should  like  to  believe  it.  If  the  British 
authorities  could  make  up  their  minds,  once  and  for  all,  to  treat  De  Wet  and  his  banditti 
as  banditti  should  be  treated,  much  bloodshed,  Boer  and  English,  would  be  avoided,  and 
the  war  would  be  brought  to  an  end  much  sooner." 

1  Very  few  instances  of  this  can  be  definitely  proved ;  and  it  is  well  known  that  where, 
as  in  a  modern  battle,  the  line  of  fighting  is  long  and  irregular,  it  is  almost  impossible  for 
combatants  at  one  end  of  the  line  to  see  the  sign  of  surrender  at  the  other.  It  may  reasonably 
and  fairly  be  allowed  that  in  all  wars  such  charges  and  recriminations  are  frequent,  that 
the  greater  number  of  such  acts  of  apparent  treachery  are  the  results  of  a  natural  misunder- 
standing ;  and  that  most  of  them  exist  only  in  the  imagination  of  those  who  did  not  see  them. 

2  The  following  case  is  characteristic  of  the  heedless  levity  with  which  outrages  are 
manufactured  in  South  Africa : — 

Captain  H.  G.  Casson,  South  Wales  Borderers,  writes  from  Krugersdorp,  under  date 
March  14th : — 

"The  following  Reuter  telegram  appeared  in  the  Times  weekly  edition  of  February  15th, 
under  heading  'The  Military  Situation' : — 

"  'Krugersdorp,  February  2nd. — It  is  stated  that  Dr.  Walker,  who  was  among  the  killed, 
had  received  three  bullet  wounds,  but  was  finally  despatched  by  a  Boer,  who  battered  in 
his  skull  with  a  stone.' 

"As  I  was  in  command  of  the  post  captured  at  Mo'dderfontein,  I  trust  that,  in  common 
fairness  to  the  enemy,  and  with  a  view  to  minimising  as  far  as  possible  the  pain  that  must 
already  have  been  caused,  you  will  allow  me  to  offer  an  unqualified  denial  to  the  above  state- 
ment. Dr.  Walker  was  hit  once  only,  and  by  a  stray  bullet,  on  the  early  morning  of  January 
31st  while  it  was  still  dark;  he  died  the  same  afternoon  from  the  natural  effects  of  the 
wound. 

"Every  possible  kindness  was  shown  to  the  wounded  by  the  Boers,  who  posted  a  sentry 
to  see  that  no  one  came  near  or  otherwise  interfered  with  them.  The  Boer  commandant 
present  at  the  time  expressed  to  Dr.  Walker  his  sorrow  that  he  should  have  been  wounded, 
and  later  in  the  day  the  Boer  General  himself  personally  expressed  to  me  his  deep  regret 
for  the  sad  occurrence,  while  many  of  the  burghers,  when  conversing  with  my  men,  also  spoke 
to  the  same  effect." 

*"We  admire  the  Boers  awfully,  and  a  large  number  of  us  are  pro-Boers."  (Extract 
from  a  private  letter.) 


56  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

more  than  all  the  gold  mines  of  their  country."  Mr.  Doyle  has  further  said: 
"The  Boers  have  been  the  chief  victims  of  a  great  deal  of  cheap  slander  in  the 
Press.  The  men  who  have  seen  most  of  the  Boers  in  the  field  are  the  most  gen- 
erous in  estimating  their  character.  That  the  white  flag  was  hoisted  by  the 
Boers  as  a  cold-blooded  device  for  luring  our  men  into  the  open  is  an  absolute 
calumny.     To  discredit  their  valour  is  to  discredit  our  victory." 

The  wild  and  violent  attacks  on  Christian  Ue  Wet  have  been  unspeakably 
repugnant  to  reasonable  and  chivalrous  Englishmen,  whose  indignation  is 
aptly  reflected  in  the  following  letter  by  Mr.  Erskine  Childers,  who  fought  in 
the  ranks  of  the  City  Imperial  Volunteers: — 

"It  is  time  that  a  word  was  spoken  in  opposition  to  the  idea  that  General 
Christian  De  Wet  is  a  man  of  brutal  and  dishonourable  character. 
Those  who,  like  myself,  have  served  in  South  Africa,  fought  against 
him,  and  frequently  met  men  who  have  been  prisoners  under  him, 
look,  I  believe,  with  shame  and  indignation  on  the  attempts  made  to 
advertise  and  magnify  such  incidents  as  the  alleged  flogging  and  shoot- 
ing of  peace  envoys,  so  as  to  blacken  the  character  of  a  man  who 
throughout  the  war  held  a  reputation  with  our  troops  in  the  field  of 
being  not  only  a  gallant  soldier,  but  a  humane  and  honourable  gentle- 
man. We  may  deplore  the  desperate  tenacity  of  his  resistance.  Our 
duty  and  effort  is  to  overcome  it  by  'smashing'  him  in  the  field.  We 
gain  nothing  and  only  lose  in  self-respect  by  slandering  him. 

"But  the  stories  may  be  true,  and  in  their  worst  complexion.  My  point  is 
that  the  character  he  has  won  is  such  that  nothing  but  the  clearest 
proof,  after  full  inquiry,  of  his  complicity  in  or  responsibility  for  bar- 
barous and  dishonourable  acts  should  be  for  a  moment  listened  to  by 
fair-minded  persons. 

"His  whole  career  gives  the  lie  to  such  aspersions.  It  was  in  May  of  last 
year,  ten  months  ago,  that  he  first  gained  prominence.  Since  then  he 
has  fought  scores  of  engagements  with  us,  some  successful,  some 
unsuccessful,  never  with  a  suspicion  of  dishonourable  conduct.  He 
has  had  at  one  time  or  another  some  thousands  of  our  men  in  his 
hands  as  prisoners  of  war.  Many  of  them  I  have  myself  met.  At 
second  or  third  hand  I  have  heard  of  the  experiences  of  many  others. 

"I  never  heard  a  word  against  De  Wet.  When  men  suffered  hardships 
they  always  agreed  that  they  could  not  have  been  helped.  But  on  the 
other  hand  I  have  heard  many  stories  showing  exceptional  personal 
kindness  in  him  over  and  above  the  reasonable  degree  of  humanity 
which  is  expected  in  the  treatment  of  prisoners  of  war. 

"I  believe  this  view  of  him  is  universal  among  our  troops  in  South  Africa-. 
It  makes  one's  blood  boil  to  hear  such  a  man  called  a  brigand  and  a 
brute  by  civilian  writers  at  home,  who  take  as  a  text  the  reports  of 
these  solitary  incidents,  incomplete  and  one-sided  as  they  are,  and 
ignore — if,  indeed,  they  know  of  it — the  mass  of  testimony  in  his 
favour." 

Mr.  Childers  adds  that  the  same  may  be  said,  indeed,  of  the  whole  impres- 
sion of  the  Boers  received  by  the  public  in  England,  perhaps  because  it  seems 
impossible  to  admire  them  without  being  thought  to  sympathise  with  them. 

This  testimony  is  amply  supported  by  numerous  letters  from  officers  and 
private  soldiers  which  have  been  published,  in  which  the  highest  possible  char- 
acter has  been  given  to  De  Wet  on  the  score  of  his  heroism  and  his  chivalrous 
behaviour  to  our  sick  and  wounded. 

In  the  Standard  of  August  7, 1900  (p.  7),  is  given  part  of  a  letter  from  Lieut.- 
Col.  Stonham,  "in  command  of  the  Imperial  Yeomanry  Hospital  at  the  front," 


THE  ENEMY.  57 

to  Lady  Georgiana  Curzon.     He  had  been  taken  prisoner  at  Roodeval,  and  thus 
stated  his  experience: — 

"The  Boers  allowed  us  to  take  comforts,  &c,  from  the  station  before  they 
blew  it  up,  but  unfortunately  a  truck  we  had  loaded  was  also  blown  up. 
General  De  Wet  personally  stated  to  me,  when  I  went  to  his  laager, 
how  much  he  regretted  the  accident;  and  to  compensate  for  it  gave  me 
fifty  sheep,  which  he  had  sent  his  men  to  round  up  and  drive  into  the 
camp.    The  Boers  allowed  us  to  keep  all  the  tents  of  the  4th  Derbys 
for  our  hospital  use.    They  came  the  next  day  to  see  the  wounded, 
and  expressed  to  many  of  them,  and  to  us,  the  regret  they  felt.     Gen- 
eral De  Wet  gave  me  a  safe-conduct  for  any  convoy  we  might  wish  to 
send.     .     .     .     He  also  said  he  would  give  us  timely  warning  of  any 
impending  action.     .     .    .    They  gave   us   a   written   order,  which  I 
could  show  to  any  Boer  approaching  our  camp,  to  the  effect  that  none 
were  to  enter  for  fear  of  disturbing  the  sick.     ...     I  could  mention 
many   other   instances   of   consideration   we   have   received   at   their 
hands.     .     .     ." 
To  the  British  army  no  more  cruel  insult  can  be  offered  than  the  advice 
that  our  prisoners  of  war  should  be  shot1  because  they  refuse  to  abandon  their 
struggle  for  freedom.     The  soldier  knows  the  worth  and  valour  of  the  enemy 
whom  the  civilian  calumniates,  and  it  is  an  unhappy  compliment  to  our  army  to 
denounce  as  imbeciles  and  poltroons  and  marauding  bands  a  foe  which  has  held 
at  bay  for  over  eighteen  months  the  greatest  army  England  ever  sent  from  her 
shores. 

Most  of  the  blunders  which  have  characterised  our  South  African  policy 
during  the  last  thirty  years  have  resulted  from  want  of  sympathy  and  of  accurate 
information.  We  have  relied  on  blind  guides  and  on  prejudiced  witnesses.  The 
faults,  and  they  are  many,  of  the  Dutch  have  been  monstrously  exaggerated; 
and  their  virtues,  and  they  have  many,  have  been  obscured.  It  is  time  that  we 
try  to  understand  the  men  who  are  fighting  against  us.  We  have  determined 
to  subdue  them  and  to  rule  them,  and,  if  we  are  to  rule  them  with  success,  we 
must  learn  something  of  their  nature.  Understanding  comes  of  knowledge, 
and  there  will  be  no  peace  for  South  Africa  until  the  two  races  come  to  know 
one  another.  In  the  first  place,  therefore,  they  are  men  of  like  passions  with 
ourselves.  The  Boer  is  very  much  like  an  Englishman.  He  prefers  being  led 
to  being  driven;  he  answers  to  the  whip  by  stubbornness,  but  to  tact  and  sympa- 
thy with  loyalty  and  devotion.  He  is  the  most  stubborn  of  enemies,  but  the 
most  faithful  of  friends;  impressionable  as  a  child,  a  hostile  touch  makes  him 
strong  and  hard  as  adamant.  Keen  in  business,  he  has  an  added  dash  of  cun- 
ning which  makes  him  a  difficult  partner.  Born  of  a  little  nation  whose  fate  it 
has  been  always  to  struggle  for  its  existence  against  mighty  foes,  he  is  sus- 
picious, perverse,  and  intractable. 

The  English  in  South  Africa  haunt  the  towns;  the  Dutch  people  the  country 
districts.  The  townsman,  with  quicker  wits,  despises  the  farmer;  the  farmer 
suspects   the  townsman.1     The  average   Boer   is   very   much   like   the   average 

1  Common  sense  may  convert  those  whom  chivalry  does  not  influence.  To  put  the 
matter  on  the  lowest  ground,  if  we  were  to  shoot  all  Boer  prisoners,  we  should  lose  more 
than  we  should  gain.  If  De  Wet  and  the  other  Boer  generals  had  shot  all  our  men  who  sur- 
rendered to  them,  we  should  have  lost  by  this  means  alone  from  the  beginning  of  November, 
1900,  to  March,  1901,  nearly  two  thousand  English  soldiers. 

2  The  life  that  their  fathers  and  grandfathers  led  does  very  well  for  them;  they  are 
content  to  live  and  die  on  their  farms,  content  to  live  in  rough  comfort  and  to  die  with  the 
assurance  (not  always  forthcoming  in  these  latter  days)  that  those  they  leave  behind  will 
walk  in  their  footsteps.  Ambition  is  a  thing  they  know  nothing  of;  the  advantages  of 
wealth,  and  all  that  money  can  give  to  its  possessor,  do  not  seem  to  appeal  one  jot  to  the 
bulk  of  them.    ...    If  times  are  hard  and  comforts  scarce,  the  Boer  takes  his  bad  fortune 


58  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

Englishman  of  country  birth  and  agricultural  surroundings;  and  a  group  of  the 
better-class  Boer  farmers  might  be  with  difficulty  distinguished  from  a  group  of 
English  farmers.  You  have  in  the  men  themselves  the  same  qualities,  the  same 
simplicity  and  frugality,  the  same  stubbornness,  the  same  narrow  views  and 
suspicions,  the  same  strong  affections  and  strong  prejudices,  the  same  loyalty 
and  the  same  tenacity.1 

The  Boer  women  display  a  stubbornness  and  a  courage  equal  to  their  hus- 
bands. Herded  together  in  refuge  camps,  fed  on  scanty  rations,  and  often 
parted  from  their  children,  they  retain  an  invincible  faith  in  the  ultimate  freedom 
of  their  race.  "Go  and  fight,"  said  a  Boer  woman  to  her  husband;  "I  would 
rather  see  you  dead,  and  all  my  children  dead,  than  that  you  burghers  should 
cease  the  struggle."  These  women  are  the  mothers  of  the  next  generation.  Is 
it  wise  that  England  should  tempt  them  to  nurse  their  children  in  bitter  hatred 
of  our  race? 

It  is  a  fashionable  belief  that  all  Dutchmen  are  lazy  and  retrograde,  that 
they  sleep  in  a  waggon  all  day,  and  that  their  civilisation  is  mediaeval.  The 
extraordinary  activity  and  hardihood  of  the  Boers  in  war  is  sufficient  to  cast 
doubt  on  the  charge  of  laziness,  and  it  is  a  fact  that  nearly  all  the  agricultural 
progress  of  South  Africa  is  due  to  the  Dutch;  all  the  wheat  and  tobacco,  and 
the  vines,  are  grown  by  these  worthless  sluggards.  The  Orange  Free  State  was 
a  characteristic  example  of  Dutch  work,  and  it  was  a  model  for  any  Govern- 
ment in  the  world.  From  a  desert  it  was  made  into  a  prosperous  agricultural 
State ;  bridges  and  roads  were  made ;  a  complete  system  of  national  education 
was  provided;  while  telegraphs  and  railways  and  an  excellent  judicature  were  a 
proof  of  a  high  order  of  civilisation. 

_  That  the  Boers  have  ill-treated  the  natives  is  to  a  considerable  extent  true, 
but  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  native  has  fared  worse  at  their  hands  than  at  the 
hands  of  their  English  masters.2  To  any  South  African  a  black  man  belongs  to 
a  lower  order  of  humanity,  or,  to  be  quite  frank,  to  no  order  of  humanity;  and 
those  who  know  South  Africa  assert  that  the  natives  live  longer  with  a  Dutch 
master  than  with  an  Englishman,  for  though  the  former  may  treat  them  more 
harshly,  his  instinct  or  his  experience  gives  him  a  greater  success  as  a  master." 

The  radical  fault  of  the  Dutch  in  our  eyes  is  that  they  dislike  the  English. 
But  this  is  a  fault  which  cannot  be  cured  by  a  policy  of  abuse  or  dragooning;  it, 
is  to  be  cured  only  by  the  lapse  of  time,  by  sympathy,  and  by  the  frank  admis- 
sion of  high  qualities  in  our  opponents.  The  Dutch  are  less  progressive  than 
the  English,  and  Dutch  civilisation  is  undoubtedly  behind  the  civilisation  of 
England.  But  if  we  are  wise  we  shall  carry  our  thoughts  back  to  England  of 
1830,  and  remember  that  a  great  nation  whose  national  existence  was  then  to 

philosophically ;  next  year  may  be  a  good  one.  His  one  desire  in  life  seems  to  be  not  to 
be  disturbed,  to  continue  on  the  even  tenor  of  his  way  without  external  interference.  The 
busy  strife,  the  eager  competition,  the  unending  nervous  strain  of  modern  civilisation,  he 
regards  with  horror ;  his  very  soul  rises  up  in  revolt  against  it." — Macmillan's  Magazine, 
May,  1901. 

'Major  Spencer  Browne,  a  Queensland  contingent  officer,  writes  in  the  Brisbane 
Courier:  "I  never  want  to  meet  kinder,  more  hospitable  and  more  comfortable  people.  True, 
some  of  them  are  poor  and  ignorant,  but  the  general  run  of  them  live  comfortable,  rear  their 
families  well  and  with  fair  education.  They  are  the  reverse  of  what  we  have  been  taught 
to  consider  them.  It  will  be  a  happy  day  for  Australia  when  our  pastoral  country  is  settled 
by  as  fine  a  class  of  people." 

2  "They  appeared  to  be  under  the  impression  that  the  Boers  in  the  Transvaal  were 
fierce  and  unjust  aggressors,  and  that  they  dispossessed  the  natives  of  their  territory,  and 
brutally  ill-treated  them  afterwards.  He  wished  hon.  members  would  read  the  papers  before 
they  came  to  this  rash  and  inconsiderate  conclusion.  The  absolute  reverse  of  this  was  the 
fact."  Mr.  Chamberlain,  1881. 

'It  is  a  significant  fact  that  among  the  enactments  issued  in  March,  1901,  by  Sir  A. 
Milner  for  the  administration  of  the  new  Colonies,  is  one  which  ordains  the  punishment  of 
Kaffirs  by  twelve  to  twenty-five  lashes. 


THE  ENEMY.  59 

be  counted  by  centuries  was  in  constitutional  and  social  reform  far  inferior  to 
the  Boer  States  of  1899. 

There  is  one  element  in  the  Boer  character  of  which  we  seem  to  have  taken 
little  account,  though  it  has  puzzled  and  irritated  us.  It  was  the  spiritual  factor 
which  won  Cromwell  his  triumphs,  and  which  helped  to  win  for  the  Americans 
their  independence.  It  is  the  spiritual  factor  which  has  nerved  the  Boers 
against  a  great  empire.  That  which  material  force  cannot  do,  spiritual  strength, 
the  ordered  strength  which  comes  of  deep  religious  and  patriotic  fervour,  can 
effect.  The  Boers  are  mystics,  as  were  the  Roundheads  and  the  early  colonists. 
Shrewd  and  active  in  the  conduct  of  their  business,  they  pass  much  of  their  life 
in  communion  with  the  Unseen.  Now  a  man  who  passes  his  whole  life  in  such 
communion  will  make  an  erratic  soldier;  but  he  who  to  spiritual  exaltation  adds 
shrewd  instinct  and  business  capacity  is  a  dangerous  foe.  The  practical  mystic 
is  invincible  by  ordinary  odds. 

We  are  told  that  the  Boers  are  hypocrites,  and  their  religion  is  a  mere 
cloak  of  deceit.  That  statement  may  contain  an  element  of  truth,  but  as  a 
generalisation  it  is  false.  We  too  often  regard  religious  people  as  simpletons 
in  business;  and  when  we  are  worsted  in  a  struggle  by  shrewd  piety  we  resent- 
fully suspect  a  fraud.  But  the  implication  is  unfair,  for  why  should  a  religious 
man  be  an  imbecile? 

Many  Boers  may  be  hypocritical,  many  are  superstitious;  but  the  Boer  race 
is  religious  with  a  simple  fervour  and  an  unsophisticated  creed.  Their  life 
under  the  lonely  stars  and  silent  hills  gives  their  thoughts  a  solemn  colour 
which  is  absent  from  the  minds  of  those  who  dwell  in  populous  cities..  Our 
soldiers  who  know  them  well,  and  who  have  been  their  prisoners  in  this  war, 
bear  witness  that  their  religion,  austere  and  hard  as  it  is,  is  part  of  their  nature 
and  of  their  life.  The  hymns  they  have  sung  over  our  buried  dead  are  no  empty 
lip-service,  but  the  sincere  utterances  of  brave  men  who  feel  the  sense  of  tears 
in  human  things,  and  can  swiftly  pass  from  the  stern  horrors  of  the  battlefield 
to  communion  with  their  Maker.  To  call  such  men  hypocrites  is  to  insult 
humanity. 

Their  history,  written  in  tears  and  blood,  will  be  an  eternal  inspiration  to 
generous  minds.  In  an  age  when  the  ideal  has  little  influence  and  little  value, 
they  have  struggled  for  the  sake  of  freedom  against  overwhelming  odds  for 
nearly  two  years.  They  have  seen  their  wives  carried  into  captivity,  their 
children  dying,  their  homes  burnt,  their  property  confiscated;  but  they  have 
not  flinched.  When  peace  and  the  ordered  ease  of  English  rule  were  offered 
them  if  only  they  would  forswear  their  country,  they  refused  the  temptation  and 
were  strong  to  fight  on.  Are  we  not  chivalrous  enough  to  acknowledge 
that  these  men  are  heroes  and  worthy  of  our  steel  and  our  regard?  Let  us, 
in  Burke's  noble  phrase,  refuse  to  draw  up  an  indictment  against  a  whole  nation. 

We,  whose  pulses  have  thrilled  at  the  heroic  story  of  our  own  land,  we 
who  have  wept  over  Poland  and  Hungary,  can  we  not  spare  a  sigh  for  the  long 
agony  of  this  unhappy  race?  Rough  and  unlettered  they  may  be,  but  they  have' 
given  us  an  example  of  high  and  splendid  faith;  and  when  the  day  of  our  own 
Armageddon  comes,  we  shall  utter  no  better  prayer  than  to  face  our  destiny 
with  a  courage  as  dauntless  and  serene. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE   ECONOMIC    FUTURE    OF    SOUTH    AFRICA. 

IT  is  no  travesty  of  the  utterances  of  the  capitalist  party  to  say  that  to  them  the 
Transvaal  takes  the  form  of  a  huge  mining  and  land  company.    They  issue 

a  prospectus  in  which  they  offer  to  the  British  public  "the  most  splendid  terri- 
tory in  the  world,"  a  land  full  of  gold  and  diamonds,  iron  and  coal,  a  land  flowing 
with  milk  and  honey.a  land  yielding  rich  crops  of  wheat,  where  flocks  and  herds 
multiply,  where  generous  nature  fills  the  lap  of  the  prosperous  settler  with  richness 
and  plenty.  The  promoters  of  this  company  point  to  the  eminence  of  the 
Board  of  Directors  and  of  their  advisers,  where  sit  many  financiers  whose  genius 
is  undisputed. 

If  a  sceptical  inquirer  objects  that  the  expenditure  has  been  excessive,  the 
promoters  may  allow  that  it  is  somewhat  high.  It  is  true  that  the  maintenance 
and  protection  and  development  of  the  new  possessions  will  cost  twice  as  much  as 
the  possession  for  many  years  will  yield.  It  is  true  that  the  struggle  to  obtain 
it  will  cost  £200,000,000  and,  say,  20,000  lives,  and  the  desolation  of  a  country 
as  large  as  France,  and  the  permanent  hatred  of  more  than  half  of  our  fellow- 
subjects  in  Cape  Colony,  and  more  disasters  than  an  English  army  has  ever  suf- 
fered. But  England  is  rich  and  can  afford  to  pour  out  her  money  like  water ;  the 
disasters  are  "incidents" ;  and  as  to  loss  of  life  and  loyalty,  these  are  "irrelevant"1 
and  mere  trifles  compared  with  Prestige.  The  unhappy  public  is  convinced,  the 
capitalists  float  their  company,  and  England  pays  her  £200,000,000  and  20,000 
lives  and  her  bitter  humiliation. 

The  basis  of  statesmanship  is  common  sense,  and  common  sense  requires  that 
we  should  examine  carefully  the  glittering  prospects  which  are  held  out  to  us. 
On  a  calm  consideration  they  lose  some  of  their  glamour.  The  fortunes  of 
South  Africa  are  determined  by  its  physical  character  and  nature,  and  it  is 
not  likely  that  where  this  factor  is  a  permanent  one,  progress  can  be  more  rapid 
than  in  the  past.  Agriculture,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word,  is  impossible  over 
the  greater  part  of  the  country.  Much  of  the  land  is  practically  desert,  the  rainfall 
is  irregular,  and  the  climate  dry.  Without  an  elaborate  system  of  irrigation,  it 
would  be  quite  impossible  to  grow  more  than  enough  corn  to  satisfy  the  wants 
of  the  South  African  population. 

The  difficulties  of  agriculture  have  driven  farmers  to  devote  their  attention 
to  the  rearing  of  cattle  and  sheep.  Most  of  the  farms  are  very  large,  and  some 
are  enormous  in  size,  covering  as  many  as  sixteen  thousand  acres,  while  many 
of  the  Dutch  farmers  have  a  very  large  stock  of  animals ;  but  the  pasture  is  thin 
and  droughts  are  frequent.  The  profits  are  so  small  and  the  life  is  so  isolated 
that  it  is  certain  that  few  Englishmen  will  consent  to  lead  it.  Nor  could  they 
cultivate  large  farms  without  a  considerable  capital.  The  South  African  farmer 
has  to  combat  many  difficulties.  He  has  either  no  water  or  too  much ;  parasitic 
pests  destroy  his  crops,  and  locusts  his  fruit.  Horse-sickness,  caused  by  feeding 
on  dew-drenched  grass,  is  a  disease  of  extraordinary  virulence,  and  in  an  epi- 
demic a  loss  of  50  per  cent,  is  by  no  means  uncommon.' 

The  great  wealth  of  South  Africa  lies  in  its  mineral  resources.     The  Wit- 

1  Mr.  Chamberlain  in  the  House  of  Commons. 
'  See  Appendix  A. 


THE  ECONOMIC  FUTURE  OF  SOUTH  AFRICA.  61 

watersrand,  which  was  discovered  in  1885,  is  probably  the  richest  gold  field  in 
the  world,  and  it  has  the  great  advantage  of  affording  a  perfectly  regular  supply. 
But  the  life  of  a  gold  mine  is  short,  and  the  introduction  of  modern  machinery 
tends  to  lessen  it  to  an  extreme  degree.  If  we  allow  that  there  still  remains 
in  the  beds  of  the  Rand  gold  to  the  value  of  £700,000,000  sterling,  we  shall  adopt 
a  generous  estimate.  It  is  certain  that  the  population  of  the  Rand  will  grow, 
and  that  with  a  more  plentiful  supply  of  labour  and  the  introduction  of  improved 
machinery  an  output  of  £25,000,000  sterling  per  annum  is  assured.  It  is  there- 
fore equally  certain  that  the  gold  mines  of  the  Rand  will  be  exhausted  in  thirty 
to  forty  years.  There  will  probably  remain  a  number  of  smaller  and  poorer 
mines  which  will  be  worked  at  a  lower  profit ;  but  for  all  practical  purposes,  and 
unless  a  new  and  as  yet  unknown  gold  bed  is  discovered,  the  Transvaal  will  be 
exhausted  of  its  gold  by  the  middle  of  this  century.  With  this  exhaustion  will 
disappear  the  population  of  Johannesburg;  and  it  is  probable  that  before  1950 
it  will  present  the  melancholy  spectacle  of  a  town  living  on  the  memory  of  its 
vanished  glory. 

It  is  difficult  and  almost  impossible  to  estimate  the  future  of  the  iron  and 
coal  mines ;  but  unless  new  economic  conditions  appear,  and  the  aggregate  popula- 
tion of  South  Africa  increases  to  an  enormous  extent,  it  is  probable  that  these 
mines  will  not  be  developed  to  a  degree  which  may  make  them  serious  competitors 
of  England  or  America  or  Germany.  Skilled  labour  is  scarce  and  dear,  and 
black  labour  is  unskilled  and  fitful  and  bad.  With  labour  which  is  either  dear  or 
bad  it  would  be  impossible  for  South  Africa  to  appear  as  a  competitor  in  this 
field;  and  unless  a  great  depression  falls  on  our  trade  at  home  it  is  not  likely 
that  English  workmen  will  emigrate  in  great  numbers  to  South  Africa.  The 
cost  of  living  is  very  high,  and  South  Africa  is  without  doubt  one  of  the  dearest 
countries  in  the  world.  White  men  cannot  work  with  blacks ;  and  where  black 
labour  is  plentiful  and  cheap  white  men  will  never  go.  Our  Colonies  in  Australasia 
and  Canada  offer  to  the  British  emigrant  better  and  more  promising  fields  for 
his  labour. 

South  Africa,  therefore,  at  present  offers  little  attraction  to  a  white  popula- 
tion which  has  not  been  brought  up  in  the  country.  It  is,  and  will  be,  a  country 
of  a  few  very  rich  men  and  of  many  poor  men.  The  Europeans  who  make  their 
fortune  will  probably  return  to  Europe  to  spend  it,  and  there  seems  little  likelihood 
of  an  immigration  and  a  permanent  settlement  of  white  people  on  a  large  scale. 

The  country  is  at  present  practically  a  wilderness,  with  a  certain  number  of 
towns  of  varying  size  and  importance.  These  towns  are  for  the  most  part  the 
centres  of  the  English  population,  while  the  Dutch  monopolise  the  agricultural 
districts  and  appear  to  be  the  only  class  of  the  population  both  able  and  willing 
to  till  the  soil  and  to  live  the  lonely  lives  of  cattle  rearers.  The  inhabitants  of 
the  towns  are  migratory,  while  the  agricultural  population  is  permanent  in  its 
nature. 

To  sum  up,  the  immediate  future  of  South  Africa  belongs,  so  far  as  we 
can  estimate  at  present,  to  the  trading  and  mining  communities ;  but  when  the  gold 
mines  are  exhausted  (and  the  traders  of  the  towns  will  be  the  first  to  feel  the  with- 
drawal of  foreign  capital),  the  centre  of  gravity  will  again  reside  in  the  popula- 
tion of  the  country  districts.  In  fifty  or  sixty  years  we  may  expect  to  see  the 
Dutch  population  considerably  exceeding  the  number  of  the  English  settlers, 
and  as  it  is  a  population  which  will  steadily  grow  and  is  homogeneous  in  charac- 
ter, it  will  exercise  a  preponderant  influence  in  politics.  Unless  we  conciliate  that 
population,  we  are  laying  up  for  our  successors  a  heritage  of  trouble. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

SIR    A.    MILNER. 

NOTHING  in  the  last  two  years  has  been  witnessed  more  melancholy  than 
the  failure  of  Sir  Alfred  Milner.  His  appointment  to  his  great  office  was 
greated  with  universal  praise ;  it  was  thought  that  one  held  in  such  affec- 
tionate regard  by  so  many  eminent  men  could  not  but  justify  that  regard,  that  a 
past  so  brilliant  was  an  omen  of  easy  and  happy  success.  He  had  shown  high 
qualities  in  Egypt  and  at  the  Board  of  Inland  Revenue.  He  had  earned  the 
reputation  of  a  skilful  administrator ;  and  it  was  said  that  under  the  charm  of  his 
manner  reposed  the  strength  of  character,  the  insight,  and  the  discretion  which 
South  Africa  demands  of  her  rulers. 

How  utterly  these  happy  auguries  have  been  fasified  the  world  now  knows. 
It  sees  that  the  Viceroy,  who  was  sent  out  to  secure  peace  and  contentment  to 
South  Africa  and  to  hold  the  balance  between  the  English  and  the  Dutch,  has 
made  every  Dutchman  disloyal  and  has  been  the  chief  agent  in  the  inception  of  the 
most  bitter  and  disastrous  war  which  England  has  waged  for  one  hundred  and 
twenty  years. 

We  have  always  relied  too  much  on  the  testimony  of  our  officials  in  South 
Africa,  and  it  would  be  well  for  us  to  take  to  heart  Lord  Palmerston's  warning 
against  "the  man  who  has  been  there,"  the  man  who  knows  nothing  of  the  his- 
tory, habits,  or  prejudices  of  those  whom  he  rules. 

There  have  been  many  unwise  and  few  wise  rulers  in  South  Africa.  Nearly 
all  have  been  high-minded,  nearly  all  have  been  imprudent;  but  no  one  save 
Alfred  Milner  has  become  to  the  Dutch  an  object  of  personal  hostility.  Even 
Sir  Bartle  Frere,  in  1881,  did  not  lose  the  private  regard  and  respect  of  the 
Dutch  in  Cape  Colony.1 

Sent  out  to  govern  as  the  constitutional  representative  of  a  constitutional 
monarchy  two  races  between  whom  the  unhappy  events  of  1895  had  raised  a  bar- 
rier of  suspicion  and  anger,  he  speedily  became  the  partisan  of  the  extreme  Loyal- 
ist party. 

High-minded,  patriotic,  and  absolutely  sincere,  Sir  Alfred  Milner  has  been 
unable  to  resist  the  sinister  influences  of  South  Africa,  and  the  unhappy  result  has 
come  about  that  by  nearly  every  Dutch  subject  of  His  Majesty  he  is  regarded  with 
bitter  hatred.  Can  we  regard  without  alarm  his  retention  in  a  land  where  the 
Dutch  form  the  predominant  factor  in  the  population? 

The  secret  of  Sir  Alfred  Milner's  failure  lies  obviously  in  the  want  of  sym- 

1  Twenty  years  ago  Mr.  Chamberlain  demanded  the  recall  of  Sir  Bartle  Frere  in 
language  curiously  fitting  to  the  present  situation :  "No  one  can  doubt  the  energy  of  the 
High  Commissioner — he  has  energy,  and  to  spare.  Indeed,  it  would  have  been  better  for 
our  South  African  dominions  if  he  had  been  a  little  less  energetic.  I  will  not  for  a  moment 
presume  to  doubt  the  ability  of  the  High  Commissioner.  In  other  positions  he  has  shown 
it,  and  in  other  positions  may  still  show  it,  in  the  service  of  the  Crown.  I  will  admit  also 
that  he  is  a  man  of  high  integrity  of  purpose  and  great  conscientiousness ;  but  these  qual- 
ities only  make  him  the  more  dangerous,  because  ability  misdirected  is  more  fatal  than 
ignorance  itself.  The  conscientiousness  of  the  High  Commissioner  can  only  lead  to  one 
conclusion,  that  he  is  not  likely  to  change  opinions  he  has  deliberately  formed,  and  which  he 
has  so  frankly  expressed.  It  has  been  suggested  that  continued  confidence  must  be  placed 
in  him  in  order  that  he  may  bring  the  present  difficulties  to  a  satisfactory  conclusion.  But 
I  cannot  see  the  logic  of  that  argument.  1  think  that  the  man  who  has  unnecessarily  raised 
these  difficulties  is  the  least  likely  person  now  to  allay  them." 


SIR  A.  MILNER.  65 

pathy  and  imagination  which  are  necessary  to  the  great  ruler.  Born  and,  during 
his  early  years,  educated  in  Germany,  he  must  have  imbibed  the  influences  of 
German  ideas  and  methods.  Admirable  as  those  methods  often  are,  they  are 
bureaucratic  and  in  their  essence  autocratic.  Repugnant  to  a  multitude  of  Ger- 
mans, they  are  utterly  unsuitable  to  the  management  of  a  free  and  stubborn 
people.  Sir  Alfred  Milner's  tenure  of  office  in  Egypt  and  at  Somerset  House 
was  not  likely  to  liberalise  his  views.  We  hold  Egypt,  frankly,  by  force,  and 
though  our  rule  has  been  an  unmixed  blessing  to  the  fellaheen,  it  is  not  reason- 
able to  deduce  from  that  fact  the  conclusion  that  the  same  methods  will  be  suit- 
able to  the  government  of  a  race  so  perverse  and  suspicious  as  the  Dutch. 

Another  factor  in  the  formation  of  Sir  Alfred  Milner's  character  was  his 
experience  on  the  staff  of  a  popular  paper.  His  despatches,  admirably  written  and 
most  interesting  as  they  are,  offer  a  clear  example  of  the  advantages  and 
dangers  of  such  an  education.  They  are  full  of  excellent  phrases,  they  are 
moving  and  eloquent ;  but  in  their  appeal  to  an  immediate  audience,  and  to  popu- 
lar prejudices,  in  their  partisanship,  in  their  impatience,  and  in  their  shortness  of 
view,  they  are  the  work  of  an  able  journalist  rather  than  the  documents  of  a 
sober  statesman  whose  strength  is  quietness  and  confidence,  and  who  is  content  to 
see  in  the  future  the  perfect  fruition  of  his  patient  wisdom. 

Sir  Alfred  Milner,  therefore,  accomplished  and  amiable  as  he  was,  approached 
his  task  under  the  grave  disadvantages  of  his  official  training,  of  his  strong  prepos- 
sessions in  favour  of  strict  rule  and  order,  and  of  a  sincere  belief  that  a  firm  and 
unyielding  policy  was  alone  fitted  to  meet  the  urgency  of  the  situation.  To  these 
causes  we  must  attribute  the  grievous  errors  and  strange  indiscretions  that  have 
marked  the  career  of  this  brilliant  but  unhappy  Viceroy. 

In  1898  he  had  evidently  made  up  his  mind  that  a  large  number  of  the 
Dutch  in  Cape  Colony  were  disloyal  and  in  treasonable  sympathy  with  the  Boers 
of  the  Transvaal  and  the  Free  State.  It  was  natural,  therefore,  that  he  should 
meet  with  impatience  their  expressions  of  loyalty  to  the  throne.1  He  accused  their 
papers  of  sedition,2  and  told  their  deputations  that  they  were  the  tools  of  unscrupu- 
lous politicians,3  and  that  he  would  no  longer  submit  to  the  political  ascendancy 
of  the  Afrikander  party. 

In  his  relations  with  the  Transvaal  Government  he  seemed  bent  on  a  policy 
of  force.  We  have  seen  how,  instructed  as  he  was  by  Mr.  Chamberlain  to  discuss 
with  Mr.  Kruger  the  problems  of  the  situation  in  a  conciliatory  manner,  he 
declined  to  touch  on  any  other  question  but  that  of  the  franchise,  and  abruptly 
closed  the  door  on  further  negotiations.  He  had  persuaded  himself  that  nothing 
would  bring  the  Boers  to  their  senses  but  threatening  language  and  the  prospect 

'"Of  course,  I  am  glad  to  be  assured  that  any  section  of  Her  Majesty's  subjects  are 
loyal,  but  I  should  be  much  more  glad  to  be  allowed  to  take  that  for  granted.  Why  should  I 
not?  What  reason  could  there  be  for  disloyalty?  You  have  thriven  wonderfully  under  that 
Government.  .  .  .  Well,  gentlemen,  of  course  you  are  loyal.  It  would  be  monstrous  if 
you  were  not.  I  am  familiar  at  home  with  the  figure  of  the  politician,  often  the  best  of  men. 
though  singularly  injudicious,  who,  whenever  any  dispute  arises  with  another  country,  starts 
with  the  assumption  that  his  own  country  must  be  in  the  wrong.  He  is  not  disloyal,  but, 
really,  he  cannot  be  very  much  surprised  if  he  appears  so  to  those  of  his  fellow-citizens  whose 
inclination  is  to  start  with  the  exactly  opposite  assumption"  (March  5,  1898).  The  Loyalist 
Press  alluded  to  this  speech  as  "a  splendid  sarcasm." 

'  "A  certain  section  of  the  Press,  not  in  the  Transvaal  only,  preaches  openly  and  con- 
stantly the  doctrine  of  a  Republic  embracing  all  South  Africa,  and  supports  it  by  menacing 
references  to  the  armaments  of  the  Transvaal,  its  alliance- with  the  Orange  Free  State,  and 
the  active  sympathy  which,  in  case  of  war,  it  would  receive  from  a  section  of  Her  Majesty's 
subjects.  I  regret  to  say  that  this  doctrine,  supported,  as  it  is,  by  a  ceaseless  stream  of 
malignant  lies  about  the  intentions  of  the  British  Government,  is  producing  a  great  effect  on 
a  large  number  of  our  Dutch  fellow-colonists"  (May  5,  1899). 

Sir  Alfred  Milner  could  produce  no  proof  of  this  statement  except  the  letter  of  an  anony- 
mous correspondent  of  an  obscure  paper,  the  Stellalander. 

'  See  Benjamin  Franklin  on  English  Governors,  p.   14. 


64  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

of  armed  intervention.  His  despatches  to  Mr.  Chamberlain,  and  more  particularly 
the  famous  cablegram  of  May,  1899,  in  which  he  called  aloud  for  a  display  of 
force  and  a  "striking  proof"  of  firmness,  leave  no  doubt  that  this  idea  had  become 
fixed  and  rooted  in  his  mind.  We  are  not  therefore  surprised  to  know  that  he 
refused  to  listen  to  the  entreaties  of  the  leaders  of  the  Dutch  party  in  Cape  Colony, 
or  to  forward  to  Mr.  Chamberlain  the  earnest  representations  of  his  own  Min- 
isters, though  they  had  been  frequently  and  fully  laid  before  him.  There  is  no 
word  or  hint  of  conciliation  in  his  despatches,  no  attempt  to  stay  a  conflict  which 
he  knew  full  well  might  bring  ruin  on  South  Africa.  In  fact,  he  loudly  called 
for  war. 

At  the  end  of  August,  1899,  when  it  was  clear  that  Mr.  Chamberlain  was 
inclined  to  accept  the  proposals  of  the  Transvaal  Government,  the  High  Com- 
missioner, dreading  a  weakening  of  the  Ministerial  policy,  despatched  the  following 
telegram :  "British  South  Africa  is  prepared  for  extreme  measures,  and  is  ready 
to  suffer  much  in  order  to  see  the  vindication  of  British  authority.  A  pro- 
longation of  negotiations  and  indecisive  result  is  dreaded,  and  I  fear  there  will 
be  a  strong  reaction  of  feeling  against  the  policy  of  Her  Majesty's  Government  if 
matters  drag."  It  is  possible  to  argue  that  Sir  Alfred  Milner's  policy  was  wise ; 
it  is  possible  to  argue  that  it  was  unwise.  One  fact,  at  any  rate,  is  clear :  he  was 
the  strong  advocate  of  war. 

Sir  Alfred  Milner  had  almost  from  the  first  decided  that  the  salvation  of 
South  Africa  lay  with  the  Loyalist  party.  It  was  a  belief  honestly  held,  but  it 
has  been  fatal  in  its  results.  Its  first  effect  was  to  persuade  the  Dutch  that  the 
Governor-General  was  a  partisan,  and  that  there  was  no  hope  of  fair  treatment 
from  him  or  from  the  Government  whose  representative  he  was.  Its  second  effect 
was  to  throw  the  Viceroy  into  the  hands  of  the  Loyalist  party.  Having  once 
made  his  choice,  he  could  not  without  difficulty  recede  from  his  position.  We  have 
seen  that  most  of  the  English  newspapers  published  in  South  Africa  were  the 
property  of  the  financial  group  who  had  organised  the  Jameson  Raid.  They  had 
been  bought  to  further  the  political  and  financial  aims  of  their  proprietors,  and  it 
is  clear  that  their  utterances  were  to  be  received  with  suspicion.  Yet  Sir  Alfred 
Milner  quoted  their  opinions  as  worthy  of  respectful  attention. 

A  further  result  was  certain  to  follow.  The  English  party  in  South  Africa  is, 
in  the  main,  a  trading  and  financial  party,  and  many  of  its  leaders  are  in  close 
alliance  with  the  capitalists  of  the  Rand.  The  fruit  of  this  alliance  is  to  be  seen 
in  the  extraordinary  appointments  which  Lord  Roberts,  presumably  on  the  advice 
of  Sir  Alfred  Milner,  has  lately  made  to  the  offices  in  the  two  annexed  Republics. 
Mr.  Markham  explained  to  a  somewhat  scandalised  House  of  Commons  that 
nearly  all  the  important  appointments,  civil,  legal  and  financial,  had  been  granted 
to  men  who  were  either  in  the  direct  employ  of  the  financial  magnates  of  Johan- 
nesburg or  who  had  been  in  such  employ.  Mr.  Markham's  statements  have  been 
met  with  some  criticism,  but  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  did  not  controvert 
them,  and  he  could  only  excuse  the  appointments  on  the  ground  that  they  were 
temporary  ones. 

Another  appointment  which  Sir  Alfred  Milner's  friends  could  not  but  regard 
as  indiscreet  was  the  selection  of  Mr.  Adrian  Hofmeyr,  who  had  been  dismissed 
from  his  pastorate  for  immoral  conduct,  for  an  important  salaried  post  at  Pre- 
toria. Mr.  Hofmeyr's  duties  were  to  act  as  intermediary  between  the  English 
and  the  Dutch,  and  Englishmen  who  can  place  themselves  for  a  moment  in  the 
position  of  respectable  Dutch  men  and  women  can  imagine  with  what  feelings 
they  would  receive  the  advances  of  an  immoral  ex-priest.1 

It  would  be  tedious  and  ungenerous  to  continue  the  catalogue  of  Sir  Alfred 
Milner's  errors,  but  it  has  been  necessary  to  give  some  few  examples  of  that  want 
of  discretion  which  seems  to  mark  him  as  unfitted  to  hold  the  difficult  and  delicate 

1  Sir  Alfred  Milner  has  acknowledged  in  a  telegram  or  despatch  to   Mr.   Chamberlain 
that  he  knew  that  Mr.  Hofmeyr  had  been  guilty  of  scandalous  conduct  in  his  parish. 


SIR  A.  MILNER.  65 

position  which  he  held  at  Cape  Town,  and  the  even  more  delicate  position  which  he 
is  about  to  hold  in  Pretoria. 

It  is  sometimes  difficult  to  distinguish  between  the  wise  and  the  clever  man. 
There  are  in  truth  many  points  of  difference,  and  one  is  this :  The  wise  man,  by 
instinct  or  experience,  foresees  the  future,  the  clever  man  lives  only  in  the  present ; 
the  former  knows  that  human  nature  is  not  logical,  while  the  latter  is  bent  on 
winning  a  dialectical  victory.  Men  are  not  actuated  by  simple  motives ;  if  they 
were,  it  would  be  easy  to  govern  them.  To  the  acute  academic  and  logical  mind  of 
Sir  Alfred  Milner  the  Dutch  character  is  incomprehensible.  That  complex  mass 
and  curious  tangle  of  bad  and  good,  of  strong  affection  and  jealous  suspicion,  of 
inherited  traditions  and  racial  prejudices  which  we  call  human  nature,  is  a  diffi- 
cult instrument  for  the  unskilful  performer,  but  the  expert  will  play  on  it  with 
ease.  A  knowledge  of  human  nature  is  the  first  attribute  of  a  great  ruler.  He 
will  know  when  to  loose  and  when  to  tighten  the  rein,  when  to  be  severe  and 
when  to  yield.  To  govern  those  who  have  never  been  free  is  easy :  to  govern  men 
of  another  race  in  whose  blood  runs  the  fierce  flame  of  inherited  freedom  has 
ever  been,  except  to  the  ruler  of  rare  genius,  a  hopeless  task. 

The  character  which  Burke  "drew  of  George  Grenville  will  apply  word  for 
word  to  the  qualities  of  Sir  Alfred  Milner.  Burke  paid  due  homage  to  the 
masculine  understanding,  the  stout  heart  and  unwearied  application  of  Mr.  Gren- 
ville, to  his  generous  ambition  and  his  admirable  and  laborious  life.  But  the  fixed 
methods  and  forms  of  office  had  not  tended  to  liberalise  Grenville's  mind. 

"It  may  be  truly  said  that  men  too  much  conversant  with  office  are  rarely 
minds  of  remarkable  enlargement.    Their  habits  of  office  are  apt  to  give 
them  a  turn  to  think  the  substance  of  business  not  to  be  much  more 
important  than  the  forms  in  which  it  is  conducted.     These  forms  are 
adapted  to  ordinary  occasions ;  and  therefore  persons  who  are  nurtured 
in  office  do  admirably  well  as  long  as  things  go  on  in  their  common 
order ;  but  when  the  high  roads  are  broken  up,  when  a  new  and  troubled 
scene  is  opened,  and  the  file  affords  no  precedent,  then  it  is  that  a  greater 
knowledge  of  mankind,  and  a  far  more  extensive  comprehension  of 
things,  is  requisite,  than  ever  office  gave  or  than  office  can  ever  give." 
The  career  of  such  men  as  Grenville  is  not  seldom  a  tragedy.    Dowered  with 
every  gift  that  seems  necessary  to  win  success  in  life — a  keen  intellect  and  a 
winning  manner,  high  culture  and  patriotic  ardour — they  yet  lack  the  one  quality 
which  gives  the  temple  its  corner-stone.     They  are  without  that  union  of  sym- 
pathy and  imagination  and  discretion  and  unerring  instinct  which  marks  the 
great  ruler  and  the  great  statesman.     Precise  and  orderly  in  their  intellectual 
methods,  and  always  able  to  frame  a  brilliant  defence  of  a  ruinous  policy,  they 
have  every  knowledge  but  the  knowledge  of  the  human  heart.     In  a  time  of 
peace  and  order  they  prove  themselves  dignified  and  able  leaders  of  men,  but 
when  passions  run  high  and  the  conflicting  claims  of  race  and  interest  cry  loudly 
for  solution,  they  are    bewildered    and  dismayed.     They  lose    their    sense    of 
proportion.       Criticism     becomes     an     impertinence,     opposition     a     treachery. 
The  whisper  of  disorder  angers  and  terrifies  them ;  cunning  advisers  hint  that  their 
dignity  and  the  safety  of  the  Empire  are  being  compromised ;  they  tell  them  that 
a  "strong  policy"  will  stay  the  coming  anarchy.     Every  step  they  take  makes 
return  more  difficult  and  more  dangerous,  and  at  last  they  find  themselves  con- 
fronted by  dangers   with  which  they  have  not  the  strength  to  fight.     Then, 
weary  and  baffled,  they  throw  themselves   into  the   arms  of  the   class   which 
flatters  them.     They  have  become  partisans,  and  all  the  good  qualities  of  their 
character — their  love  of  decency  and  order,  their  culture  and  simplicity,  their 
devotion  to  their  country — become  instruments  of  their  ruin.    In  bitter  remorse 
they  see  around  them  the  desolation  of  which  they  have  been  the  unwilling  agents, 
and  the  men  whom  by  their  unwisdom  they  have  driven  into  sedition  and  war 
rise  up  and  curse  them. 


66  PEACE  COR  WAR. 

It  is  now  clear  that  at  last  Sir  Alfred  Milner  recognises  the  tragical  failure  of 
his  policy.  Seldom  in  English  history  has  a  statesman  been  forced  to  describe 
in  terms  more  discouraging'  the  despair  of  the  present  and  the  ominous  prospects 
of  the  future.  We  know  that  if  Sir  Alfred  Milner  could  start  again  with  the 
knowledge  which  painful  experience  has  brought  him,  he  would  probably  take  a 
different  road,  and  he  would  certainly  not  take  with  him  the  companions  who  have 
led  him  into  his  grievous  indiscretions.  But  the  errors  of  the  past  may  be  the 
errors  of  the  future,  and  difficulties  almost  as  great  await  him  in  the  new  posses- 
sions which  his  policy  has  added  to  the  Empire  and  of  which  he  has  been 
appointed  the  Governor.  He,  the  chief  agent  of  their  misery  and  their  conquest, 
has  to  rule  men  who  will  never  forget  and  never  forgive — men  whom  it  will  be 
impossible  to  convince  of  his  justice  or  of  his  mercy  or  of  his  truth.  Is  it  wise 
that  we  should  place  him  there?  Is  it  wise  that  he,  of  his  own  will,  should  be 
there  ? 

The  proportion  of  responsibility  we  should  assign  to  the  Colonial  Secretary 
and  the  Viceroy  at  present  we  can  only  guess  and  we  may  never  fully  know,  but 
Sir  Alfred  Milner  must  at  all  events  bear  a  heavy  burden.  The  position  which 
he  has  filled  has  indeed  been  one  of  extraordinary  delicacy,  and  it  is  one  which  only 
a  man  of  genius  could  have  filled  with  success.  But  it  is  a  sound  and  useful  rule 
that  where  a  community,  large  or  small — a  nation,  regiment,  or  school — sinks  to 
disorder  and  anarchy,  the  guilt  shall  fall  on  the  ruler  rather  than  on  the  ruled.  If  a 
surgeon,  after  a  wrong  diagnosis,  amputates  a  sound  limb,  we  are  not  disposed  to 
pardon  his  error  because  his  intentions  were  good  or  his  difficulties  great.  We 
look  to  each  man  to  carry  out  successfully  the  special  duty  that  is  ordained  of  him, 
and  it  is  the  duty  of  a  statesman  to  succeed.  Circumstances  may  extenuate  his 
error,  but  they  cannot  excuse  his  failure  or  justify  his  retention. 

We  are  too  near  the  events  to  judge  serenely.  History  will  weigh  the  facts 
and  sift  the  evidence  and  assign  the  responsibility,  and  it  may  be  that  she  will  de- 
cide that  across  the  dark  stage  of  South  Africa  there  has  passed  no  figure  more 
interesting,  more  pathetic,  and  more  ineffectual  for  good. 

1  Sir  Alfred  Milner's  despatch  of  February  6,  1901. 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

UNREST,    OR    GOVERNMENT    WITHOUT    CONSENT. 

THERE  are  now  only  two  courses  open  to  us.  We  must  either  crush  the 
Boers  and  compel  their  submission,  or  we  must  offer  them  as  reasonable 
terms  as  they  will  accept.  The  first  is  the  policy  which  the  English 
Ministry  has  outlined  with  complete  definiteness  through  Mr.  Chamberlain. 
The  second  policy  is  obviously  favoured  by  Lord  Kitchener. 

By  the  first  policy  the  separate  national  existence  of  the  two  Republics  is 
annihilated,  and  by  annexation  they  completely  lose  their  independence  and  are 
incorporated  in  the  scheme  of  the  British  Empire.  Mr.  Chamberlain  proposes 
that,  when  the  Boers  have  been  utterly  defeated,  they  shall  be  governed  by 
military  rule  for  a  period  of  time  the  length  of  which  shall  depend  upon  their 
good  behaviour.  If  the  Boers  show  themselves  obedient  and  well-behaved  sub- 
jects, military  rule  will  be  quickly  followed  by  a  period  of  Crown  Colony  Gov- 
ernment. 

This  method  of  government,  though  not  military  in  its  character,  is  abso- 
lutely autocratic,  and  will  be  imposed  upon  the  two  annexed  provinces  for  a 
term  of  years  which,  as  before,  will  depend  upon  the  good  behaviour  of  the 
conquered  peoples.  Finally,  when  the  Boers  have  shown  by  their  acts  and  their 
promises  that  they  are  loyal  subjects  of  the  British  Empire,  representative  insti- 
tutions will  be  granted  to  them,  and  they  will  be  allowed  to  take  their  place 
as  separate  provinces  of  a  confederated  South  African  Dominion,  owning  alle- 
giance to  the  British  Crown. 

To  those  who  know  the  character  of  South  Africans,  whether  they  be  Dutch 
or  whether  they  be  English,  the  mere  statement  of  this  policy  carries  its  own 
condemnation.     The  folly  of  such  a  scheme  is  not  only  ludicrous  but  tragical. 

It  is  difficult  to  decide  which  of  the  first  two  methods  will  beget  the  greatest 
difficulties.  England  has  had  little  experience  in  ruling  by  military  force  a  dis- 
loyal white  population.  The  case  of  Ireland  is  not  analogous,  for  Ireland  has  a 
safety-valve  through  her  representatives  in  the  British  Parliament,  nor  must 
it  be  forgotten  that  the  position  of  Ireland  makes  it  possible  for  us  to  flood  the 
country  at  a  day's  notice  with  a  mass  of  soldiery.  In  the  first  place,  the  Boers 
will  be  the  most  difficult  of  subjects.  We  heard  eighteen  months  ago  that  the 
result  of  this  war  would  be  a  reconciliation  between  the  two  races,  that  the 
Boers  would  learn  to  respect  us,  and  that  they  would  accept  from  us  the  right 
hand  of  fellowship.  That  was  an  estimate  which  might  have  been  made  by  san- 
guine people  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  but  it  is  not  an  estimate  which  can  be 
now  made  by  the  most  optimistic. 

The  war  has  had  many  of  the  features  of  a  civil  war,  and  on  the  part  of  the 
Boers  it  has  been  a  war  waged  by  the  whole  body  of  their  citizens  against  a 
professional  army.  The  difference  between  a  citizen  and  a  professional  army  is 
radical,  and  where  the  whole  population  of  a  country  joins  together  to  defend 
its  territory  and  its  independence,  a  bitter  national  feeling  is  excited  which, 
whether  victory  or  defeat  await  the  citizens,  will  not  be  allayed  for  generations. 
The  last  eighteen  months,  if  they  have  taught  us  anything,  have  taught  us  that 
there  is  in  the  Dutch  nature  an  invincible  passion  for  freedom,  a  sullen  repug- 
nance to  the  rule  of  an  alien,  however  generous  and  enlightened.  It  is  vain  to 
denounce  such  stubbornness.     It  exists,  and  with  it  we  must  reckon.     The  Boer 


68  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

character  will  never  wholly  assimilate  with  the  English,  and  the  best  hope  that 
we  can  entertain  is  that  the  two  races  may  come  to  accept  what  is  best  in  each 
other,  and  to  overlook  that  part  which  is  unpleasant  to  them. 

It  is  too  much  to  hope  that  the  memories  of  this  unhappy  war  will  ever  fade 
from  the  minds  of  the  Dutch.  If  we  can  picture  to  ourselves  England  swept 
from  end  to  end  by  hostile  forces,  her  towns  ravaged,  her  villages  destroyed, 
her  farms  burnt,  her  women  and  children  hurried  from  their  homes  into  camps; 
if  we  can  imagine  one  tithe  of  the  physical  pain,  the  mental  agony,  and  the 
undying  bitterness  which  such  a  war  in  our  own  country  would  engender  in  our 
minds,  we  shall  be  able  to  understand  in  some  faint  degree  the  depth  and 
strength  of  the  passionate  hatred  which  the  Boers  of  the  two  Republics  will 
for  many  a  year  feel  against  their  English  invaders. 

During  the  period  of  military  rule,  we  shall  have  to  keep  in  subjection  not 
only  the  Boers  but  the  capitalists  and  the  population  of  the  goldfields.  It  is 
quite  certain  that  we  shall  not  be  able  to  reduce  the  burden  of  taxation  which 
Mr.  Kruger  imposed  on  the  mines,  and  it  is  probable  that  this  burden  will  be 
under  our  rule  considerably  increased.  We  shall  have  to  raise  heavy  taxes 
throughout  the  provinces,  and  as  none  of  the  Dutch  will  pay  these  taxes  except 
under  compulsion,  and  as  many  of  the  English  and  the  foreign  inhabitants  of 
Johannesburg  may  after  a  time  display  a  similar  unwillingness,  we  may  have  to 
collect  these  taxes  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet — we  who  went  to  war  that  the 
bright  rays  of  freedom  might  illumine  these  sullen  lands.  The  English  and 
foreign  mining  population  will,  if  we  can  trust  the  lessons  of  history,  bear  with 
ill  grace  the  vexatious  exercise  of  military  authority,  and  it  is  by  no  means 
incredible  that  we  shall  create  among  the  European  and  American  inhabitants 
a  hatred  of  our  rule  as  bitter  as  the  hatred  we  have  inspired  in  the  Dutch.  We 
will,  however,  assume  that  peace  is  maintained,  and  that  we  permit  the  popula- 
tion to  enter  upon  the  second  period — the  period  of  Crown  Colony  Government. 

The  conditions  of  this  form  of  government  are  not  obvious  to  men  who  have 
not  before  been  under  the  sway  of  an  alien  Power;  and  though  it  will  be 
accepted  by  the  foreign  element  as  an  improvement  on  the  military  period,  it  is 
certain  that  the  rule  of  Downing  Street  will  be  almost  as  vexatious  as  the 
administration  of  soldiers.  Those  who  have  examined  the  difficult  problems  of 
our  colonial  system  are  aware  that  no  danger  which  has  threatened  the  safety 
of  our  colonial  empire  is  so  acute  as  the  danger  we  have  suffered  through  the 
incompetence  and  narrow  obstinacy  of  our  official  classes.  To  a  colonial, 
whether  he  be  an  Australian  or  a  New  Zealander,  a  Canadian  or  an  African  or 
West  Indian,  the  name  of  Downing  Street  is  typical  of  the  worst  faults  of 
bureaucratic  government,  and  the  slightest  suspicion  that  this  hateful  instru- 
ment is  likely  to  interfere  in  the  government  of  his  country  will  turn  at  once  the 
most  loyal  colonist  into  the  most  bitter  malcontent. 

The  English  Ministers  will,  during  this  period  as  during  the  last,  find  in  the 
mine-owners  as  difficult  and  probably  as  dangerous  a  foe  as  in  the  Dutch.  The 
mine-owners  and  managers,  most  of  whom  are  foreigners,  will  care  nothing 
about  the  administration  or  the  safety  of  the  country  in  so  far  as  it  does  not 
concern  their  own  definite  interest.  They  will  be  daily  pressing  upon  the  Eng- 
lish Ministry  the  necessity  of  regulating  native  labour,  and  fixing  by  law  a  price 
for  such  labour,  and  of  importing  even  against  their  will  natives  from  the  sur- 
rounding countries.  English  Ministers  will  hesitate  to  sanction  and  enforce  a 
system  which  has  little  to  distinguish  it  from  slavery;  but  in  their  perplexity, 
fearing  on  the  one  side  the  disloyalty  of  the  Dutch,  and  on  the  other  the  hos- 
tility of  the  mine-owners,  the  English  Government  may  find  itself  obliged  to 
cultivate  the  friendship  of  the  capitalists  in  order  to  secure  the  quiet  of  the 
country. 

Finally,  the  period  of  representative  institutions  will  arrive.  It  is  impossi- 
ble for  England  to  govern  a  white  population  for  any  length  of  time  by  other 


GOVERNMENT  -WITHOUT   CONSENT.  69 

than  constitutional  methods.  Russia  might  succeed,  or  Germany;  but  Eng- 
land's traditions  and  her  sympathy  with  freedom  are  too  powerful  to  allow  her 
for  ever  to  dragoon  white  men  into  submission.  Ultimately,  public  opinion  in 
Great  Britain  will  assert. itself,  and  constitutional  privileges  will  be  granted  to 
the  Dutch  in  the  two  annexed  Republics. 

We  shall  then  be  met  by  an  obvious  but  painful  dilemma.  If  it  is  true  that 
in  fifty  or  sixty  years  the  Dutch  population  in  these  two  Republics  will  out- 
number or  be  equal  to  the  English  population,  if  the  passion  for  independence 
which  animates  the  Dutch  to-day  retains  its  vigour,  it  is  probable  that  the  Boers 
will  endeavour  by  constitutional  means  to  secure  their  independence.  We  shall 
either  be  compelled  to  assent  to  any  demands  their  representatives  may  choose 
to  make,  or  to  refuse  to  yield  to  those  demands.  In  the  latter  case,  we  shall  be 
forced  back  to  the  odious  remedies  of  military  coercion,  and  shall  find  ourselves 
again  obliged  to  hold  down  two  great  territories  with  an  armed  force'. 

But  the  cardinal  objection  to  the  subjugation  of  the  two  Republics,  and  to 
the  absolute  loss  of  their  independence  will  be  its  disastrous  effect  upon  the 
loyalty  of  the  Dutch  in  Cape  Colony.  The  danger  which,  above  all  others,  an 
English  Ministry  should  avoid  is  that  of  consolidating  the  whole  Dutch  popula- 
tion of  South  Africa  by  enforcing  upon  them  a  racial  grievance. 

The  sympathy  of  the  Cape  Dutch  with  the  Boers  of  the  Transvaal  and  the 
Orange  Free  State  is  not  political  but  racial.  The  same  blood  flows  in  their 
veins,  they  are  related  by  ties  of  marriage  and  kinship,  and  the  sympathy  which 
they  feel  for  two  peoples  of  the  same  blood  is  the  sympathy  which  Englishmen 
would  feel  under  the  same  conditions  for  men  of  their  blood  threatened  with 
annihilation  by  a  great  Power.  The  Dutch  colonists  had  not  shown  before 
the  Jameson  Raid  any  violent  sympathy  with  the  Transvaal;  on  the  other  hand, 
they  had  displayed  considerable  hostility  towards  the  political  defects  of  the 
Boer  Government.  They  recognised  too  well  the  advantages  of  their  position 
as  an  English  Colony  to  wish  to  join  their  political  fortunes  with  those  of  the 
Transvaal. 

There  is  then  among  the  Colonial  Dutch  a  passionate  feeling  of  racial 
sympathy  with  the  men  of  their  own  blood  in  the  two  Republics,  and  all  their 
leaders  assure  us,  in  language  of  solemn  warning,  that  the  Cape  Dutch  will  never 
rest  until  the  Dutch  in  the  Transvaal  and  the  Orange  Free  State  enjoy,  if  only 
to  a  limited  extent,  the  independence  which  is  the  breath  of  their  life.  So  long 
as  the  Dutch  of  the  Transvaal  and  the  Free  State  are  held  down  as  a  subject 
and  conquered  race,  their  position  will  unite  the  whole  Dutch  population  of 
South  Africa,  and  will  create  a  most  dangerous  disaffection  throughout  its 
length  and  breadth.  We  shall  then  govern,  not  only  a  hostile  people  in  the 
annexed  Republics,  but  a  more  numerous  and  equally  hostile  people  in  Cape 
Colony.  Through  their  representatives  the  Cape  Dutch  will  be  able  to  press 
steadily  for  a  reversal  of  our  policy,  and  to  take  advantage  of  our  weakness  and 
its  opportunities.  We  cannot  permanently  ignore  the  demands  of  a  Cape  Par- 
liament, in  which  the  Dutch  may  be  supreme,  and  we  shall  either  have  to  gram 
these  demands  or  suspend  free  institutions.  The  certain  outcome  of  such  a 
policy  would  be  rebellion  and  civil  war.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  allow  the 
Boers  to  retain  their  own  laws  and  customs  and  representative  institutions,  we 
shall  divert  this  sympathy,  and  our  colonists,  embittered  no  longer  by  the  sub- 
jugation of  their  kinsmen  across  the  Orange  and  the  Vaal,  will  return  again  to 
their  own  political  interests. 

The  military  effects  of  a  policy  of  unconditional  submission  will  be  disas- 
trous. To  hold,  without  the  consent  of  its  inhabitants,  a  country  so  desolate, 
so  barren,  so  vast,  so  sparsely  populated,  and  so  hostile,  will  be  impossible  by 
any  other  than  a  great  military  force.  England  will  be  obliged  to  build  forts 
at  frequent  intervals  through  the  whole  country;  she  will  have  to  maintain  in  the 
two  Republics  an  army  of  40,000  men  in  addition  to  a  police  force  of  10,000 


70  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

men;  and  the  presence  of  these  troops,  and  the  inevitable  friction  which  will 
ensue  between  the  Dutch  and  English  officials,1  will  keep  alight  a  fire  which 
any  sudden  violence  on  our  part  or  any  European  complication  would  fan  into 
inextinguishable  flame.  Two  results  at  least  will  follow.  A  first  and  immedi- 
ate result  will  be  an  increase  in  our  standing  army,  together  with  an  enormous 
increase  in  our  expenditure  and  in  the  burden  of  taxation.  It  will  be  impossible 
for  us  to  maintain  an  armed  force  of  50,000  men  in  South  Africa  and  to 
maintain,  on  the  old  establishment,  troops  sufficient  to  guard  India  and  our 
vast  interests  at  home  and  abroad.  There  will  be  a  demand  on  the  part  of  our 
war  party  for  conscription  or  for  some  form  of  compulsory  service.  That  the 
English  nation  will  permit  such  service,  except  under  the  stress  of  foreign  inva- 
sion, is  incredible;  and  when  the  time  comes  to  choose  between  conscription 
and  a  conciliatory  attitude  in  South  Africa,  there  is  little  reason  to  doubt  that 
it  will  be  able  to  make  its  choice  without  hesitation.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we 
yield  to  the  clamour  of  the  military  party,  we  shall  slowly  but  surely  drop  behind 
in  that  race  for  national  and  commercial  pre-eminence  in  which  even  now  it  is 
difficult  to  preserve  our  place.  The  money  which  we  have  spent  in  South 
Africa  to  no  purpose  would  have  sufficed  to  equip  in  every  first-rate  and  second- 
rate  town  in  Great  Britain  a  technical  institution  which  might  have  been  inval- 
uable to  us  in  our  commercial  struggle.  South  Africa  will  drain  our  strength; 
we  shall  lose  power  and  opportunity:  we  shall  bleed  to  weakness  if  not  to 
exhaustion. 

In  addition  to  the  military  and  political  difficulties,  there  will  arise  a  finan- 
cial problem  of  great  magnitude.  One  of  the  many  illusions  from  which  we  are 
slowly  awakening  is  the  expectation  that  we  shall  be  able  to  recover  a  consid- 
erable portion  of  the  cost  of  the  war  from  the  two  Republics.  This  illusion  was 
partly  based  on  the  hope  that  a  war  of  three  months  would  find  the  Boers  at 
our  mercy;  but  there  are  still  many  men  sanguine  enough  to  hope  that  even 
after  eighteen  months  of  warfare  we  may  still  be  able  to  relieve  the  English 
taxpayer  from  a  portion  of  his  burden.  This  hope  must  now  be  definitely 
abandoned.2  The  two  Republics  cannot  for  many  years,  and  perhaps  will  never, 
bear  any  considerable  share  of  the  cost  of  the  war.  This  statement  is  a  strong 
one  and  will  be  a  shock  to  optimists.  But  we  cannot  by  optimism  evade  plain 
facts,  and  a  recital  of  such  facts  will  be  sufficient  to  demolish  the  pathetic  hopes 
of  the  English  taxpayer. 

In  the  first  place,  though  it  is  at  present  impossible  to  estimate  accurately 
the  cost  of  the  war,  we  know  that  in  round  figures  the  present  expenses  of 
the  campaign  vary  between  £1,750,000  and  £2,000,000  a  week.  If  we  assume 
that  the  war  is  only  to  be  ended  by  the  complete  submission  of  the  Boers,  and 
if  we  also  assume  that  such  a  submission  cannot  be  obtained  in  less  than  two 
years  from  the  commencement  of  the  war,  we  shall  obtain  an  aggregate  cost  of 
£150,000,000.  This  estimate  is  a  very  low  one,  and  it  is  probable  that 
when  the  whole  expenses  of  the  war  are  computed  they  will  amount  to 
£175,000,000,  while  if  the  war  lasts  for  more  than  two  years,  the  total  cost  may 
be  £200,000,000  or  £250,000,000  ($1,250,000,000). 

The  two  Republics  have  been  devastated,  and  very  many  of  the  farms  in 
the  Orange  Free  State  and  in  the  Transvaal  have  been  burnt  and  destroyed. 
Many  of  the  smaller  towns  in  the  two  States  have  also  been  sacked,  and  the 
few  irrigation  works  which  existed  in  the  country  have  probably  been  ruined. 

1  What  happened  after  the  first  annexation  is  a  portent  of  what  must  happen  after  a 
second.    And  now  the  risks  are  immeasurably  greater. 

2  Sir  David  Barbour,  who  was  sent  by  the.  Government  to  the  Transvaal  to  report  on  the 
financial  situation  and  on  the  prospects  of  a  contribution  from  the  annexed  territories,  has 
reported  that  the  Free  State  will  furnish  nothing  towards  the  cost  of  the  war  and  that  the 
Transvaal,  having  been  brought  to  the  verge  of  ruin,  will  not  be  able  to  contribute  anything 
for  many  years.     (Sir  M.  Hicks-Beach,  April  18,  1901.) 


GOVERNMENT   WITHOUT   CONSENT.  71 

It  will  be  necessary  for  us,  if  we  are  to  govern  the  country  properly,  to  restore 
to  it  its  agricultural  and  its  industrial  prosperity.  It  will  be  impossible  to  feed 
the  inhabitants  of  the  large  towns  without  the  aid  of  an  agricultural  popula- 
tion. We  shall  have  therefore  to  rebuild  and  restock  the  farms  which  we  have 
burnt,  to  redeem  them  from  the  Jew  mortgagors  who  will  foreclose  on  the 
ruined  Boers,  and  to  supply  capital  to  the  Boer  farmers  whom  we  replace  on 
their  farms.  If  we  confiscate  these  farms  and  are  able  to  find  Englishmen  to 
succeed  the  Boer  owners,  we  shall  be  obliged  to  supply  such  men  with  even 
greater  capital.  It  will  also  be  necessary  to  take  in  hand  large  irrigation  works, 
and  to  develop  the  country  by  a  network  of  railways  and  by  other  necessary  but 
expensive  methods  of  development.  This  work  of  restoration  will  involve  us 
in  a  very  large  expenditure.  To  rebuild  the  farms,  to  supply  capital  to  the  old 
or  the  new  farmers,  to  develop  the  country  by  irrigation  and  railways  and  to 
compensate  those  of  our  own  colonists  who  have  suffered  in  this  war,  will  cost 
us  at  the  least  £25,000,000. 

We  thus  arrive  at  a  capital  sum  of  at  least  £200,000,000,  or  it  may  be 
£250,000,000,  which  will  fall  entirely  on  the  English  taxpayer  unless  we  are  able 
to  lay  part  of  the  burden  on  the  resources  of  the  Transvaal  and  the  Free  State. 
It  is  necessary,  therefore,  to  examine  the  resources  of  the  two  Republics. 

In  1898  the  total  revenue  which  the  Transvaal  was  able  to  raise  was,  in 
round  figures,  £4,000,000,  while  the  expenditure  amounted  to  the  same  sum. 
Of  this  sum  no  less  than  half  a  million  was  spent  in  armaments,  and  we  may 
therefore  assume  that  the  civil  administration  of  the  country  and  its  various 
services  cost  £3,500,000. 

The  following  is  the  financial  statement  of  the  Transvaal  for  1898: — 

Receipts. 

Fines,  &c £90,713 

Hut  and  native  tax 110,182 

Import  duties 1 .066,994 

Interest  254,991 

Licences 174,383 

Postal  Department  (including  telegraphs) 206,331 

Prospecting  licences 322,748 

Revenue,  Netherlands  Railway 668,951 

Sale  of  explosives 158,973 

Stamp  dues 285,383 

State  royalty  on  dynamite 67,71 1 

Stand  licences 60,004 

Transfer  dues 125,439 

Other  revenue 390,757 

£3.083,560 

Expenditure. 

Education    £202,831 

Fixed  salaries  1,080,382 

Hospitals  ._. 88,952 

Import  duties 316,426 

Interest  151,146 

Diggers'  and  Prospectors'  licences  (owners'  portion) 178,203 

Police  and  prisons..^ 80,963 

Purchase  of  properties 140,310 

Public  works 535,502 

Special  expenditure 211,911 

Sundry  services  148,874 

Swaziland  expenditure 148,961 

Telegraph  Department  92,023 

War  Department  357,225 

Other  expenditure  237,765 

£3.97M73 
Surplus  12,087 


72  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

The  revenue  of  the  Orange  Free  State  in  1895-96  was  £375,000,  and  the 
expenditure  was  £430,000.  The  succeeding  years  showed  an  increase  of  the 
figures  both  of  revenue  and  expenditure,  but  in  no  year  as  there  any  material 
surplus  of  income  over  expense. 

It  is  difficult  and  almost  impossible  to  determine  whether  some  of  the 
items  of  the  Transvaal  expenditure  are  extravagant,  and  whether  some  01  the 
receipts  may  not  be  increased  under  British  administration.  In  particular,  the 
revenue  derived  from  the  Netherlands  Railway  Company  will  probably  show 
an  increase  if  we  exercise  the  powers  of  expropriation  which  the  late  Trans- 
vaal Government  possessed.  It  is  probable  that  the  Transvaal  spent  on  its  war 
department  more  than  £357,000,  and  we  may  assume  that  the  extra  expenditure 
has  been  concealed  in  some  of  the  other  items.  But  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
the  expenses  of  a  Government  ruling  a  huge  territory  can  be  materially 
reduced  in  any  direction  except  in  that  of  military  supplies,  and  it  is  quite 
certain  that  many  of  the  expenses  will  be  considerably  increased.  The  admin- 
istration of  the  Transvaal  was  inefficient,  and  even  bad,  but  it  was  cheap.  It 
did  not  employ  a  host  of  officials,  and  the  salaries  paid  were  not  in  the  aggre- 
gate high. 

Putting  on  one  side  extravagant  expenditure  and  the  amount  expended  on 
armaments,  we  may  assume  that  the  cost  of  government  of  the  two  States  did 
not  in  any  year  exceed  £4,000,000;  and  it  is  well  known  that  British  administra- 
tion, though  efficient,  is  extremely  costly.  Whether  the  new  provinces  be  undei 
military  rule  or  Crown  Colony  government  or  representative  government,  it  is 
certain  that  the  number  of  officials  will  be  considerably  greater  than  the  number 
of  Boer  officials,  and  that  the  aggregate  amount  of  their  salaries  and  of  the 
general  cost  of  administration  will  exceed  by  at  least  one-half  the  expense  of 
the  former  civil  administration  of  the  Transvaal  and  the  Free  State.  We  may 
safely  assume,  therefore,  that  the  civil  administration  of  the  Transvaal  and  the 
Free  State  conducted  according  to  English  methods  will  cost  not  less  than 
£6,000,000. 

When  the  submission  of  the  Boers  is  enforced  there  is  to  be  a  force  of 
mounted  police  of  10,000  men.  The  pay  of  this  police  is  very  high,  and  amounts 
on  an  average  to  £200  a  year  for  each  man.  The  expenses  of  such  a  force, 
including  extra  allowances,  rations,  horses,1  and  equipment  for  the  rank  and 
file,  and  allowing  for  the  high  cost  of  all  necessaries  of  life,  will  amount  at  least 
to  another  £2  a  week  per  man.  This  police  force,  therefore,  will  cost  in  pay 
and  keep  £3,000,000  per  annum. 

It  will  also  be  necessary  to  maintain  a  large  military  force  in  the  conquered 
territories,  and  it  is  probable  that  this  force  will  number  for  several  years  at 
least  40,000  men.  Such  a  force  will,  making  due  allowance  for  the  cost  of  living 
and  for  the  general  waste  of  a  large  body  of  men,  cost  £100,000  a  week,  or 
£5,000,000  a  year.  Thus  the  military  occupation  and  the  policing  of  the  two 
territories  will  cost  £8,000,000  a  year,  and  the  whole  cost  of  the  civil  and  mili- 
tary administration  of  the  two  territories  cannot  be  less  than  £14,000,000  per 
annum. 

A  moment's  consideration  will  prove  to  us  that  it  will  be  quite  impossible 
to  raise  from  the  Transvaal  and  the  Free  State  more  than  a  quarter  of  this 

'  Horse-sickness  is  one  of  the  greatest  plagues  of  South  Africa,  and  it  has  been  esti- 
mated by  a  writer  in  the  African  Review  of  January  5,  1901,  that  the  average  mortality 
among  the  horses  in  our  army  of  occupation  will  be  at  least  75  per  cent.  Even  if  we  assume 
that  this  estimate  is  exaggerated,  and  reduce  it  to  50  per  cent.,  the  result  is  startling.  Assum- 
ing that  the  police  force  requires  30,000  horses,  of  these  15,000  will  die  every  year,  and, 
valuing  these  at  £20  each,  the  annual  cost  to  the  Government  in  horses  alone  will  be  £300,- 
000.  Moreover,  owing  to  the  risks  of  grass  food,  the  Government  will  havt  to  feed  at  least 
half  its  horses  on  forage,  and,  allowing  £2  per  month  per  horse  for  this  item,  we  arrive  at  an 
udditional  expense  of  £360,000.  The  total  expense  of  the  30,000  horses  alone  will  be  £660,- 
000  per  annum. 


GOVERNMENT   WITHOUT  CONSENT.  73 

amount.  The  taxable  value  of  the  Free  State  was  always  small,  and  after  the 
war  it  will  obviously  be  bankrupt.  The  agricultural  resources  of  the  Transvaal 
will  be  almost  annihilated,  and  the  English  Ministry  will  find  that  their  only 
source  of  revenue  left  is  the  mining  industry,  with  the  direct  or  indirect  taxation 
of  commodities. 

The  Government  will  be  met  at  the  outset  by  a  difficulty  of  pressing 
urgency.  For  what  reason  did  the  Government  embark  in  this  war?  Our  Min- 
isters have  stated  that  the  object  of  their  policy  was  to  redress  the  wrongs  of 
British  residents  and  to  enforce  British  supremacy.  If  this  is  so,  the  war  has 
obviously  been  undertaken  for  Imperial  interests,  and  the  Ministers  cannot 
consistently  demand  a  contribution  from  the  mine-owners,  most  of  whom  are 
non-British  subjects.  Nor  shall  we  be  able  to  demand  an  indemnity  from  the 
two  Republics,  for  we  have  annexed  them.  They  are  our  Colonies,  and  Eng- 
land cannot  demand  an  indemnity  from  her  Colonies. 

Mr.  J.  B.  Robinson  and  other  mine-owners  have,  during  the  last  few  months, 
vehemently  protested  against  the  placing  of  any  heavier  burdens  on  the  mines, 
and  the  influence  and  the  power  of  the  mine-owners  and  the  necessity  of  their  co- 
operation with  the  English  Government  will  force  us  to  yield  to  their  wishes 
and  to  spare  the  mines  any  burden  much  heavier  than  they  bore  under  the  Trans- 
vaal Government. 

In  1898  the  aggregate  .amount  of  dividends  paid  by  the  gold  mines  was 
under  £5,000,000,  and  the  taxes  on  profits  paid  by  them  to  the  Transvaal  Gov- 
ernment amounted  to  about  £250,000.  Making  every  allowance  for  an  increased 
output  of  gold  and  lighter  burdens,  it  will  be  impossible  for  the  English  Govern- 
ment to  raise  from  the  gold  mines  more  than  £500,000  a  year. 

In  addition  to  the  sources  of  revenue  which  we  have  given  above,  there  remain 
a  few  "concessions"  or  mining  rights  which,  having  been  the  property  of  the 
Transvaal  Republic,  will  pass  into  the  hands  of  its  successors.  The  value  of 
these  rights  has  been  exaggerated,  and  they  probably  will  not  realize  more  than 
£2,000,000,  which,  at  4  per  cent.,  will  yield  an  income  of  £80,000  a  year. 

We  will  now  tabulate  the  various  figures  and  form  an  estimate  of  the  receipts 
and  expenditure  of  the  two  States  under  British  administration.  Such  an  estimate 
must,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be  rough,  but  it  will  probably  be  found  that  the 
aggregate  amounts  are  not  far  distant  from  the  truth. 

Receipts. 

Taxation  of  gold-mines £500,000 

Imports  1,000,000 

Netherlands  Railway 750,000 

Dues  and  licences 750,000 

Income  from  sales  of  new  concessions 80,000 

Post  Office  220,000 

Other  receipts  350,000 

£3,650,000 

Expenditure. 

Civil  administration  of  the  two  provinces £6,000,000 

Military  occupation 5,000,000 

Police  force  of  10,000  men 3.000,000 

£  14,000.000 
3,650,000 

Deficit   £  10,350,000 

It  is  possible  and  probable  that  this  disastrous  balance-sheet  will  be  improved 
in  the  course  of  years,  but  no  material  improvement  is  possible  while  a  military 
occupation  of  the  two  territories  is  necessary. 


74  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

The  capital  expense  of  the  war  must  be  met  by  some  sort  of  loan,  whether 
wholly  by  an  addition  to  the  national  debt  of  England,  or  partly  by  a  loan  to  the 
new  Colonies  under  British  guarantee.  But  the  result  will  be  the  same.  The 
interest  on  the  money  will  and  can  only  be  paid  by  the  English  taxpayer.  If  the 
war  is  continued  for  a  further  considerable  period,  its  capital  expense  will  amount 
at  least  to  £200,000,000,  which  will  be  increased  to  £225,000,000  if  we  assume 
that  a  special  loan  of  £25,000,000  will  be  necessary  for  the  restoration  of  agri- 
culture and  the  rebuilding  of  the  burnt  farms.  The  interest  on  this  amount, 
allowing  for  a  sinking  fund,  at  3^  per  cent,  will  be  £  7,875,000,  and  if  we  add  this 
amount  to  the  deficit  on  the  revenue  accounts  of  the  two  States,  i.e.,  £10,350,000, 
we  arrive  at  a  total  of  £18,225,000.  Such  is  the  annual  burden  which  our  new 
Colonies  will  lay  upon  us  for  some  years  if  we  determine  to  secure  the  submission 
of  the  inhabitants  by  military  methods  and  to  control  their  disaffection  by  the 
sword. 

Of  this  huge  annual  expenditure  no  reduction  can  be  made  until  the  two 
provinces  become  settled  and  peaceful,  and,  looking  at  the  future  in  the  light  of 
the  past  and  the  present,  it  would  be  imprudent  to  hope  for  partial  withdrawal 
of  our  military  forces  and  a  reduction  of  our  police  force  within  four  or  five  years 
from  the  end  of  the  war. 


CHAPTER   IX. 

PEACE,   OR   GOVERNMENT    WITH    CONSENT. 

A  ~\  J  HEN  we  turn  from  the  lamentable  prospects  of  continued  warfare  and 
Y  Y  military  or  Crown  Colony  rule  to  a  reasonable  and  generous  pol- 

icy, we  are  met  by  the  instant  protests  of  pride.  But  to  propose 
terms  again  zvould  be  to  confess  an  error,  and  to  suffer  a  humiliation.  There,  at 
last,  we  have  touched  the  secret  wound.  It  is  our  pride  and  not  our  wisdom 
which  revolts.  We  fear  to  lose  Prestige.  Is  not  England  growing  a  little  tired 
of  this  word  and  of  some  other  sonorous  phrases  which  have  been  fashionable  of 
late?  Education  has  brought  with  it  a  certain  vulgarity  not  only  of  thought  and 
temper  but  of  expression.  High  and  noble  words  and  big  sounding  phrases  are 
attractive.  They  serve  to  dignify  a  commonplace  thought,  and  every  third-rate 
writer  or  speaker  must  mouth  of  Patriotism  and  Imperialism  and  Prestige.  They 
become  stale  by  ignoble  use,  until  sober  men  are  sick  of  the  sound  of  words 
which  are  as  incongruous  to  their  utterers  as  a  Tudor  palace  to  a  parvenu. 

The  old  cry  is  raised  again  that  to  oppose  the  Ministry  is  to  encourage  the 
enemy.  Every  argument  of  the  opponents  of  this  war  has  been  met  by  the  same 
protest :  "The  nation  is  at  war ;  the  Ministry  therefore  is  sacrosanct ;"  "Every 
vote  given  to  the  Liberals  is  a  vote  given  to  the  Boers ;"  "A  whisper  of  criticism 
in  England  will  be  heard  by  the  Boer  generals."  The  same  poor  and  futile  appeals 
were  made  by  North  and  Wedderburn,  and  were  met  by  Burke  in  language  as 
apt  to-day  as  it  was  a  century  and  a  quarter  ago. 

"Sir,  this  vermin  of  court  reporters,  when  they  are  forced  into  day  upon 
one  point  are  sure  to  burrow  in  another ;  but  they  shall  have  no  refuge ; 
I  will  make  them  bolt  out  of  all  their  holes  .  .  .  they  take  other 
ground,  almost  as  absurd,  but  very  common  in  modern  practice  and  very 
wicked,  which  is  to  attribute  the  ill  effect  of  ill-judged  conduct  to  the 
arguments  which  had  been  used  to  dissuade  us  from  it.  They  say 
that  the  opposition  made  in  Parliament  .  .  .  encouraged  the  Ameri- 
cans to  their  resistance." 
"If  this  unheard-of  doctrine  of  the  encouragement  of  rebellion  were  true,  if 
it  were  true  that  an  assurance  of  the  friendship  of  numbers  in  this  coun- 
try towards  the  colonies  could  become  an  encouragement  to  them  to 
break  off  all  connection  with  it,  what  is  the  inference?  Does  anybody 
seriously  maintain  that,  charged  with  my  share  of  the  public  councils, 
I  am  not  obliged  to  resist  projects  which  I  think  mischievous,  lest  men 
who  suffer  should  be  encouraged  to  resist?  ...  It  is,  then,  a  rule  that  no 
man  in  this  nation  shall  open  his  mouth  in  favour  of  the  colonies,  shall 
defend  their  rights,  or  complain  of  their  sufferings,  or,  when  war  breaks 
out,  no  man  shall  express  his  desire  of  peace?  ...  By  such  acquies- 
cence great  kings  and  mighty  nations  have  been  undone ;  and  if  any  are 
at  this  day  in  a  perilous  situation  from  rejecting  truth  and  listening 
to  flattery,  it  would  rather  become  them  to  reform  the  errors  under 
which  they  suffer  than  to  reproach  those  who  forewarned  them  of  their 
danger." 
We  may,  in  the  eyes  of  extreme  and  truculent  partisans,  suffer  humiliation ; 
but  can  we  suffer  greater  humiliations  than  we  have  been  enduring  for  eighteen 
months?  The  greatest  Empire  in  the  world  has  seen  the  greatest  army  it  has 


76  PEACE  OR  WAR.  1. 

ever  sent  from  its  shores  held  at  bay  by  two  little  nations  whose  whole  population 
is  beneath  that  of  a  second-rate  English  town.  We  have  a  population  of  forty 
millions  to  draw  upon,  immense  wealth  and  every  source  of  civilisation ;  the  Boers 
have  no  reinforcements  to  look  to,  and  they  have  no  visible  means  of  procuring 
supplies  and  ammunition.  Their  army  is  an  army  of  farmers,  and  when  they 
have  been  beaten  they  have  been  beaten  by  overwhelming  numbers.  If  it  is  only 
a  loss  of  prestige  that  we  fear,  let  us  be  manly  enough  to  recognise  that  we  are 
likely  to  lose  as  much  by  a  continuance  as  by  a  cessation  of  the  war ;  and,  at  any 
rate,  it  is  better  to  lose  a  little  prestige  than  a  sea  of  blood. 

To  open  negotiations  and  to  offer  honourable  terms  may  disclose  weakness ; 
but  which  is  the  greater  weakness — to  acknowledge  a  mistake,  or  in  our  foolish 
pride  to  blunder  into  the  dark  and  difficult  future,  regardless  of  the  cost,  and  igno- 
rant of  the  goal  ?  The  strong  man  can  afford  to  confess  his  mistake  and  to  turn 
back,  because  he  knows  that  he  is  strong,  that  he  possesses  the  capacity  of  amend- 
ment, and  that  he  can  redeem  his  loss.  The  weak  man,  like  the  ill-bred  among 
aristocrats,  is  conscious  of  his  weakness,  and  fears  detection.  He  hopes  to  cover 
his  retreat  by  loud  words,  and,  dreading  the  jeers  of  his  friends,  goes  obstinately 
along  to  perdition. 

If  foreign  nations  look  upon  our  change  of  purpose  with  scorn,  let  us  take 
this  comfort.  In  no  way  can  we  serve  the  interests  of  our  rivals  better  than  by 
continuing  this  war.  Every  pound  we  spend  in  South  Africa,  every  man  we  lose, 
is  their  gain,  and  while  we  are  bleeding  they  are  watching  and  waiting.  Every 
month  of  war  weakens  our  strength,  and  sees  us  more  impotent  to  defend  the 
manifold  interests  of  the  Empire.    Is  this  Prestige? 

Statesmanship  is  common  sense  touched  by  imagination  and  informed  by 
history;  and  the  very  essence  of  English  political  wisdom  is  compromise.  It  is 
common  sense  in  action  as  opposed  to  the  official  mind  in  action.  Real  states- 
manship is  the  union  of  the  ideal  and  the  practical,  and  it  recognises  that  what 
may  be  good  for  one  people  is  unbearable  by  another ;  that  human  nature  is  largely 
composed  of  prejudices,  and  that  to  gain  one  advantage  we  often  have  to  resign 
another;  that  a  strict  insistence  on  abstract  rights  not  seldom  results  in  the  loss 
of  rights  more  valuable.  To  carry  an  argument  to  its  logical  conclusion  may  be  in 
theory  admirable ;  in  ordinary  life,  and  above  all  in  political  life,  it  is  the  extreme 
of  folly.  We  must  take  other  men  and  nations  as  we  find  them.  God  made 
them  as  He  made  us,  and  they  are  probably  no  worse  and  no  better  than  we. 

The  wise  man  understands  the  limitations  of  his  strength,  and  he  knows  that 
to  aim  too  high  is  often  to  fall.  There  is  in  all  negotiations  the  happy  moment 
when  the  victor  of  the  hour  may  secure  his  reasonable  aims :  that  moment  passed, 
he  may  find  his  advantage  gone  and  his  first  conditions  impossible.  The  Sibyl  has 
offered,  and  will  yet  offer,  her  books  to  others  than  to  Tarquin. 

To  make  a  fetish  of  unconditional  submission,  to  prolong  a  great  and  costly 
war  because  our  enemy  might  make  submission  on  certain  terms  and  because 
he  will  not  make  submission  on  the  terms  which  we,  in  a  moment  of  rashness,  have 
laid  down,  is  obstinacy  as  criminal  as  was  that  of  George  III.,  and  the  result 
may  be  as  fatal. 

The  problem  of  a  practical  settlement  is  obviously  difficult  from  any  point  of 
view  save  that  which  recognises  no  difficulties  that  cannot  be  solved  by  sheer 
force.  Indeed,  it  is  not  unlikely  that  the  very  difficulties  of  the  case  are  among 
the  main  reasons  why  the  British  Government  chose  at  first  the  course  of  de- 
manding unconditional  surrender  from  the  Boers,  instead  of  offering  them  reason- 
able terms.  To  admit  this,  of  course,  would  be  to  confess  that  the  war  was 
forced  on  without  foresight,  and  has  been  pursued  for  no  good  cause.  The  easiest 
course,  at  first  sight,  has  seemed  to  be  that  of  effecting  a  conquest,  and  leaving 
the  settlement  slowly  to  shape  itself.  Like  haphazard  methods  in  general,  how- 
ever, this  course  has  merely  increased  the  difficulty.  The  demand  for  mere  sur- 
render, and  the  means  taken  to  enforce  it,  have  made  the  burghers  only  more 


GOVERNMENT  WITH  CONSENT.  77 

determined,  more  desperate,  more  irreconcilable.  Without  crying,  then,  over  the 
spilt  milk,  let  us  consider  what  plan  of  settlement  may  be  suggested  which  has 
any  chance  of  making  peace  and  keeping  it. 

It  is  clear  that  Lord  Kitchener,  and  in  a  lesser  degree  Sir  Alfred  Milner,  is 
convinced  that  for  our  own  sake  and  for  the  sake  of  South  Africa  this  war  should 
cease.  Lord  Kitchener  himself  was  willing  .to  make  notable  concessions.  He 
asked  General  Botha  to  meet  him  at  Middleburg,  and  he  there  submitted  to  the 
Boer  leader  certain  terms  which  in  his  opinion  the  English  Government  might 
be  willing  to  accept.    The  most  important  of  these  were : 

1.  That  military  government  should  cease  on  the  ceasing  of  hostilities,  and 
that  an  elected  assembly  should  advise  the  Crown  Colony  administration. 

2.  That  the  legal  debts  of  the  Republics  incurred  during  the  war  should  be 
taken  over  by  the  English  Government. 

3.  That  a  gift  of  money  should  be  made  to  repair  burnt  farms. 

4.  That  the  English  Government  should  move  the  Governments  of  Cape 
Colony  and  Natal  to  grant  an  amnesty  to  all  rebels. 

Lord  Kitchener's  tentative  proposals  were  laid  before  Mr.  Chamberlain,  and 
they  were  by  him  modified  and  made  more  stringent  on  these  and  other  points. 
Whether  these  modifications  were  unacceptable  to  the  Boer  leaders  or  whether 
Lord  Kitchener's  original  proposals  seemed  to  them  impossible,  we  do  not  know. 
All  we  do  know  is  that  on  March  16,  1901,  General  Botha,  in  a  short  letter,  sum- 
marily declined  to  recommend  the  terms  of  the  British  Ministry  to  the  earnest 
consideration  of  his  Government.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  no  terms  at  present 
are  likely  to  be  acceptable  to  the  Boers  which  do  not  give  them  a  modified  form 
of  independence. 

The  simplest,  and  in  the  long  run,  the  safest  course  would  be  a  return  to  the 
status  quo  ante  with  such  guarantees  and  modifications  as  would  safeguard  the 
interests  of  British  subjects  and  our  supremacy  in  South  Africa.  Any  scheme 
which  falls  short  of  practical  independence  must  ultimately  bear  within  it  the 
seeds  of  its  own  dissolution :  the  Boers  will  never  rest  until  they  have  regained 
the  right  to  manage  their  own  affairs.  But  in  the  present  temper  of  the  British 
public  it  is  beyond  the  range  of  practical  statesmanship  to  achieve  such  a  result. 

The  ground  of  agreement,  therefore,  must  be  sought  in  the  announcement 
by  Mr.  Chamberlain  in  the  House  of  Commons  to  the  effect  that  in  time  the 
Boer  provinces  must  have  self-governing  institutions.  This,  doubtless,  clashes  with 
language  used  about  the  same  time  by  Lord  Salisbury ;  but  there  are  many  reasons 
for  holding  that  Mr.  Chamberlain's  view  can  carry  the  day,  and  it  is  not  consistent 
with  the  terms  which  Lord  Kitchener,  obviously  with  Sir  Alfred  Milner's  ap- 
proval, proposed  to  Botha.  In  its  way,  however,  stands  the  serious  difficulty  that 
the  time  of  settlement  must  on  his  principles  be  determined  by  military  consid- 
erations. Not  till  the  commander  in  the  field  reports  tranquillity  and  security  is 
the  British  Government  likely  to  withdraw  its  forces  and  to  consent  to  a  period  of 
Crown  Colony  government,  which  in  its  turn  is  to  be  followed  by  such  Colonial 
self-government  as  prevails  in  Canada  and  Australia.  And  this,  as  already  sug- 
gested, is  probably  a  main  reason  why,  up  to  last  February,  Lord  Kitchener 
had  not  been  authorized  to  offer  terms  to  the  enemy.  Such  an  offer  would  have 
to  specify  dates ;  and  to  do  this,  from  Mr.  Chamberlain's  point  of  view,  would  in- 
volve stipulations  for  a  somewhat  prolonged  military  occupation  and  autocratic 
government  before  the  advent  of  representative  institutions.  That  the  Boers 
would  accept  such  terms  is  somewhat  unlikely.  Their  acceptance  would  mean  their 
submission  to  a  martial  law  administered  by  the  very  men  whom  lately  they  had 
been  fighting;  and  no  one  who  has  studied  the  operation  of  martial  law  can  well 
believe  that  under  these  of  all  circumstances  it  would  be  administered  in  an  en- 
durable fashion. 

Here  emerges  the  fatality  of  the  resort  to  arms,  with  its  normal  sequel  of 
angry  persistence  up  to  the  point  of  partial  exhaustion.    Terms  which  might  be 


78  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

offered  and  accepted  at  an  early  stage  are  at  that  stage  refused :  when  they  are 
offered,  the  stage  of  willing  acceptance  is  passed.  In  the  American  War  of  Inde- 
pendence, the  Ministry  of  Lord  North  sent  commissioners  in  1777  with  powers 
to  make  a  settlement.  Had  this  been  done  in  1775  there  might  have  been  no 
Declaration  of  Independence ;  but  in  1777  the  concessions  offered  came  too  late, 
and  the  war  went  on.  The  simple  fact  is  that  the  temper  which  makes  war  blinds 
men  to  the  means  which  can  either  avert  or  stop  it. 

If,  then,  there  is  to  be  any  diplomatic  arrest  of  the  war  in  South  Africa, 
it  must  be  by  way  of  a  plan  which  transcends  the  difficulties  that  now  hem  in  Mr. 
Chamberlain,  yet  stands  a  fair  chance  of  being  accepted  by  the  Ministerial  party. 
We  must  seek  a  solution  which  can  be  accepted  by  the  Boers  as  being  not  worse 
for  them  than  a  continuance  of  the  war,  while  at  the  same  time  it  does  not  restore 
the  conditions  of  unstable  equilibrium  that  led  to  the  war. 

To  this  end  the  following  suggestions  are  offered  with  due  diffidence,  though 
they  are  made  after  a  careful  and  anxious  calculation  of  all  the  ostensible  possi- 
bilities. They  are  doubtless  open  to  many  objections,  but  they  will  at  all  events 
serve  as  a  basis  of  discussion. 

( 1 )  Let  the  Boers  be  required  to  disband  on  the  conditions  that — 

(2)  A  general  amnesty  shall  be  proclaimed  both  for  the  inhabitants  of  the 
two  provinces  and  for  the  Cape  rebels. 

(3)  The  former  Republics  shall  be  made  constituent  provinces  in  a  South 
African  Federation  on  the  lines  of  that  of  Australia;  each  of  the  Boer  States, 
however,  retaining  its  local  legislature,  subject,  on  equal  terms  with  the  other 
States,  to  the  common  control  of  the  Federation. 

(4)  Neither  Republic  shall  be  at  liberty  to  enter  into  foreign  diplomatic 
relations  of  any  kind,  or  to  set  up  any  military  organisation  save  such  as  may  be 
authorised  by  the  common  Parliament  of  the  Federation,  with  a  view  to  possible 
danger  from  native  races. 

(5)  Further,  not  only  shall  the  franchise  conditions  in  the  Boer  provinces  be 
pre-determined  (either  in  the  common  Parliament,  under  the  usual  supervision  by 
the  Crown,  or  by  separate  agreement),  but  the  fiscal  control  of  the  Johannesburg 
mines  shall  be  similarly  determined,  to  the  end  that — 

(6)  The  taxation  to  be  drawn  from  the  mines  shall  be  directed  (a)  pri- 
marily to  the  repair  of  all  the  destruction  and  impoverishment  wrought  by  the 
war,  without  distinction  of  race;  and  (b)  secondarily,  after  such  restoration,  to 
the  general  development  and  administration  of  the  federated  provinces  of  South 
Africa. 

(7)  These  conditions  being  agreed  to,  the  Boer  provinces  shall  not  be 
administered  by  martial  law  in  the  interval  between  the  surrender  and  the  con- 
stitution of  the  Federation ;  but  the  British  Government  shall  be  entitled  to  main- 
tain at  specified  places  forces  sufficient  to  preserve  order  and  security,  while  the 
former  Parliaments  of  the  two  Boer  States  shall  be  at  liberty  to  recommence  the 
normal  administration  of  the  country,  save  and  except  as  regards  the  former 
military  organisation. 

(8)  In  order  to  hasten  and  guarantee  the  repair  of  the  destruction  and  im- 
poverishment wrought  by  the  war  on  both  sides,  the  British  Government  shall 
raise  on  loan  and  guarantee  a  fund  (to  be  specified)  at  a  date  not  later  than  six 
months  after  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  such  fund  to  be  disbursed  and  admin- 
istered by  three  or  four  Chief  Justices  (of  South  Africa),  one  British  Financial 
Expert,  two  Boers  of  high  station,  and  two  high  British  officials,  one  High  Com- 
missioner (=  four  Boers  and  five  or  six  British),  as  they  shall  see  fit. 

(9)  On  the  constitution  of  the  South  African  Federation,  the  fund  so  dis- 
bursed shall  be  recognised  as  part  of  the  common  debt  of  such  Federation,  and  the 
interest  upon  it  shall  be  met  out  of  the  common  revenue.  The  existing  debts  of 
the  other  provinces  shall  be  treated  in  the  same  fashion. 

(10)  Such  constitution  of  the  South  African  Federation  shall  take  place  as 


GOVERNMENT  WITH  CONSENT.  79 

soon  as  is  compatible  with  proper  arrangements,  and  shall  on  no  account  be  delayed 
more  than  three  years  from  the  date  of  cessation  of  hostilities. 

(u)  The  seat  of  the  common  Parliament  of  the  Federation  shall  be  in  a 
central  place,  to  be  agreed  upon  by  the  Parliaments  of  the  four  provinces. 

(12)  The  system  of  education,  the  treatment  of  natives,  and  the  use  of  the 
English  and  the  Dutch  language  shall  be,  as  far  as  possible,  uniform  in  all  the  con- 
stituent States. 

To  this  line  of  settlement  the  most  obvious  objection  is  that  it  commits  Cape 
Colony  and  Natal  to  a  Federation  on  which  they  have  not  been  asked  to  pro- 
nounce. This,  however,  may  be  met  by  an  offer  of  an  immediate  armistice  to  last 
for  a  given  period,  during  which  the  Parliaments  of  the  two  Colonies,  and  those 
of  the  two  Boer  States,  may  vote  on  the  general  question  of  a  Federation,  leaving 
open  only  such  details  as  cannot  be  readily  settled.  As  the  refusal  to  accept  Feder- 
ation all  round  would  mean  the  indefinite  prolongation  of  a  war  which  in  different 
degrees  is  disastrous  to  all  the  provinces  concerned,  as  well  as  to  the  British  Em- 
pire, there  is  fair  reason  to  trust  that  all  would  acquiesce.  If  not,  everything  would 
be  recommitted  to  the  fortune  of  war. 

The  government  of  the  Rand  district  must  always  be  a  difficult  problem, 
whether  under  Boer  or  British  rule.  If  in  the  forthcoming  settlement  some  special 
arrangement  were  possible  for  the  administration  of  this  part  of  the  Transvaal, 
many  dangers  of  the  future  would  be  avoided. 

The  dangers  of  a  liberal  policy  are,  in  the  opinion  of  its  opponents,  the  con- 
tinued existence  of  two  hostile  States  which  might  become  a  nucleus  of  intrigue 
against  British  supremacy  and  in  favour  of  foreign  intervention,  while  we  should 
again  be  exposed  in  the  course  of  a  few  years  to  an  increase  of  the  armaments  of 
the  Boers.  That  these  dangers  do  to  a  certain  degree  exist,  and  that  they  are  likely 
to  exist  for  some  time  is  true,  but  the  policy  of  annexation  will  rather  increase  than 
diminish  them. 

It  will  be  impossible  to  prevent  the  Boers  in  the  two  Republics  from  arm- 
ing themselves  with  rifles ;  and  in  fact  no  sane  Ministry  would,  in  view  of  the 
dangers  which  white  men  must  face  daily  in  South  Africa,  attempt  to  prohibit  the 
use  of  small  arms.  The  larger  armaments  we  could  forbid,  and  we  could  probably 
make  our  prohibition  effective.  But  if  we  govern  the  two  Republics  either  by 
military  rule  or  as  a  Crown  Colony,  we  shall  in  time  unite  the  whole  population 
against  ourselves,  whereas  if  we  allow  them  to  retain  a  modified  independence 
we  shall  escape  an  enormous  annual  outlay,  many  dangers,  and  countless  per- 
plexities. The  Boers  will  be  the  most  difficult  subjects  that  the  Empire  has  ever 
governed.  A  continuance  of  their  independence,  limited  by  guarantees  and  safe- 
guards, will  convert  them  from  rebels  into  neighbours,  sullen  perhaps,  but  unlikely 
to  inflict  practical  injuries  upon  us.  Annexed  and  held  down  by  force,  the  Boers 
will  be  ever  scheming  for  foreign  assistance.  Independent,  they  will  be  as  hostile 
to  foreign  interference  as  they  have  been  to  British  interference. 

It  is  clear  that  one  of  the  chief  difficulties  which  have  faced  the  Government 
and  which  will  face  it  in  the  future  is  the  question '  of  amnesty  for  the  Cape 
rebels.  In  theory  and  in  logic  their  offence  has  undoubtedly  merited  the  severest 
punishment.  They  have  been  guilty  of  high  treason,  and  they  are  therefore 
liable  to  the  severest  penalty  which  can  be  enforced  under  ordinary  law  or  special 
law  or  martial  law.  But  in  matters  of  practical  wisdom  there  is  not  so  much  room 
for  theory  and  logic  as  the  unobservant  may  suppose.  History  teaches  us  that  the 
theorist  and  the  logician  are  commonly  the  worst  statesmen,  and  that  common 
sense  is  the  basis  of  wise  policy.  If  it  is  true  that  the  Dutch  and  the  English 
have  to  live  permanently  side  by  side  not  only  in  the  two  Republics  but  in  Cape 
Colony  and  Natal,  it  should  obviously  be  the  aim  of  the  wise  statesman  to 
remove  all  possible  causes  of  friction  and  discontent.  If  the  Government  is  weak, 
it  will  yield  again  to  the  fierce  outcry  of  those  Loyalists  in  South  Africa  whose 
violence  has  led  our  Ministry  into  its  present  deplorable  position,  and  will  refuse 


80  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

an  amnesty  to  those  Dutch  in  Cape  Colony  who  have  taken  up  arms  on  behalf  of 
their  kinsmen.  If  the  Government  is  wise  it  will  remember  that  these  rebels 
.are  men  of  the  same  blood  as  the  citizens  of  the  two  Republics,  that  they  have 
been  induced  to  support  their  kinsmen  by  a  sympathy  which,  however  wrong- 
headed,  was  at  least  the  result  of  generous  motives.  There  can  be  no  peace  in 
South  Africa  until  the  two  races  are  brought  to  live  side  by  side  in  moderate 
friendship.  If  we  keep  the  wound  open  by  insisting  on  disfranchisement  or  im- 
prisonment, we  are  deliberately  placing  obstacles  in  the  path  of  a  peaceful  future. 
We  can  only  govern  by  consent  of  the  governed;  and  every  citizen  whom  we  do 
not  pardon,  whom  we  leave  embittered  by  the  loss  of  his  own  political  privileges  or 
of  the  rights  of  those  who  are  near  and  dear  to  him,  is  a  definite  and  irremov- 
able obstacle  to  a  peaceful  settlement  in  South  Africa.  The  policy  of  revenge  has 
been  tried,  and  it  has  always  failed :  the  policy  of  amnesty  has  been  tried,  and 
it  has  nearly  always  succeeded. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE   CONCLUSION   OF   THE   MATTER. 

WE  have  now  reached  the  close  of  our  consideration  of  this  great  prob- 
lem. We  have  seen  that  as  the  war  of  1775  arose  through  the 
assertion  of  a  right  of  sovereignty  over  the  American  Colonies,  so  the 
war  with  the  South  African  Republics  in  1899  arose  from  the  assertion  of  the 
right  of  England  as  suzerain  power  to  interfere  in  the  internal  concerns  of  the 
Transvaal.  We  have  seen  how  this  cruel  and  deplorable  war  was  the  outcome 
of  grievous  mistakes  on  both  sides,  of  incapacity  "and  perverse  distrust  on  the 
part  of  the  Boers,  of  gross  ignorance  and  of  an  insincere  and  awkward  diplo- 
macy on  the  part  of  our  advisers  and  officials. 

We  have  reviewed  the  melancholy  catalogue  of  absurdities  of  statement  and 
prediction  which  have  marked  the  history  of  the  last  two  years.  We  have  heard 
the  public  told  that  the  Boers  were  a  semi-barbaric,  unwashed,  wholly  dishonest 
and  corrupt  race  of  men  who  had  taken  advantage  of  our  ill-timed  generosity 
to  build  up  on  our  frontiers  a  powerful  military  system  and  to  threaten  our  Empire 
with  a  malignant  conspiracy.  We  have  seen  the  public  believing  that  the  Out- 
landers  were  outraged  by  these  men,  that  English  settlers  were  humiliated,  per- 
secuted, robbed  and  murdered,  that  they  were  "helots"  in  a  land  which  they  had 
enriched  by  their  exertions,  that  they  were  wandering  through  the  streets  of 
Johannesburg  with  downcast  eyes  and  speaking  with  bated  breath  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  tyrant  Boers.  We  were  told  that  at  least  two  great  Englishmen  had 
arisen  to  say  that  no  longer  should  such  a  disgrace  rest  on  the  name  of  the 
great  Empire. 

It  is  a  humiliating  task  to  review  the  stages  of  our  pathetic  optimism.  We 
were  told  that  Mr.  Chamberlain's  strong  words  and  Sir  Alfred  Milner's  firm  atti- 
tude would  bring  the  Boers  to  reason;  that  the  despatch  of  a  few  thousand 
troops  would  prevent  a  war;  that  30,000  men  would  crush  the  enemy  in  three 
months;  that  £9,000,000  would  more  than  cover  our  expenses,  and  that  the  two 
Republics  would  repay  us  that  sum;  that  500  killed  and  wounded  would  be  more 
than  the  total  of  our  losses;  that  after  the  first  defeat  the  Dutch  would  accept 
the  inevitable  and  look  to  us  with  love  and  admiration;  that  the  capture  of 
Bloemfontein  was  the  conquest  of  the  Free  State;  that  the  occupation  of  Pre- 
toria was  the  end  of  the  war;  that  British  troops  were  securely  occupying  our 
new  possessions;  that  severity  would  teach  the  new  Boers  a  lesson,  and  that  the 
devastation  of  their  farms  would  quickly  tame  their  stubborn  spirit.  Finally, 
in  September,  1900,  we  were  told  by  the  Government  that  the  campaign  was 
practically  finished,  and  in  November,  1900,  we  were  told  by  Lord  Roberts  that 
the  war  was  over. 

Is  it  necessary  to  demonstrate  the  absurdity  of  these  predictions?  We  have 
sent  300,000  troops  to  South  Africa,  we  have  spent  over  £100,000,000,  and  we 
now  know  that  no  contribution  can  come  from  the  ruined  and  devastated  prov- 
inces; we  have  lost  15,000  men  by  death,  and  40,000  have  left  South  Africa  as 
invalids.  Are  we  nearer  the  end,  or  are  we  not  losing  more  men  every  month 
than  we  lost  in  the  period  of  our  early  disasters?1     Have  we  not  evacuated  half 

1  The  monthly  average  of  our  casualties  during  the  first  five  months  of  the  war  was 
1,647;  the  casualty  list  for  April,  1901,  contained  2,873  cases. 


82  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

the  towns  we  once  occupied,  and  do  not  Boer  commandoes  roam  at  will  over 
Cape  Colony? 

The  ironies  of  the  war  are  no  less  ludicrous.  We  went  to  war  to  extend 
the  franchise  to  the  whole  body  of  citizens  in  the  Transvaal;  we  are  now  told 
that  the  first  outcome  of  the  war  will  be  a  military  government  of  the  two  prov- 
inces, and  that  representative  institutions  may  be  postponed  for  generations. 
Lord  Salisbury  solemnly  asserted  that  we  sought  no  territory  and  no  goldfields; 
the  result  of  our  first  victory  was  an  equally  definite  statement  that  we  intended 
to  annex  the  two  Republics.  The  declared  ambition  of  our  Ministers  was  to 
bring  peace  and  reconciliation  to  the  two  races:  the  result  of  the  war  has  been 
to  generate  a  most  ferocious  hatred  between  the  English  and  the  Dutch,  and  to 
deprive  our  fellow-subjects  in  Cape  Colony  of  their  civil  liberties.  We  were  told 
that  in  the  Transvaal  not  the  least  outrage  on  justice  was  the  control  of  the 
judges  by  the  executive;  we  now  hear  that  under  the  new  rule  the  judges  will 
be  directly  under  the  control  of  Sir  Alfred  Milner.  It  was  imputed  as  a  fault  to 
the  Transvaal  Government  that  Dutch  was  the  only  language  permissible  in  the 
law  courts;  we  are  now  informed  that  in  a  Dutch  country  the  English  language 
only  is  to  be  used.  We  were  told  that  the  elevation  of  the  native  was  a  primary 
object  of  our  ambition:  we  now  hear  that  Sir  Alfred  Milner  will  forward  that 
elevation  by  a  system  of  lashes. 

We  have  seen  the  touching  confidence  of  the  English  people  rudely  shaken; 
we  have  seen  every  estimate  of  our  Ministers  falsified,  every  statement  dis- 
proved, every  calculation  refuted,  every  hope  shattered,  every  prophecy  unful- 
filled.    Is  not  the  cup  of  error  full  to  the  brim? 

We  have  followed  the  course  of  the  war  from  the  disasters  of  its  first 
months  to  the  early  and  brilliant  successes  of  Lord  Roberts.  We  have  seen 
how,  after  the  fall  of  Bloemfontein,  the  golden  opportunity  of  peace  was  lost; 
how,  during  the  last  twelve  tedious  months,  the  unwearying  labours  of  our 
brave  army  have  borne  little  fruit.  We  have  seen  that  a  policy  of  devastation 
has  resulted  in  a  more  embittered  hostility  and  a  more  tenacious  determination 
on  the  part  of  our  enemy.  We  have  seen  the  area  of  the  war,  enormous  at  first, 
increased  by  the  invasion  of  Cape  Colony.  We  have  seen  that  Colony  held 
down  by  martial  law,  distracted  by  racial  hate,  and  torn  by  civil  war.  We  have 
seen  our  troops  struck  down  by  fever,  stale  and  weary ;  we  have  seen  the  whole 
of  South  Africa  divided  into  two  hostile  camps,  traversed  by  hurrying  columns, 
carrying  ruin  and  desolation  to  a  country  which  is  to  add  to  our  prosperity. 
We  have  examined  the  alternatives  that  lie  before  us,  how  the  unconditional 
submission1  which  our  Ministers  still  demand  will  result  in  permanent  disaffec- 
tion and  danger  and  in  a  grievous  strain  of  our  military  and  financial  resources. 
We  have  searched  for  a  way  of  escape  from  a  melancholy  future.  We  have 
examined  the  other  alternative  which  promises  reconciliation  and  peace  and 
freedom  from  the  dangers  which,  if  we  are  unwise,  we  shall  lay  upon  ourselves 
and  our  heirs. 

The  public  has  suffered  and  has  learnt  much  since  October,  1899.  It  is 
slowly  recovering  from  the  heady  fumes  of  Ministerial  wine,  and  it  is  now  better 
able  to  distinguish  between  the  voice  of  error  and  the  voice  of  truth.  The  Eng- 
lish people,  agonised,  bewildered,  alarmed,  and  angered,  is  groping  towards  the 

'The  solemn  appeal  which  Burke  made  in  1777  in  his  letter  to  the  Sheriffs  of  Bristol 
might  be  made  almost  literally  to-day :_  "I  think  I  know  America.  If  I  do  not,  my  ignorance 
is  incurable,  for  I  have  spared  no  pains  to  understand  it;  .and  I  do  most  solemnly  assure 
those  of  my  constituents  who  put  any  sort  of  confidenc  m  my  industry  and  integrity  that 
everything  that  has  been  done  there  has  arisen  from  a  total  misconception  of  the  object; 
that  our  means  of  originally  holding  America,  that  our  means  of  reconciling  with  it  after 
a  quarrel,  of  recovering  it  after  separation,  of  keeping  it  after  victory,  did  depend,  and  must 
depend,  in  their  several  stages  and  periods,  upon  a  total  renunciation  of  that  unconditional 
submission  which  has  taken  such  possession  of  the  minds  of  violent  ir»n." 


THE  CONCLUSION  OF  THE  MATTER.  «3 

truth.  For  not  the  least  danger  of  prophecy  is  its  nonfulfilment.  A  falsified 
forecast  demoralises  its  utterer,  and  leads  him  to  seek  from  every  quarter  save 
the  right  one  the  explanation  of  his  error.  As  one  false  statement  leads  to  the 
manufacture  of  a  second  to  shield  the  first,  so  the  error  of  the  bold  and  unsuc- 
cessful prophet  leads  him  into  a  wilder  prophecy  and  a  more  dangerous  path. 
The  public  sees  that  it  has  been  deceived  by  its  Ministers,  deceived  by  its 
officials,  deceived  by  its  newspapers,  and  it  asks  itself  whether  the  gigantic 
errors  of  the  past  may  not  be  ominous  of  future  mistakes  as  great  and  possibly 
more  dangerous. 

From  the  beginning  of  1896  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  history  of  our 
diplomacy  is  the  history  of  a  personal  struggle  between  Mr.  Chamberlain  and 
President  Kruger.  Such  a  struggle  was  certain.  Both  men  belonged  to  the 
same  type,  stubborn,  imperious,  and  suspicious.  A  fixed  idea  inspired  both. 
Mr.  Chamberlain  honestly  believed  that  the  Boers  would  yield  to  pressure  and 
threats,  while  the  President  regarded  Mr.  Chamberlain's  violent  methods  as 
additional  confirmation  of  his  suspicions  and  fears.  A  vicious  circle  had  been 
started.  Every  minatory  speech  by  Mr.  Chamberlain  made  a  return  to  reason- 
able diplomacy  on  his  part  less  possible,  while  every  proposal  of  the  Transvaal 
Government  was  regarded  by  him  as  a  new  attempt  to  confuse  the  issues  and 
prolong  a  period  of  vexatious  inaction. 

Mr.  Chamberlain  had  determined  that  there  could  be  only  one  issue  to  the 
deadlock,  and  that  it  must  take  the  form  of  a  complete  diplomatic  submission 
on  the  part  of  the  Boer  Government.  He  had  assured  himself,  through  the 
information  and  counsel  which  he  derived  from  Sir  Alfred  Milner,  that  the 
unwillingness  of  the  Boers  to  meet  our  wishes,  and  their  open  armaments,  were 
undermining  our  authority  in  South  Africa.  Would  it  be  an  exaggeration  to 
say  that  England  has  been  involved  in  a  disastrous  war  because  an  English  Min- 
ister attempted  by  threats  to  force  an  ignorant  Dutchman  into  submission  to  his 
will? 

The  radical  error  of  our  Ministers  throughout  the  negotiations  of  1899, 
and  the  long  war  which  has  ensued,  is  due  to  their  lack  of  imagination.  They 
held  that  the  Boers  would  yield  to  diplomatic  pressure,  firmly  and  consistently 
applied.  They  believed  that  the  despatch  of  troops  and  the  embodying  of  an 
army  corps  would  complete  the  surrender  which  diplomacy  had  not  been  able 
to  effect.  They  believed  that  the  men  whom  defeat  in  the  field  had  not  terrified 
would  weaken  at  the  sight  of  their  burning  farms  and  their  imprisoned  wives. 
They  did  not  know  that  a  stubborn  race  could  face  all  dangers  and  every  form 
of  death  for  their  freedom. 

From  this  lamentable  error  have  flowed  all  those  subsequent  troubles  and 
disasters  which  have  plunged  South  Africa  into  desolation  and  England  into 
grief:  in  its  train  have  followed  the  cruel  and  odious  necessity  of  making  war 
on  women  and  children,  the  bitter  griefs  of  thousands  of  English  homes.  The 
denial  to  the  Boer  Government  of  the  ordinary  rights  of  nations,  the  insistence 
upon  unconditional  submission  and  the  threat  of  the  total  loss  of  their  independ- 
ence, were  certain  to  engender  in  the  hearts  of  the  Boer  nation  a  determination 
to  struggle  for  their  independence  until  the  death.  Our  Ministers  have  given  us 
many  examples  of  their  ignorance  of  the  most  elementary  facts  of  history  and 
experience.  If  there  is  one  thing  that  brave  men  will  fight  for  it  is  for  the  inde- 
pendence of  their  country.  For  this  they  will  struggle,  and  rightly  struggle, 
against  overwhelming  odds.  If  Lord  Salisbury  and  Mr.  Chamberlain  had 
been  wise  in  the  spring  of  1900.  we  should  now  have  been  enjoying  peace  for 
more  than  a  year,  and  it  would  have  been  an  honourable  peace,  which  brought 
us  all  we  ever  asked  or  claimed  of  the  two  Republics,  which  would  have  placed 
the  States  under  the  British  flag,  and  which  might  have  brought  about  the 
federation  of  South  Africa. 

From  that  fair  picture  turn  to  this.     From  end  to  end  South  Africa  is  in 


84 


PEACE  OR  WAR. 


the  grip  of  war.  Throughout  the  two  annexed  Republics  many  of  the  richest  of 
the  farms  and  villages  are  charred  and  blackened  ruins.  Cape  Colony  itself  is 
the  scene  of  civil  war,  the  women  and  children  of  our  foes  are  gathered  into 
refugee  camps,  and  there  are  learning  nothing  but  bitter  hatred  of- our  rule. 
Our  army,  long  since  weary  of  a  tedious  campaign,  sick  with  disappointment, 
and  decimated  by  fever,  is  still  pursuing  a  phantom  foe.  Meantime,  the  war, 
which  at  the  end  of  March,  1900,  had  probably  cost  under  £30,000,000,  has  cost 
us  since  that  date  at  least  £75,000,000  more,  and  is  costing  us  over  a  million  and 
a  half  a  week.  The  drain  of  brave  lives  is  more  terrible.  On  March  17,  1900, 
the  total  number  of  men  taken  prisoners,  killed  in  action  or  by  disease,  and  sent 
home  as  invalids  was  13,974.  On  April  30,  1901,  the  total  list  of  casualties  was 
63,498.  Therefore  the  refusal  of  our  Government  to  grant  the  Boers  reason- 
able terms  of  peace  has  cost  us  the  lives,  or  health,  or  services  of  over  50,000 
men.  Each  week  as  it  passes  now  sees  the  death  from  wounds  or  disease  of  one 
hundred  and  fifty  men  and  the  disablement  through  the  same  causes  of  nearly 
eight  hundred  more,  while  the  number  of  those  whose  hearts  and  strength  are 
failing  them  of  sheer  exhaustion  and  weariness  our  generals  in  South  Africa 
alone  can  tell.  What  a  commentary  on  the  optimism  of  our  rulers,  on  the  fiction 
of  a  finished  war!  The  tragedy  of  it,  the  despair  and  the  folly,  are  solely  due  to 
the  inability  of  our  Government  to  grasp  the  truth  that  a  brave  people  will  fight 
for  its  independence  to  the  last  cartridge. 

Providence  has  indeed  decreed  that  because  man's  happiness  depends 
greatly  on  his  illusions  he  shall  not  escape  the  dangers  which  are  incident  to 
them.  We  are  facing  the  dangers  now.  The  policy  of  our  Government  is  a 
failure,  self-evident  and  self-confessed.  Is  it  wise  to  delude  ourselves  any 
longer  with  comfortable  words  from  a  Fool's  Paradise?  One  by  one  our  illu- 
sions are  falling  from  us,  one  by  one  our  fond  and  foolish  hopes  are  melting 
into  grim  realities.  We  are  now,  at  all  events,  face  to  face  with  facts.  The 
gloomy  review  of  the  situation  which  Sir  Alfred  Milner,  on  February  5,  1901, 
despatched  to  Mr.  Chamberlain  makes  it  clear  that  not  only  are  we  making  no 
progress  in  the  two  States,  but  that  since  August,  1900,  there  has  been  a  steady 
and  ominous  retrogression.  The  situation,  in  Sir  Alfred  Milner's  words,  is 
"puzzling." 

Nor  is  our  own  financial  danger  less  ominous.  The  purely  military 
expenses  of  the  war  amount  at  the  present  time  to  £1,750,000  a  week,  and  in 
addition  there  is  the  enormous  cost  of  maintaining  the  18,000  prisoners  of  war, 
the  30,000  Eoer  women  and  children  and  non-combatants  who  are  gathered  into 
refugee  camps,  the  large  number  of  refugees  at  Cape  Town  and  Durban,  and 
possibly  a  considerable  number  of  the  native  population  of  South  Africa.  What 
the  weekly  expenditure  on  such  maintenance  may  be  we  can  only  dimly  guess, 
but  we  shall  certainly  not  pass  the  truth  if  we  put  it  from  £150,000  to  £200,000 
a  week.  The  expenses  of  the  war,  therefore,  are  now  nearly  £2,000,000  a  week, 
and  such  expenses  tend  to  increase  rather  than  to  diminish.1  ^s 

1  The  following  table  will  convey  to  the  reader  a  rougTridoa  of  the-hTSs"Tn  money  which 
a  prolongation  of  the  war  will  entail  upon  the  British  people,  assuming  that  the  total  ex- 
penditure up  to  April  1st  has  been  £120,000,000,  and  also  assuming  that  the  cost  will  increase 
rather  than  decrease. 

Cost  to  April    1,  1901 £120.000,000 

"       July  1,  1901 144,000,000 

"        October  1,  1901 170,000,000 

"        January  I,  1902 106.000,000 

"       April  1,  1902 222,000,000 

"       July  1,  1902 240.000.000 

"       October  1,  1902 276,000,000 

The  loss  of  life,  by  battle  and  disease,  is  at  least  120  a  week,  i.  e.,  6,000  a  year. 

The  cost  of  the  Crimean  war,  which  we  have  always  regarded  as  a  great  and  costly 
struggle,  was  only  £70,000.000.  The  twenty  years'  war  against  Napoleon  added  £600.000.000 
to  the  National  Debt,  and  the  war  of  1775-83  added  £70.000.000. 


h 


^ 


THE  CONCLUSION  OF  THE  MATTER. 


85 


The  most  disastrous  feature  of  the  whole  outlook  is  that  our  loss  in  money 
and  lives  will  not  cease  with  the  ceasing  of  the  war.  If  we  were  engaged  in 
hostilities  with  a  European  nation  from  whose  country  we  should  retire  on  the 
conclusion  of  peace,  we  should  at  all  events  be  able  to  calculate  our  expenses  and 
to  feel  that  our  future  was  to  that  extent  secure  and  definite.  But  we  are  about 
to  add  to  the  Empire  two  unwilling  colonies;  and  the  maintenance  there  of  a 
large  military  force,  combined  with  the  costly  re-settlement  of  a  devastated  land, 
will  involve  us  in  an  indefinite  cost  for  an  indefinite  number  of  years.  It  is  now 
acknowledged  that  the  Free  State  will  furnish  us  with  nothing,  and  that  for 
many  years  the  Transvaal  will  be  practically  insolvent.  The  peace,  when  it 
comes,  will  cost  us  over  £18,000,000  a  year.  Was  ever  victory  so  disastrous 
or  peace  so  costly? 

The  financial  future  is  indeed  disquieting.  It  is  clear,  as  Sir  Michael  Hicks- 
Beach  pointed  out  on  the  introduction  of  the  Budget  of  1901,  that  the  extra 
taxation  which  we  have  been  bearing  during  the  last  year,  and  which  is  now 
about  to  be  enlarged,  is  only  sufficient  to  meet  our  increased  expenditure.  If 
the  war  were  over  to-morrow,  we  could  not  remit  these  heavy  burdens.  We  are 
paying  war  taxes,  but  we  are  not  paying  for  the  war  with  them.  On  the  con- 
trary, if  trade  declines  to  any  considerable  extent  during  the  next  two  years  we 
shall  have,  unless  we  reduce  our  ordinary  expenditure,  to  increase  the  burden  of 
taxation.  We  have  increased  in  two  years  our  National  Debt  by  £120,000,000, 
i.  e.,  by  one-fifth  of  its  former  bulk.  Wealthy  as  England  is,  she  cannot  bear  for 
long  a  strain  so  grievous.  Our  national  solvency  and  credit  depends  on  a 
decreasing  National  Debt,  and  if  the  war  continues  we  must  increase  that  debt 
at  the  rate  of  £100,000,000  per  annum.  All  we  can  do,  if  the  present  policy  is 
to  hold  the  field,  is  to  pay  on,  knowing  not  only  that  nothing  will  come  back 
to  us  from  these  provinces  which  we  have  annexed,  but  that  they  will  add  an 
annual  sum  of  not  less  than  £18,000,000  to  the  burdens  under  which  we  are 
already  labouring.  And  this  is  the  financial  result  of  a  war  which  was  one  of 
"practical  business.'" 

When  we  shrink  from  a  future  so  melancholy,  when  we  seek  for  light  on 
our  path,  we  are  met  by  the  cry  that  to  be  prudent  is  to  be  weak,  that  to  use  our 
common  sense  is  to  surrender  our  rights,  that  we  must  still  continue  to  shear 
the  wolf  we  have  by  the  ears.2  Our  Ministers  still  urge  us  to  yield  our  scruples 
to  their  foresight.     The  road  is  dark  and  difficult,  and  we  ask  ourselves  what 


1  Mr.  Cecil  Rhodes's  words. 

'Again  let  Burke  speak  to  us:  "But  I  must  say  a  few  words  on  the  subject  of  these 
rights,  which  have  cost  us  so  much,  and  which  are  likely  to  cost  us  our  all.  Good  God ! 
Mr.  Speaker,  are  we  yet  to  be  told  of  the  rights  for  which  we  went  to  war?  Oh,  excellent 
rights!  Oh,  valuable  rights!  Valuable  you  should  be.  for  we  have  paid  at  parting  with  you. 
Oh,  valuable  rights  !  that  have  cost  Britain  thirteen  provinces,  four  islands,  a  hundred  thousand 
men,  and  more  than  seventy  millions  of  money!  Oh,  wonderful  rights!  that  have  lost  to 
Great  Britain  her  boasted,  grand,  and  substantial  superiority  which  made  the  world  bend 
before  her!  .  .  .  What  were  these  rights?  Can  any  man  describe  them?  Can  any  man 
give  them  a  body  and  a  soul,  a  tangible  substance,  answerable  to  all  these  mighty  costs  ?  We 
did  all  this  because  we  had  a  right  to  do  it ;  that  was  exactly  the  fact.  'And  all  this  we  dared 
to  do  because  we  dared.'  We  had  a  right  to  tax  America,  says  the  noble  lord,  and  as  we  had 
a  right  we  must  do  it.  We  must  risk  everything,  forfeit  everything,  think  of  no  consequences, 
take  no  consideration  into  view  but  our  right ;  consult  no  ability,  nor  measure  our  right  with 
our  power,  but  must  have  our  right.  Oh,  miserable  and  infatuated  Ministers !  miserable  and 
undone  country !  not  to  show  that  right  signifies  nothing  without  might ;  that  the  claim  with- 
out the  power  of  enforcing  it  was  nugatory  and  idle  in  the  copyhold  of  rival  States  or  of 
immense  bodies  of  people.  Oh,  says  a  silly  man  full  of  his  prerogative  of  dominion  over  a 
few  beasts  of  the  field,  there  is  excellent  wool  on  the  back  of  a  wolf,  and  therefore  he  must 
be  sheared.  What!  shear  a  wolf?  Yes.  But  will  he  comply?  Have  you  considered  the 
trouble?  How  will  you  get  the  wool?  Oh,  I  have  considered  nothing,  and  I  will  consider 
nothing  but  my  right ;  a  wolf  is  an  animal  that  has  wool ;  all  animals  that  have  wool  are  to  be 
shorn,  and  therefore  I  will  shear  the  wolf.  This  was  just  the  kind  of  reasoning  urged  by  the 
Minister,  and  this  the  counsel  he  has  given." 


86  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

manner  of  men  are  our  guides.  It  is  too  late  for  them  to  appeal  for  our  silence. 
There  are  times  when  silence  is  patriotic;  but  there  is  a  limit  to  all  things,  and 
there  are  times  when  silence  is  an  abnegation  of  intelligence.  The  time  has 
come  when  the  public  must  take  its  fate  into  its  own  hands.  Our  Ministers 
have  been  tried  and  have  been  found  wanting. 

Nor  do  they  see  the  end.  We  are  drifting  now  in  the  blind  hope  of  some 
happy  chance.  Let  us  at  once  face  facts,  and  frame  a  policy  which  shall  meet 
those  facts.  Let  us  cast  off  and  abjure  that  incurable  levity,  that  foolish  opti- 
mism, that  weak  fatalism  which  blind  men  to  their  own  incompetence  and  to 
approaching  disaster.     The  ''inevitable"  is  the  last  refuge  of  the  imbecile. 

The  contest  has  been  raging  too  long  round  names  rather  than  essential 
principles  or  the  demands  of  prudence.  The  good  name  of  a  Minister  or  a 
Viceroy  is  of  no  account  in  comparison  with  the  lasting  welfare  of  our  country. 
These  men  pass,  they  become  as  the  shadows  of  nothing,  but  England  endures. 
We  must  act  with  a  single  eye  to  her  interests,  knowing  that  mercy  and  judg- 
ment and  honour  are  in  the  end  identical  with  good  policy.  We  have  made  a 
gigantic  mistake;  let  us  confess  our  error  like  giants,  and  not,  like  pigmies,  seek 
to  hide  it.  To  return  to  reason  and  common  sense  is  no  weakness;  rather  is  it 
a  counsel  of  black  despair  which  bids  us  continue  to  tread  the  same  weary  and 
costly  path  which  we  are  treading  now. 

In  such  a  controversy  as  we  have  recently  passed  through  the  majority  is 
not  always  in  the  right.  The  nature  of  man  is  prone  to  violent  courses,  to 
selfishness  of  aim  and  to  haughtiness  of  temper.  It  was  a  minority  which 
opposed  the  policy  of  North  in  1775:  it  was  a  minority  which  attacked  the  insane 
adventure  of  the  Crimea:  it  was  a  minority  which  in  1863  supported  the  cause 
of  the  North  against  the  South.  In  each  case,  the  few  and  faithful  men,  voices 
crying  in  the  wilderness,  were  assailed  by  every  form  of  virulent  abuse ;  but  who 
will  now  say  that  they  were  in  error? 

To  make  an  honorable  peace  with  the  Boers  will  indeed  disclose  a  failure. 
But  it  is  useless  to  disguise  from  ourselves  or  the  world  that  we  have  failed. 
It  is  not  given  to  the  wisest  man  or  the  greatest  State  always  to  be  wise,  always 
to  succeed.  Men  and  nations  often  utter  rash  and  proud  words  of  which  later 
they  repent.  Are  they  to  be  held  for  ever  bound  to  the  performance  of  a 
promise  made  in  ignorance  and  haste?  Let  us  be  manly  enough  to  confess 
our  mistake  and  we  may  be  assured  that  if  we  are  wise  in  time,  it  will  not  count 
against  us  for  long  in  the  assize  of  the  nations. 

Let  us  cultivate  a  historic  detachment,  and  endeavour  to  review  this  war 
with  something  of  the  cool  reasonableness  with  which  our  sons  and  grandsons 
will  regard  it,  with  which  we  can  now  criticise  the  folly  of  the  Crimea  and  the 
blindness  of  1775.  The  tale  of  folly  is  ancient  as  the  hills,  recurrent  as  the  sea- 
sons. That  which  the  apostles  of  unconditional  submission  preach  to  us  now, 
the  apostles  of  the  same  policy  preached  to  our  forefathers  a  hundred  and 
twenty-five  years  ago.  From  mercy  and  reason  and  good  sense  they  declared 
would  flow  the  loss  of  our  Colonies,  of  our  self-respect,  of  our  prestige,  of  our 
place  among  the  nations.  The  same  voice  is  speaking  now  from  different  lips, 
and  if  we  follow  its  counsel  we  shall  suffer  as  our  fathers  suffered;  and  even 
as  they  lost  America,  so,  though  we  may  win  the  immediate  prize  on  which  our 
hearts  are  set,  will  the  future  bring  its  retribution  and  the  loss  of  the  land  we 
are  striving  to  conquer. 

There  are  dangers  and  difficulties  in  a  policy  of  conciliation,  but  they  are 
less  numerous  and  less  menacing  than  the  dangers  of  continued  violence.  If 
the  Imperial  Government  and  the  two  races  are  earnest  in  their  desire  for  peace 
a  way  will  be  found  out  of  the  difficulties,  and  safeguards  will  be  devised  against 
the  dangers.  To  close  a  terrible  and  devastating  war  with  a  peace  which  gives 
us  all  we  ever  claimed  from  our  enemy,  which  places  the  two  States  under  the 


THE  CONCLUSION  OF  THE  MATTER. 


87 


British  flag,  and  which  brings  about  at  once  a  union  of  South  Africa,  is  surely 
no  weak  or  dishonouring  surrender. 

We  must  attempt  to  realise  the  scenes  oi  horror  and  desolation  and  hatred 
with  which  South  Africa  is  now  accursed.  The  two  Dutch  Republics  are  black- 
ened deserts,  Natal  and  Cape  Colony  are  divided  into  hostile  camps.  A  state 
of  civil  discord,  almost  of  civil  war,  exists.  Sons  of  the  same  father  are  fight- 
ing on  opposite  sides;  the  mother  sympathises  with  the  Dutch,  the  daughter 
with  the  English;  the  springs  of  social  intercourse  are  poisoned.  For  the 
Dutch  South  Africa  is  almost  a  hell.  And  yet  the  Dutch  in  Cape  Colony  are 
our  fellow-subjects.  They  have  exactly  the  same  rights  and  privileges  as  an 
ordinary  English  citizen,  and  they  have  been  up  to  the  present  moment  as  loyal 
to  the  Sovereign  of  England  as  his  most  loyal  subject  in  Great  Britain.  If  their 
loyalty  has  been  undermined,  is  it  matter  for  wonder?  The  Dutch  in  Cape 
Colony  are,  with  the  exception  of  the  inhabitants  of  Cape  Town,  under  martial 
law,  which  is  in  fact  the  negation  of  all  law.  They  are  liable  to  severe  pun- 
ishment if  they  stir  out  of  their  houses  after  the  time  of  curfew,  if  they  make  a 
jesting  remark  to  an  English  soldier.  Their  horses  are  taken  from  them,  their 
cattle,  their  forage,  and  even  their  boots.  Their  papers  are  suppressed,  their 
editors  are  imprisoned,  their  Parliament  is  indefinitely  prorogued,  and  all  their 
representative  rights  are  in  abeyance.  Can  we  wonder  if  their  loyalty  to  the 
English  throne  has  in  this  chilling  atmosphere  grown  cold? 

The  Loyalists  indeed  are  the  greatest  obstacle  to  peace.  The  rivalry 
between  the  Loyalists  and  the  Dutch  has  been  both  political  and  racial;  but  it 
has  been  chiefly  political,  and  a  political  party  ever  resents  the  domination  of  its 
rival.  But  such  domination  implies  no  political  or  physical  slavery,  and  to 
summon  the  aid  of  war  to  adjust  the  balance  of  politics  is  surely  a  monstrous 
demand.  We  are  told  that  to  concede  terms  of  peace  to  the  Boers  is  to  sacri- 
fice the  Loyalists  in  Cape  Colony  and  to  sap  the  foundations  of  their  attachment 
to  the  mother  country.  Is  not  this  a  shameful  plea;  for  what  does  it  mean  but 
that  the  loyalty  of  the  Loyalists  is  a  plant  of  such  tender  and  fickle  growth  that 
it  must  be  watered  with  the  blood  and  strengthened  by  the  removal  of  every 
rival?  The  Loyalists  have  doubtless  suffered  much,  and  their  fidelity  claims  our 
proper  gratitude.  But  has  not  England  made  sufficient  sacrifices  for  the  Loy- 
alists, and  is  it  not  carrying  their  claims  too  far  to  demand  that  the  Empire 
shall  suffer  indefinitely  this  terrible  drain  of  blood  and  treasure?  Is  there  to  be 
literally  no  limit  to  our  sacrifices?  Do  the  Loyalists  insist  that  we  shall  see 
another  15,000  of  our  sons  completing  with  their  death  the  subjugation  of  their 
political  rivals,  another  £150,000.000  lost  for  ever  and  to  no  purpose  in  the 
devouring  maw  of  South  Africa?  Surely  we  have  suffered  enough:  is  this  dis- 
astrous war  to  proceed  until  the  Loyalists  have  their  political  foes  by  the 
throat?     Is  not  the  hour  come  when  England  should  think  of  herself? 

Imagination  shrinks  before  the  future  if  we  are  bent  on  following  our 
present  path.  Another  weary  year  of  war,  costly  with  thousands  of  English 
lives  and  millions  of  English  money;  another  year  of  alternate  hopes  and  fears, 
elation  and  despair;  another  year  of  weakness  in  Europe  and  Asia,  of  impaired 
credit,  and  of  burdensome  taxation.  And  what  of  the  end?  Failure  it  must 
be,  for,  whether  we  conquer  or  resign  the  struggle,  we  have  failed.  What  can 
it  be  but  failure  if  we  have  to  keep  down  an  embittered  population  by  a  standing 
army,  to  rule  over  two  desolated  provinces  whose  exhausted  revenues  the 
British  taxpayer  must  make  good? 

If  the  sufferings  of  South  Africa  and  our  own  grave  national  dangers  have 
little  weight  with  us,  shall  we  pay  no  heed  to  the  silent  appeal  of  our  soldiers?" 


'  Mr.  Chamberlain,  indeed,  regards  all  suffering  caused  by  this  war  as  "irrelevant."     A 
somewhat  different  view  of  statesmanship  was  expressed  by  Pericles  when  he  boasted  that 


88  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

It  can  no  longer  be  hidden  from  the  dullest  that  our  army  is  worn  by  constant 
labour  and  fasting,  sick  with  disappointment,  and  wasted  by  disease.  The  high 
hopes  with  which  our  soldiers  entered  on  their  task  have  long  since  melted 
away,  and  in  their  place  has  come  the  deadly  indifference  which  is  born  of  inglo- 
rious and  indecisive  conflict.  The  strain  is  not  for  ever  endurable  by  human 
beings,  and  though  we  know  that  our  soldiers  will  struggle  on  while  there 
remains  the  shadow  of  a  hope,  should  we  ignore  the  danger  that  the  fine  drawn 
cord,  of  which  the  bystanders  cannot  see  the  slowly  weakening  strands,  may 
snap  at  last?  As  we  think  of  the  brave  men  and  gallant  boys  who  have  fallen 
to  no  purpose  in  this  unhappy  strife,  the  bitter  and  reproachful  prayer  of  the 
Roman  Emperor  rings  in  our  ears — "Vare,  redde  legiones." 

Another  consideration  should  urge  us  to  bring  this  struggle  to  an  end.  We 
are  in  no  ordinary  case.  If  we  were  continuing  the  war  to  obtain  from  the 
Boers  some  gift  or  indemnity  which  they  are  not  yet  willing  to  grant,  if  it  was 
our  policy  or  our  intention  to  leave  the  country  in  the  hands  of  its  inhabitants 
when  the  war  was  over,  there  might  be  some  reason  in  our  attitude.  But  we 
do  not  intend  to  leave  this  country;  it  has  been  annexed  by  us,  and  the  two 
Republics  now  form  part  of  our  Empire.  They  are  our  colonies,  the  inhabitants 
are  our  subjects:  we  are  then  devastating  our  own  property  and  slaying  our 
own  colonists.  We  have  to  live  with  these  men  for  ever,  we  have  to  make 
them  appreciate  the  blessings  of  English  rule  and  work  together  with  us  for  the 
prosperity  of  South  Africa.  Surely  we  are  marching  along  a  strange  path  to 
this  end. 

About  the  great  builders  of  Empire  there  has  always  been  a  certain  noble 
expediency,  a  certain  simple  reasonableness  which  is  infinitely  distressing  to  the 
theorist  and  the  bureaucrat.  In  problems  of  state  as  well  as  of  business  the 
simplest  solution  is  often  the  wisest.  It  has  generally  been  found  that  the 
easiest  way  to  make  men  peaceful  is  to  make  them  happy,  and  that  the  easiest 
way  to  make  them  happy  is  to  remove  all  unnatural  and  artificial  restrictions 
and  to  allow  them  free  exercise  of  their  individuality.  To  restrict  such  exercise 
is  to  produce  a  spurious  uniformity  and  to  make  men  slaves  or  rebels.  The 
pedant  legislates  for  abstractions,  the  statesman  for  living  human  beings;  and 
though  the  methods  of  the  latter  may  seem  illogical  and  contrary  to  a  priori 
principles,  they  generally  have  the  advantage  of  being  successful. 

It  is  useless  to  reproach  the  Boers  with  their  unwillingness  to  accept  our 
domination.  They  are  Dutch  and  we  are  English:  should  we  under  equal  con- 
ditions display  a  willingness  the  absence  of. which  we  resent  in  them?  English 
rule  is  good  for  us,  but  need  it  be  good  for  others?  It  is  right  that  we  should 
be  proud  of  our  own  institutions,  but  is  it  necessary  that  we  should  seek  to 
impose  them  on  other  races?  The  Boers  may  be  foolish  in  that  they  refuse  the 
privileges  of  our  Imperial  system;  but  is  liberty  nothing,  is  independence 
nothing?  A  poor  thing  it  may  be,  but  it  is  their  own.  If  men  would  only  use 
their  imagination  to  picture  what  they  themselves  would  do  or  feel  in  like  cir- 

up  to  that  time  no  Athenian  had  put  on  mourning  through  any  act  of  his.  Here  may  be 
quoted  Burke|s  indignant  rebuke  to  the  wanton  maker  of  war : — 

"A  conscientious  man  would  be  cautious  how  he  dealt  in  blood.  He  would  feel  some 
apprehension  at  being  called  to  a  tremendous  account  for  engaging  in  so  deep  a  play  without 
any  sort  of  knowledge  of  the  game.  It  is  no  excuse  for  presumptuous  ignorance  that  it  is 
directed  by  insolent  passion.  The  poorest  being  that  crawls  on  earth,  contending  to  save 
itself  from  injustice  and  oppression,  is  an  object  respectable  in  the  eyes  of  God  and  man. 
But  I  cannot  conceive  any  existence  under  heaven  (which  in  the  depth  of  its  wisdom  tolerates 
all  sorts  of  things)  that  is  more  truly  odipus  and  disgusting  than  an  impotent,  helpless 
creature,  without  civil  wisdom  or  military  skill  .  .  .  bloated  with  pride  and  arrogance, 
calling  for  battles  which  he  is  not  to  fight.  ;  .  .  If  you  and  I  find  our  talents  not  of  the 
great  and  ruling  kind,  our  conduct  at  least  is  conformable  to  our  faculties.  No  man's  life 
pays  the  forfeit  of  our  rashness.  No  desolate  widow  weeps  tears  of  blood  over  our  igno- 
rance." (Letters  to  the  Sheriffs  of  Bristol,  1777.) 


THE  CONCLUSION  OF  THE  MATTER.  89 

cumstance  our  diplomacy  would  be  more  reasonable  and  our  demands  less 
stringent.  If  England  were  held  by  a  German  army,  face  to  face  with  the  threat 
of  lost  freedom,  would  Englishmen  flinch  from  a  struggle  to  the  death?  Would 
they  consent  to  negotiate  with  their  German  victors  terms  which  would  leave 
them  German  citizens,  even  though  such  citizenship  might  bring  with  it  the 
improved  methods  of  German  bureaucracy?  Would  Englishmen,  for  all  the 
privileges  of  German  civilisation,  consent  to  be  ruled  by  German  officials,  to  be 
held  in  check  by  German  sergeants,  to  pay  taxes  for  the  maintenance  of  a  Ger- 
man army?  Would  the  editors  of  our  newspapers  become  peace  envoys  from 
the  Germans  to  describe  to  us  the  blessings  of  German  rule  and  the  hopeless- 
ness of  our  struggle?  Would  Mr.  Chamberlain  and  the  other  apostles  of 
unconditional  submission  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  a  German  monarch? 
To  ask  these  questions  is  to  answer  them. 

We  have  had  enough  of  violence:  let  us  now  turn  to  the  more  gracious 
qualities  by  which  we  are  great:  mercy  and  generosity1  and  reason  and  the  vig- 
orous common  sense  that  has  kept  England  alive  these  many  centuries.  For 
violence  will  not  help  us:  force  is  no  remedy.  Force  may  be  a  proper  means 
to  bring  a  savage  race  to  reason,  but  it  is  not  a  weapon  to  be  used  lightly 
against  a  race  so  spirited  and  stubborn  as  the  Boers.  It  is  a  weapon  which  it  is 
easy  to  take  up  but  hard  to  lay  down.  It  as  frequently  wounds  him  who 
employs  it  as  its  victim.  Its  effects  are  fleeting,  and  when  it  is  withdrawn,  it 
leaves  the  object  resentful  and  unconquered.  It  ruins  the  treasure  which  it 
seeks  to  possess,  and  if  it  fails,  its  failure  is  disgraceful  and  absolute. 

Force  without  wisdom  we  have  tested,  and  its  failure  is  known  to  all.  The 
apostles  of  violence  robbed  us  of  our  American  Colonies.  Twenty  years  ago 
in  Afghanistan  our  threats  and  our  violence  were  followed  by  a  failure  absolute 
and  undisguised.  In  1857  the  policy  of  the  Provost  Marshal  delayed  the 
advent  of  peace  until  a  wise  man  inaugurated  a  clement  policy,  and  a  mutiny 
which  might  have  lasted  for  years  was  calmed  in  a  few  months.  In  Canada 
a  similar  rivalry  of  race,  a  similar  divergence  of  language  and  tradition,  bid 
fair  to  distract  that  province  for  ever.  The  same  mad  policy  of  force  was  tried 
in  vain,  and  not  until  a  wise  statesman  took  up  the  reins  of  government  did  the 
tumult  subside. 

We  are  plunging  blindly  towards  an  unseen  goal.  We  do  not  know  when 
we  shall  reach  it,  nor  how  we  shall  reach  it,  nor  if  we  shall  reach  it.  Is  this  the 
majestic  progress  of  a  mighty  empire?  The  capture  by  an  army  of  a  town  or 
territory  is  not  of  necessity  a  conquest.  There  may  be  a  victory  more  fatal  to 
the  victor  than  to  the  vanquished;  there  may  be  a  success  that  turns  to  Dead 
Sea  apples  in  our  mouths.  The  glory  of  a  great  empire  is  not  to  win  isolated 
triumphs,  but  to  proportion  her  aims  to  her  strength,  to  see  with  clear  eyes 
the  road  along  which  she  means  to  travel,  and  to  make  sure  that  every  victory 

1  Burke  is  out  of  fashion,  but  even  now  it  is  difficult  to  read  this  noble  appeal  without 
emotion : 

"All  this,  I  know,  well  enough,  will  sound  wild  and  chimerical  to  the  profane  herd  of 
those  vulgar  and  mechanical  politicians,  who  have  no  place  among  us ;  a  sort  of  people  who 
think  that  nothing  exists  but  what  is  gross  and  material ;  and  who  therefore,  far  from  being 
qualified  to  be  directors  of  the  great  movement  of  empire,  are  not  fit  to  turn  a  wheel  in  the 
machine.  But  to  men  truly  initiated  and  rightly  taught,  these  ruling  and  master  principles, 
which,  in  the  opinion  of  such  men  as  I  have  mentioned,  have  no  substantial  existence,  are 
in  truth  every  thing  and  all  in  all.  Magnanimity  in  politics  is  not  seldom  the  truest  wisdom; 
and  a  great  empire  and  little  minds  go  ill  together.  If  we  are  conscious  of  our  situation,  and 
glow  with  zeal  to  fill  our  place  as  becomes  our  station  and  ourselves,  we  ought  to  auspicate 
all  our  public  proceedings  on  America  with  the  old  warning  of  the  church,  Sursum  corda! 
We  ought  to  elevate  our  minds  to  the  greatness  of  that  trust  to  which  the  order  of  Provi- 
dence has  called  us.  By  adverting  to  the  dignity  of  this  high  calling,  our  ancestors  have 
turned  a  savage  wilderness  into  a  glorious  empire ;  and  have  made  the  most  extensive,  and  the 
only  honourable  conquests ;  not  by  destroying,  but  by  promoting,  the  wealth,  the  number,  the 
happiness,  of  the  human  race."  On  Conciliation  with  America. 


90  PEACE  OR  WAR. 

is  a  step  in  the  orderly  graduation  of  her  progress.  That  is  wise  and  conscious 
effort  directed  to  ends  which  may  be  good  or  may  be  bad,  but  which  at  all  events 
will  be  attained. 

What  can  ultimate  victory  leave  us  but  two  ruined  lands  and  sullen  peoples? 
We  may  pour  army  after  army  into  South  Africa;  we  may  make  a  desert  and 
call  it  peace;  but  the  peace  will  not  be  there.  The  clumsy  and  violent  methods 
which  we  are  using  will  poison  and  inflame  the  wholy  body.  Men  have  said 
that  the  epitaph  of  South  Africa  should  be  Too  late;  but  a  more  just  inscription 
would  be  Too  soon.  It  is  ignorance  and  impatience  which  have  inflicted  on  this 
unhappy  country  those  cruel  wounds  which  only  tact  and  time  will  cure,  and 
many  generations  will  pass  before  the  bitter  memories  of  these  two  years  are 
blotted  out  from  the  minds  of  the  Dutch.  English  men  and  English  women 
have  suffered  great  and  abiding  sorrow,  but  they  have  not  seen  their  citizen 
soldiers  sent  captive  to  a  distant  land,  their  country  laid  desolate,  their  women 
carried  into  captivity,  their  independence  taken  from  them.'  These  things  will 
never  be  utterly  forgotten,  but  it  may  be  that  their  fierce  outlines  will  be 
softened  by  the  lapse  of  years  and  the  wisdom  of  men.  South  Africa  requires 
no  "surgical  operation,"  she  asks  only  patience  and  sympathy  and  the  healing 
hands  of  time. 

As  we  went  to  war  to  vindicate  a  misty  claim  to  Suzerainty,  so  we  seem 
likely  to  remain  at  war  because  we  have  not  the  clear  sight  and  the  moral  cour- 
age which  can  see  a  means  of  escape  from  a  lamentable  complication.  It  has 
been  the  ambition  of  every  statesman  to  form  South  Africa  into  a  federation 
under  the  English  flag,  and  it  is  the  declared  ambition  of  our  own  Ministers 
to  endow  our  new  possessions  with  the  largest  powers  of  self-government.  If 
therefore  it  is  now  in  our  power  to  end  at  once  this  most  unhappy  and  inglorious 
war  with  a  settlement  which  would  give  us  all  that  the  most  sanguine  ever 
dared  to  hope,  what  is  it  but  temper  and  the  spirit  of  revenge  which  delay  the 
advent  of  peace?  There  is  in  every  heart,  expressed  or  unexpressed,  a  deep 
longing  for  peace.  England  requires  it,  the  enemy  would  welcome  it:  are  we 
so  set  on  unconditional  submission  that  peace  shall  only  come  to  us  by  that  fatal 
path? 

For  what  are  we  fighting  now?  Is  it  to  vindicate  British  supremacy  in 
South  Africa?  But  was  that  supremacy  ever  in  real  danger?  No  sane  Boer 
questioned  our  power  or  our  rights,  and  on  any  assumption  they  are  surely  vin- 
dicated now.  Is  it  to  gain  the  franchise  for  our  citizens,  and  to  undo  the  griev- 
ances of  the  mine-owners?  We  can  gain  the  one  and  undo  the  other  by  an 
honourable  peace.  It  must  be,  then,  that,  as  embittered  partisans  have  told  us, 
we  are  fighting  to  force  the  Boers  to  their  knees,  to  compel  an  unconditional 
submission,  to  thrash  the  remaining  life  out  of  this  stubborn  people  who  have 
defied  us  so  long.  Is  this  a  worthy  aim  for  the  conquerors  of  Napoleon?  Nor 
shall  we  reach  our  end.  We  are  essaying  now  an  impossible  task.  We  may 
slay  the  bodies  of  our  foe,  but  they  have  something  else  which  is  beyond  our 
reach.  You  cannot  dam  the  mountain  stream  or  force  back  freedom  to  her 
source.     Inimitable  as    the    rolling  veldt,  indestructible  as    the    high  hills  that 

1  The  words  of  Paine  are  as  true  to-day  of  South  Africa  as  they  were  true  one  hundred 
and  twenty  years  ago  of  America — "We  are  a  people  who  think  not  as  you  think ;  and  what 
is  equally  true,  you  cannot  feel  as  we  feel.  The  situations  of  the  two  countries  are  exceed- 
ingly different.  Ours  has  been  the  seat  of  war;  yours  has  seen  nothing  of  it.  The  most 
wanton  destruction  has  been  committed  in  our  sight;  the  most  insolent  barbarity  has  been 
acted  on  our  feelings.  We  can  look  around  and  see  the  remains  of  burnt  and  destroyed 
houses,  once  the  fair  fruit  of  hard  industry.  We  walk  over  the  dead  whom  we  loved,  in  every 
part  of  America,  and  remember  by  whom  they  fell.  There  is  scarcely  a  village  but  brings  to 
life  some  melancholy  thought,  and  reminds  us  of  what  we  have  suffered,  and  of  those  we 
have  lost  by  the  inhumanity  of  Britain.  A  thousand  images  arise  to  us,  which,  from  situation, 
you  cannot  see,  and  we  are  accompanied  by  as  many  ideas  which  you  cannot  know." 

Thomas  Paine  to  Lord  Shelburne. 


i 


THE  CONCLUSION  OF  THE  MATTER.  91 

nurture  it,  the  national  spirit  of  this  people  will  elude  our  fetters.  Its  allies  will 
be  bitter  agony  and  memory  and  time  and  hope,  and  man's  unconquerable  mind. 

The  war  indeed  has  long  lost  its  glamour.  To  a  large  section  of  the  Eng- 
lish people  it  has  always  been  odious  and  in  the  eyes  of  every  foreign  nation  we 
suffer  daily  humiliation.  The  support  of  our  Colonies,  the  patience  of  our 
citizens,  the  valour  of  our  army,  the  individual  heroism  of  our  soldiers  cannot 
cleanse  it  from  the  trail  of  finance  which  has  been  over  it  from  the  beginning. 
Can  we  draw  comfort  or  glory  from  such  a  war?  Deep  down  in  our  hearts  is 
there  not  a  shrinking  shame  when  our  Ministers  confess  that  they  have  half 
starved  the  wives  and  children  of  our  enemy;  that  they  have  burnt  their  farms 
because  they  cannot  conquer  them?  Is  our  brave  army  to  be  made  the  tools 
of  civil  meanness?  Is  there  here  the  dignity  and  the  chivalry  of  war?  is  there 
not  rather  unutterable  disgrace? 

We  hear  to-day  the  old  taunt  of  treachery,  the  old  bitter  cry  that  to  oppose 
the  policy  of  one's  nation  is  to  be  guilty  of  treason.  There  is  indeed  no  preju- 
dice more  healthy  than  the  instinct  which  prompts  us  to  defend  or  condone 
national  errors.  But  there  are  times  when  a  man  may  dare  to  criticise  a  national 
policy;  and  is  it  certain  that  those  who  counsel  chivalry  and  forbearance  and 
peace  are  traitors  to  England?  May  not  in  their  veins  run  as  passionate  a  love 
of  England  as  that  which  inspires  the  preachers  of  violence  and  force?  Is  there 
not  an  England  of  Shakespeare  and  Milton,  of  Chatham  and  Fox  and  Burke,  of 
Nelson  and  Wellington  and  Havelock,  and  of  a  thousand  others  who  could  live 
and  die  for  England  with  no  insult  for  a  brave  foe  on  their  lips?  There  may  be 
an  England  which  is  not  the  England  of  Wedderburn  and  North,  of  the  German 
stockjobber  and  the  Jew  contractor;  an  England  which  is  not  the  England  of 
the  music-hall  and  of  the  shouting  streets;  not  the  England  who  lifts  her  timid 
cheek  to  the  strong  and  turns  to  crush  the  little  nations.  The  England  of  our 
history  and  our  hopes  is  chivalrous  and  merciful,  silent  and  self-reliant,  not 
given  to  vain  boasting  and  abuse,  lover  of  free  nations,  defender  of  the  weak. 

"The  Moving  Finger  writes ;  and,  having  writ, 
Moves  on :  nor  all  your  Piety  nor  Wit 

Shall  lure  it  back  to  cancel  half  a  Line, 
Nor  all  your  Tears  wash  out  a  Word  of  it." 

We  stand  on  the  threshold  of  a  new  century  and  of  a  new  reign.  It  is  our 
duty  and  our  highest  interest  to  husband  our  resources,  to  free  ourselves  from 
the  gloomy  fatalism  which  has  involved  us  in  this  war  and  seems  likely  to  pre- 
vent our  extrication  from  its  embarrassments.  The  future  is  dark  and  big  with 
storms.  The  nations  are  watching  us,  and  the  exhaustion  of  a  great  war  may  be 
an  occasion  for  our  foes. 

Two  paths  lie  open.  One  seems  obvious  and  broad,  and  we  are  treading 
it  now.  It  is  hard  to  turn  back,  but  the  road  turns  to  ultimate  disaster.  The 
other  path  is  steep  and  strewn  with  thorns  and  stones  that  wound  and  mortify 
our  pride.  But  difficult  though  it  be  it  leads  straight  to  peace  and  honour. 
Better  is  he  that  ruleth  his  spirit  than  he  that  taketh  a  city. 


APPENDIX  A. 
Agriculture  in  South  Africa. 

The  following  is  a  summary  of  a  paper  read  before  the  Royal  Colonial  Institute  by  Mr. 
R.  Wallace,  Professor  of  Agriculture  in  the  University  of  Edinburgh.  Mr.  Wallace  had  just 
returned  from  a  visit  of  investigation. 

It  remains  to  be  decided  whether  or  not  South  Africa  is  an  agricultural  and  stock-raising 
country  capable  of  great  development  and  of  supporting  many  more  inhabitants  of  European 
origin.  My  personal  belief  is  that  South  Africa  will  never  be  developed  through  its  agricul- 
ture, but  that  development  will  first  come  through  the  mines,  not  alone  of  gold  and  diamonds 
but  of  silver,  copper,  coal,  and  many  other  valuable  minerals,  which  in  South  Africa  seem 
to  be  represented  in  a  manner  for  variety  and  extent  unsurpassed  in  any  other  area  of 
similar  extent.  The  demands  for  fruit  and  vegetable  products  at  the  mines  will,  no  doubt, 
lead  to  the  extension  of  market  gardening  near  these  populous  centres,  but  the  development 
of  the  general  agriculture  of  the  country  will  be  a  slow  process.  The  chances  are  that,  for 
a  time,  it  will  go  back  in  the  two  new  Colonies,  because  the  Dutch  population  will  not  hence- 
forward exercise  so  much  control  over  the  black  people  who  have  done  this  work,  and  the 
area  of  cultivation  will  naturally  contract.  A  great  deal  has  been  written  about  irrigation 
being  the  probable  salvation  of  the  country.  Many  small  local  ventures  have  been  marvel- 
lously successful  in  transforming  what  was  desert  into  Gardens  of  Eden.  At  Douglas,  for 
example,  a  prosperous  community  has  sprung  up  on  small  plots,  many  of  which  were  sold 
recently  at  £53  per  acre.  Land  under  ordinary  farm  crops  is  held  at  Oudsthoorn  at  from 
£50  to  £150  per  acre  of  capital  value.  Fruit  lands  of  good  quality  have,  in  some  instances, 
run  up  to  several  hundreds  of  pounds  per  acre,  and  at  Warrenton,  in  a  report  issued  by 
Government  authority,  the  record  annual  return  of  £100  per  acre  is  mentioned.  A  good 
many  promising  irrigation  schemes  have  been  examined  in  various  districts  of  Cape  Colony, 
but  most  of  them  involve  the  expenditure  of  a  large  amount  of  capital,  and  will  require  to 
be  worked  with  much  skill  and  care  to  make  them  pay.  But  all  the  possible  schemes  put 
together  would  not  form  a  scheme  large  enough  to  produce  any  appreciable  difference  on  the 
development  of  the  vast  area  of  South  Africa.  Admitting  that  there  are  many  small  irriga- 
tion ventures  that  are  likely  to  be  financially  successful,  even  with  a  considerable  capital 
outlay,  it  is  a  fact  that  no  great  irrigation  undertaking,  like  those  of  India,  is  possible.  There 
the  cause  of  success  of  the  great  canal  systems  of  Northern  India  is  that  the  inlets  are  sup- 
plied near  the  basis  of  the  mountains  by  the  never-failing  drainage  from  their  ever  snow- 
clad  summits,  and  most  abundantly  when  the  sun  is  hottest  and  when  water  is  most  wanted. 
In  South  Africa  the  conditions  are  quite  different.  There  is  no  summer  reserve  of  snow. 
The  torrential  rains  pass  off  in  a  few  days  by  deep  channels  from  which  water  can  only  be 
taken  in  limited  quantities,  at  few  points,  and  at  great  expense.  No  deep  storage  dams  could 
be  contemplated  in  the  mountains  to  supply  an  area,  say,  of  100,000  acres,  and  the  shallow 
dams  which  it  is  possible  to  form  in  a  flat  country,  with  an  evaporation  of  a  depth  of  from 
five  to  seven  feet  of  water  annually,  become  in  a  few  years  salt  marshes.  This  fact  has  been 
abundantly  demonstrated  at  Van  Wyk's  Vlei,  in  the  dry  Carnarvon  district  of  Cape  Colony. 
The  irrigation  dam  at  Beaufort  West  has  also  demonstrated  that  shallow  dams  in  the  Karoo 
rapidly  fill  with  silt  washed  in  from  the  drainage  area.  Without  irrigation  the  extent  of  South 
Africa  that  is  capable  of  cultivation  with  satisfactory  results  is  an  infinitesimal  fraction  of 
the  whole,  and  even  that  is  subjected  to  periodical  droughts,  which  at  times  destroy  a  whole 
season's  crop;  to  destructive  hailstorms,  which  are  especially  prevalent  on  the  central  plateau; 
and  to  fungoid  parasitic  pests  on  the  common  grain  crops,  which  make  the  growth  of 
European  cereals  practically  impossible  during  the  wet  season  of  summer.  It  is  highly 
probable  that  among  the  new  disease-resisting  breeds  of  cross-fertilised  grains  which  have 
been  produced  at  Newton-le- Willows  by  the  brothers  Garton  species  of  both  oats  and  wheat 
may  be  found,  on  experiment  to  overcome  this  difficulty,  but  still  sufficient  reasons  remain 
why  South  Africa  will  never  be  a  great  agricultural  country  capable  of  exporting  grain.  With 
the  development  of  the  local  irrigation  schemes  that  are  possible,  and  better  systems  of 
management,  it  may  more  nearly  produce  the  amount  of  food  requisite  for  internal  consump- 
tion. The  possible  development  in  the  numbers  of  live  stock  is,  for  the  present,  curtailed  by 
the  prevalence  of  so  many  diseases,  which  reduce  profits  and  introduce  an  additional  element 
of  speculation,  which  cannot  fail  to  check  the  investment  of  capital  in  the  industry.  The 
common  diseases  and  parasitic  affections  are  nowhere  better  represented,  but  in  addition 
South  Africa  has  a  number  of  diseases  peculiarly  her  own,  for  which  specifics  have  not  yet 
been  found.  The  prospects  in  the  live  stock  industry  are,  nevertheless,  decidedly  more 
promising  than  those  of  cultivation,  but  the  introduction  of  means  to  combat  the  present  diffi- 
culties will  necessarily  be  a  slow  process,  involving  a  period  of  probably  many  years.  To  my 
mind  the  most  important  question  at  issue  in  South  Africa  is  that  of  labour.  Unless  some 
method  be  found  to  induce  the  black  men  to  work,  the  development  of  South  Africa  in  all 
but  the  richest  mines  will  be  indefinitely  postponed. 


APPENDIX   B 

A  Convention  concluded  between  Her  Majesty  the  Queen,  &c,  &c, 
and  the  South  African  Republic. 

Note. —  The  words  and  paragraphs  bracketed  or  printed  in  italics  are  fro- 
posed  to  be  inserted  those  within  a  black  line  are  proposed  to  be 
omitted. 


Her  Majesty's  Commissioners  for  the  settlement  of  the  Transvaal 
Territory,  duly  appointed  as  such  by  a  Commission  passed  under  the 
Royal  Sign  Manual  and  Signet,  bearing  date  the  5th  of  April,  1881,  do 
hereby  undertake  and  guarantee,  on  behalf  of  Her  Majesty,  that  from 
and  after  the  8th  day  of  August,  1881,  complete  self-government,  subject 
to  the  suzerainty  of  Her  Majesty,  Her  Heir  and  Successors,  will  be  ac- 
corded to  the  inhabitants  of  the  Transvaal  Territory,  upon  the  following 
terms  and  conditions,  and  subject  to  the  following  reservations  and 
limitations : — 


Whereas  the  Government  of  the  Transvaal  State,  through  its  Dele- 
gates, consisting  of  Steplianus  Johannes  Paulus  Kruger,  President  of  the 
said  State ;  Steplianus  Johannes  Du  Toit,  Superintendent  of  Education ; 
Nicholas  Jacobus  Smit,  a  member  of  the  Volksraad,  have  represented  to 
the  Queen  that  the  Convention  signed  at  Pretoria  on  the  3rd  day  of  Aut 
gust,  1881.  and  ratified  by  the  Volksraad  of  the  said  State  on  the  25th 
October,  1881,  contains  certain  proyisions  which  are  inconvenient,  and  im- 
poses burdens  and  obligations  from  which  the  said  State  is  desirous  to  be 
relieved ;  and  that  the  south-western  boundaries  fixed  by,  the  said  Con- 
vention should  be  amended  with  a  view  to  promote  the  peace  and  good 
order  of  the  said  state,  and  of  the  countries  adjacent  thereto;  and 
whereas  Her  Majesty  the  Queen,  &c,  &c,  has  been  pleased  to  take  the 
said  representations  into  consideration.  Now,  therefore,  Her  Majesty  has 
been  pleased  to  direct,  and  it  is  hereby  declared  that  the  following  articles 
of  a  new  Convention shall  when  ratified  by  the  Volks- 
raad of  the  South  African  Republic,  be  substituted  for  the  Articles  em- 
bodied in  the  Convention  of  3rd  August,  1881  ;  which  latter,  pending  such 
ratification,  shall  continue  in  full  force  and  effect. 

Signed  at  Pretoria  London  this  3rd  day  of  August,  i8S«, 
HERCULES  ROBINSON, 

President  and  High  Commissioner. 
EVELYN   WOOL),  Major  Genorol. 
Officer  Adminictering  tha  Govornmont. 
J,  H,  de  VILLIERS, 

We,  the  undersigned,  Stephanus  Johannes  Paulus  Kruger,  Martinus 
Wescel — PretoriH6,  and  Petrus  Jarohm  Jnnhrrt.  as  reprenentative  dele- 
gates of  the  Transvaal  Burphers,  South  African  Republic,  do  hereby  agree 
to  all  the  above  conditions,  reservations,  and  limitations,  under  which 
Belf  government  has  been  restored  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  Transvaal 
Territory,  cubjoct  to  tho  cuaerainty  of  Hor  MajoGty,  Her  Hoirc  and  Sue 
eooooro.  and  we  agree  to  accept  the  Government  of  the  caid  Territory, 
with  all  righto  and  obligations  thereto  appertaining  on  tho  8th  day  of 
Auguot,  1881,  and  we  pmrnise  and  undertake  that  this  Convention  shall  be 
ratified  by  a  newly  elected  Volksraad  of  the  Trantvaal  State  South  Afri- 
can Republic  within  thrte  six  months  from  this  date. 

Signed  at  Pretoria   London   this  3rd  day  of  August,  1881. 

C.  J.  P.  KRUGER, 
M.  W.  PRETORIUB,- 
P.  J.  JOUBERT. 


Looting   and    Burning   a   Boer    Farm. 

(An  English  Artist's  Sketch,  as  published  in  the  London  Graphic  > 

A  PICTURE  THAT  SPEAKS  MORE  THAN  WORDS  CAN  EXPRESS. 

COULD    ANYTH1NQ    BE    MORE    HEART  RENDING,    BARBAROUS    OR    DESPICABLE? 


Permission  is  granted  to  reprint  with  engraving.    It  is  desired  that  it  be  given  the  widest  circulation. 

Additional  copies  will  be  furnished  by  addressing  CHARLES  D.  PIERCE,  Trustee  and  Treasurer 
BOER  RELIEF  FUND,  136  Liberty  Street,  New  York. 


This  picture — which  is  not  exaggerated  or  overdrawn — was  published  in  the  London 
Graphic  and  is  from  a  sketch  by  an  English  artist,  and  shows  how  the  British  are  waging 
war  against  women  and  children,  whose  protectors  have  either  been  killed  in  battle  or  are 
imprisoned  at  St.  Helena  or  Ceylon.  There  are  over  70  000  poor,  suffering,  homeless  women 
and  children  in  South  Africa,  imprisoned  in  pens  and  stockades  under  British  guards, 
including  among  them  many  refined,  elderly  ladies  over  seventy  years  of  ago;  thousands 
have  died  from  sickness,  exposure  and  starvation. 

In  the  illustration  is  shown  the  unprotected  wife  and  children,  driven  from  their  once 
happy  home,  which  is  being  destroyed;  a  few  articles  of  furniture,  bedding  and  a  trunk  are 
shown ;  the  house  is  in  flames ;  a  British  officer  is  giving  instructions  to  his  aides ;  two  soldiers 
are  running  after  chickens; — all  in  the  presence  of  the  sorrow-stricken  mother  and  children. 

Much  has  been  said  and  written  concerning  the  burning  of  Boer  farm-houses  by  the 
British  troops  in  South  Africa,  accurate  accounts  of  which  are  constantly  being  published  in 
English  papers  from  reports  and  letters  of  officers,  engineers  and  soldiers  of  the  British 
army,  many  of  whom  have  Cameras  with  which  pictures  were  taken  to  verify  reports.  Since 
Great  Britain  has  found  that  she  is  unable  to  subjugate  the  Boers  by  honorable  warfare,  she 
seeks  to  depopulate  their  country  and  starve  the  people  into  submission.  Orders  have  been 
issued  by  Lord  Roberts  and  Gen.  Kitchener  to  seize  and  remove  all  cattle,  sheep,  hogs, 
chickens,  grain,  foodstuffs,  growing  crops,  wagons  and  farming  implements  from  all  farms, 
and  where  that  is  not  possible,  they  are  to  be  destroyed,  whether  the  owner  is  present  or  not. 
The  soldiers  are  also  to  blow  up  and  burn  all  farm-houses  and  outbuildings,  not  allowing  the 
family  to  remove  any  of  the  house  furnishings,  they  being  hastily  driven  away  with  only 
the  clothing  they  have  on  their  backs. 


Looting  and  Burning  a  Boer  Farm. — Continued. 


The  Boer  home  is  usually  a  building  of  one 
story,  the  walls  of  which  are  built  of  blocks  01 
stone  or  bricks.  The  roof  is  either  thatched  or 
covered  with  corrugated  sheet  iron.  The  walls 
being  very  strong,  it  is  necessary  to  use  a  high 
explosive.  The  officer  and  his  engineer  first 
enter  the  house,  throwing  the  carpets,  bedding, 
curtains  and  all  inflammable  material  in  a  heap 
in  the  middle  of  the  rooms.  The  engineer  re- 
moves a  stone  from  the  inside  of  the  wall;  he 
then  places  a  high  explosive,  such  as  dynamite 
or  explosive  gun  cotton,  in  the  opening  attach- 
ing a  fuse.  The  explosive  is  covered  with  earth 
and  pieces  of  stone,  all  of  which  is  tamped  hard 
in  order  that  the  explosion  will  be  most  effec- 
tive. The  torch  is  then  applied  to  the  Inflam- 
mabable  materials;  the  entire  building  is  in 
flames;  there  is  a  powerful  explosion,  a  cloud  of 
smoke,  a  shower  of  stones,  and  the  Boer  home 
is  destroyed  beyond  repair. 


A  RELIC  OF  BARBARISM! 

By  order  of  the  British  Government.    V.  R.  means 
Victoria  Regina  (Queen). 

v.  R. 

(By  the  Grace  of  God.) 

PUBLIC    NOTICE. 

It  is  hereby  notified  for  information, 
that  unless  the  nien  at  present  on 
commando  belonging  to  families  in 
the  town  and  district  of  Kruegersdorp 
surrender  themselves  and  hand  in  their 
arms  to  the  Imperial  Authorities  by 
20th  July,  the  whole  of  their  property 
will  be  confiscated,  and  their  families 
turned  out  destitute  and  homeless. 

By  Order, 
G.  H.  M.  RITCHIE,  (Capt.  K.  Horse). 

District  Supt.  Police. 

Krugersdorp,  Wijuly,  1900. 

Verbatim  copy  from  Johannesburg  Gazette,  July  21 ,  1000. 


The  following  extracts  are  from  newspapers 
published  in  London: 

Mr.  E.  W.  Smith,  writing  in  the  Morning  Leader  of 
May  aist,  under  date  of  April  39th,  says : 

"Gen.  French  and  Gen.  Pole-Carew,  at  the 
head  of  the  Guards  and  18th  Brigade,  are  march- 
ing in,  burning  practically  everything  in  the 
road.  The  brigade  is  followed  by  about  3.5o0 
head  of  loot,  cattle  and  sheep.  Hundreds  of  tons 
of  corn  and  forage  have  been  destroyed.  The 
troops  engaged  in  the  work  are  Roberts'  Horse, 
the  Canadians  and  Australians.  I  hear  to-day 
that  Gen.  Rundle  burnt  his  way  up  to  Dewets- 
dorp.  At  one  farm  only  women  were  left.  Or- 
ders were  inexorable.  The  woman  threw  her 
.  arms  around  the  officer's  neck  and  begged  that 
the  homestead  might  be  spared.  When  the 
flames  burst  from  the  doomed  place  the  poor 
woman  threw  herself  on  her  knees,  tore  open 
her  bodice  and  bared  her  breasts,  screaming: 
'Shoot  me!  shoot  me!  I've  nothing  to  live  for 
now  that  my  husband  is  gone,  and  our  farm  is 
burnt  and  our  cattle  taken!'  " 

A  lady  in  Colesburg,  thus  described  the  looting  of 
her  home: 

"On  Friday,  March  2.  the  first  body  of  troops 
appeared.  Monday,  after  breakfast,  eight  men 
arrived.  They  forced  the  doors,  took  whatever 
they  wanted  —  carts,  three  saddles,  pillows, 
blankets  sheets,  clothing,  down  to  even  the 
baby's  baptismal  cloak,  Mr.  J.'s  wedding  pres- 
ents, family  Bible,  telescope,  microscope— all  pic- 
tures on  the  wall  and  mirrors  were  smashed. 

Writing  to  his  father  at  Whaplode,  Spalding,  from 
Bnslin  Camp,  Trooper  O.  Benton  says : 

"We  burned  and  blew  up  some  beautiful 
houses    that    the    Free    Staters    have   left.    You 


would  hardly  believe  what  furniture  they  have; 
some  beautiful  pianos— and  all  the  lot  go." 

A  special  correspondent  of  the  Manchester  Guardian. 
after  riding  from  Bloemfonteln  to  Kimberly,  wrote: 

"The  way  is  a  line  of  desolation.  The  farm- 
houses have  not  merely  been  sacked— they  have 
been  savagely  destroyed.  The  mirrors  have  been 
smashed,  the  pianos  wrecked,  children's  toys 
and  books  wantonly  destroyed.  Even  the  build- 
ings  themselves   have  been   burned.'' 

The  same  correspondent  writes  May  8th,  from  Col. 
Mahon's  headquarters.  Dry  Harts  Siding : 

"In  ten  miles  we  have  burned  no  fewer  than 
six  farm-houses;  the  wife  watched  from  her 
sick  husband's  bedside  the  burning  of  her  home 
a  hundred  yards  away.  It  seemed  as  though  a 
kind  of  domestic  murder  was  being  committed. 
I  stood  till  late  last  night  and  saw  the  flames 
lick  around  each  poor  piece  of  furniture — the 
chairs  and  tables,  the  baby's  cradle,  the  chest 
of  drawers,  containing  a  world  of  treasure,  and 
when  I  saw  the  poor  housewife's  face  pressed 
against  the  window  of  a  neighboring  house  my 
own  heart  burned  with  a  sense  of  outrage.  The 
effect  on  the  Colonial  troops,  who  are  gratifying 
their  feelings  of  hatred  and  revenge.  Is  very 
bad.  They  swarm  into  the  houses,  looting  and 
destroying,  filling  the  air  with  high-sounding 
cries  of  vengeance." 

Private  Stanley  of  the  N.  S.  W.  contingent,  writes 
to  the  Sydney  Telegraph  : 

"When  within  800  yards  of  the  farm  we  halted, 
and  the  infantry  blazed  a  volley  into  the  house; 
we  broke  open  the  place  and  went  in.  It  was 
beautifully  furnished,  and  the  officers  got  sev- 
eral things  they  could  make  use  of.  There  was 
a  lovely  library — books  of  all  descriptions, 
printed  m  Dutch  and  English.  I  secured  a 
Bible;  also  a  rifle,  quite  new.  After  getting  all 
we  wanted  out  of  the  house,  our  men  put  a 
charge  under  and  blew  it  up.  It  seemed  such  a 
pity;   it  was  a  lovely  house." 

Mr.  Porter  Smith  of  New  Westminster,  writes : 

"We  are  camped  with  some  of  the  Munster 
Fusiliers,  doing  most  of  the  scouting.  They 
make  great  hauls— watches,  clothes,  money  and 
jewelry." 

A  correspondent  of  the  Daily  /Tail  thus  describes 
the  flight  to  the  Vaal,  just  before  the  arrival  of  the 
British  troops : 

"Huge  wagons  drawn  by  full  spans  of  trek 
oxen,  piled  high  with  farm-house  furniture, 
where  perched  wistful-eyed  women  and  children, 
with  frightened,  tear-stained  faces;  passed  de- 
serted houses  with  wide,  open  doors,  and  scat- 
tered belongings;  passed  ambulances  filled  with 
groaning  wounded.  It  was  bitterly  cold.  The 
wind  has  a  frost  edge  and  cut  to  the  quick. 
Thinly-clad  women  clasped  their  shivering 
babes.  Heartrending  as  was  this  enforced 
abandonment  of  homes,  few  hesitated  to  make 
the  sacrifice.  Anything  was  better  than  to  fall 
into  the  hands  of  the  hated  English." 


John  N.  King,  who  served  with  the  American  scouts 
in  the  Boer  army,  under  Capt.  John  A.  Hassell,  writes: 

"As  to  the  statement  that  the  women  and  chil- 
dren in  South  Africa  are  not  needing  relief,  I 
will  say  that  funds  were  being  raised  in  the 
Transvaal  before  Johannesburg  and  Pretorfa 
fell;  that  over  15,000  refugees  depended  on  what 
the  government  furnished  them,  and  that  wheal 
the  English  took  those  cities  they  took  all  the 
provisions  we  had  left  and  gave  them  nothing 
but  cornmeal  to  eat.  There  were  3,000  destitute 
women  and  children  at  Barberton  alone,  who 
had  been  driven  from  their  homes,  and  who 
depended  solely  upon  the  government  for  their 
support." 


THE  BEST  PRO-BOER  LITERATURE. 


T 


HE  BUREAU  OF  LITERATURE  of  this  office  is  supported  mainly  by  funds 
contributed  by  friends  of  the  Boer  cause,  large  quantities  are  distributed 
gratuitously ;  therefore,  in  order  to  maintain  this  important  work  it  is  desired  that 
readers  of  this  literature  and  friends  of  the  cause  will  contribute  to  this  fund. 
Remittances  for  this  purpose  will  be  most  thankfully  received  and  acknowl- 
edged. 

The  following  publications  are  authentic  and  among  the  best  published ;  they  will 
be  furnished  by  this  office  at  prices  stated,  cash  to  accompany  orders,  the  object  being  to 
furnish  literature  at  as  near  cost  as  possible,  to  disseminate  the  truth  throughout  the 
United  States  regarding  the  war  in  South  Africa,  and  to  enlist  from  the  American  peo- 
ple a  well-deserved  sympathy  for  those  brave  Boers  who  are  fighting  as  heroically  for 
liberty  and  independence  as  did  the  Americans  in  1776.  If  books  (or  other  articles)  are 
to  be  forwarded  by  registered  mail,  send  10  cents  additional  for  register  fee. 

"THE  SOUTH  AFRICAN  REPUBLICS,"  by  Charles  D.  Pierce,  Consul-General  of  the  Orange  Free  State, 
a  book  of  48  pages.  A  beautiful  souvenir,  embellished  with  40  photo-engravings  from  original  photo- 
graphs taken  in  the  South  African  Republics ;  printed  on  the  finest  wood-cut  paper,  the  cover  in  six  colors, 
showing  medallion  of  Presidents  Kruger  and  Steyn  draped  with  the  Boer  flags— the  Orange  Free  State  flag  in 
red,  white,  blue  and  yellow,  and  the  flag  of  the  South  African  Republic  in  red,  white,  blue  and  green.  The 
illustrations  are  the  best  and  latest  of  Presidents  Kruger  and  Steyn  and  General  De  Wet ;  Boer  men,  women  and 
children  fighting  in  the  trenches ;  blowing  up,  burning  and  looting  of  Boer  homes  by  British  soldiers,  showing 
weeping  mother  and  children  in  the  foreground ;  the  Boer  national  anthem  ;  history  of  both  Republics  ;  war 
scenes.  Fine  engravings  showing  Martha  Kranti,  the  heroic  Boer  woman  soldier ;  the  German  Army  Corps  ; 
sharpshooters  on  outposts  ;  the  officers  of  the  American  Scouting  Corps  of  the  Boer  army:  Heliograph  Signal 
Corps  ;  Colonel  Blake  and  his  Irish  Brigade  ;  Boers  on  the  fighting  line ;  scene  on  Spion's  Kop — British  dead 
soldiers  one  day  after  the  battle.    Price  by  mail,  post-paid the  small  sum  of  35  cents 

"PEACE  OR  WAR  IN  SOUTH  AFRICA."— A  reprint  in  America  of  a  book  written  by  a  liberal-minded 
Englishman,  A.  M.  S.  Methuen,  of  the  well-known  publishing  house  of  Methuen  &  Co.,  of  London,  England, 
whose  purpose  was  to  Influence  English  public  opinion  against  the  prolongation  of  an  unjust  war  in  South 
Africa,  voicing  the  opinion  of  a  large  majority  of  the  better  class  of  English  people,  who  are  against  the  jingo 
or  war  party.  Mr.  Methuen  shows  a  remarkable  parallel  between  the  American  war  for  Independence  in  1776 
and  the  Boer  struggle  for  liberty  in  South  Africa  in  1901,  a  most  striking  analogy.  Over  50,000  copies  of  this 
book  have  been  distributed  throughout  Great  Britain.  The  London  Spectator  says:  "  We  are  deeply  impressed 
by  its  patriotic  purpose."  The  Manchester  Guardian  says:  "This  book  is  a  noteworthy  reinforcement  to  the 
cause  of  England  and  of  justice  in  South  Africa."  This  book  contains  100  pages,  7*10  inches  ;  has  three  maps 
of  South  Africa,  the  first  showing  the  effectual  occupation  of  the  British  forces  on  Sept.  1,  1900;  the  second 
showing  the  ineffectual  occupation  of  the  British  forces  on  May  1, 1801;  the  third  showing  South  Africa  where 
ineffectually  occupied  by  the  British  in  the  South  African  Republic  and  the  Orange  Free  State,  also  the 
country  which  has  been  invaded  by  the  Boers  in  Cape  Colony,  Natal  and  Zululand.  There  Is  aiso  a  fine 
engraving  showing  looting  and  burning  of  a  Boer  farm,  as  published  in  the  London  Graphic.  A  book  intensely 
interesting  to  every  liberty-loving  American  and  Boer  sympathizer.     The  London  price  was  one  shilling 

(24  cents)  per  copy.    The  price  of  the  American  Edition  for  single  copies,  not  Including  postage,  is 10 

SINGLE  COPIES  OF  THE  ABOVE  BOOK,  postage  paid Price,  each,     .15 

THE  ABOVE  BOOK,  IN  CLUBS  OF  50  OR  MORE,  postage    or    express    charges   paid    by  purchaser. 

Price,  each,     .07 

THE  ABOVE  BOOK,  IN  CLUBS  OF  100  OR  MORE,  postage   or  express  charges  paid   by  purchaser. 

Price,  each,  Special 

"THE  ABSENT-MINDED  BUROHER."     Poem  (a  parody  on  Kipling's  "  The  Absent-Minded  Beggar  "), 

finest  Boer  Poem  published.     Grand,  sarcastic,  witty,  truthful.     In  book  form.     By  mail 15 

"THE  ABSENT-MINDED  BUROHER,"  poem,  on  leaflets 05 

"THE  SOUTH-AFRICAN  CRISIS,"  by  Prof.  H.  Kuyper,  D.D.,  LL.D..  the  Holland  Premier,  one  of  the 
most  brilliant  writers  in  Holland.  Printed  by  the  "  STOP-THE-WAR  COMMITTEE  "  of  Lon- 
don.   81  pages ; Price,     .10 

"  THE  STRUQOLE  OF  THE  DUTCH  REPUBLICS,"  by  Charles  Bossevain,  Editor  of  Algtmecn  Handels- 
bladot  Amsterdam.  Holland,  containing  a  letter  to  the  Most  Worshipful  Master  Masons  of  the 
Lodges  in  the  U.  S.  of  A.    93  pages Price,     .12 

"OPEN  LETTER  TO  THE  DUKE  OF  DEVONSHIRE,"  by    Charles    Bossevain,    Editor   of   Algcmecn 

Ilandelsblad.  of  Amsterdam,  Holland.    63  pages Price,      .10 

"TRANSVAAL  VERSUS  GREAT  BRITAIN."      By  Dr.   W.   Van    der    Vlugt,    Professor   at  "Leyden 

University."  Holland,  of  Amsterdam,  Holland.    40  pages Price,      .10 

For  $1 .00  we  will  send  by  mail,  postage  paid,  to  any  address  in  the  United  States, 
all  of  the  seven  publications  mentioned  above,  including  the  "  Leaflets  "  described 
on  the  other  side  of  this  sheet,  worth  altogether  $3.00.    Price  for  all  only  $  1 .00. 

"THE  BOERS  IN  WAR,"  by  H.  C.  Hillegas.    300  pages,  .54  fine  illustrations..  .(Add  postage,  10  cents.)  $1.50 

"OOM  PAUL'S  PEOPLE,"  by  H.  C.  Hillegas.    308  pages,  8  illustrations (Add  postage,  10  cents.)     1.50 

"  JOHN  BULL'S  CRIMES  ;  or,  ASSAULTS  ON  REPUBLICS,"  by  Webster  Davis  :  a  book  of  400  pages, 

illustrated  with  over  80  full-page  engravings.    Attractively  bound (Add  postage,  20  cents.)     2.00 

"  THE  STORY  OF  THE  BOERS,"  by  C.  W.  Van  der  Hoogt.    286  pages,  4  illustrations  (Postage,  10  cents).        .50 

FLAGS  OF  THE  REPUBLICS,  4x6  ft,  cotton '-SO 

"  "  "  6x10  ft.,  best  bunting 5'°° 

OFFICIAL  BADGES  OF  THE  REPUBLICS,  enameled  in.  the  colors  of  the  flags— red,  white,  blue,  green 

and  orange— 15  cents  ;  same,  heavy  gold  plated *® 

BUTTON  BADGES,  MEDALLION  OF  PRESIDENTS  KRUGER,  STEYN,  AND  FLAOS 10 

SAME  IN  LOTS  OF  50  AND  OVER •* 

Address  all  orders  and  communications  to 

CHARLES  D.  PIERCE, 

Consul -General  Orange  Free  State,  136  Liberty  Street,  New  York,  U.  S.  A. 


LEAFLETS 


Issued  from  the  Orange  Free  State  Consulate,  136  Liberty  Street,  New  York. 

Address  All  Orders  to  CHARLES  D.  PIERCE,  Consul-Qeneral. 

The  largest  circulation  is  desired.  A  small  remittance  to  cover  postage  and  cost  of 
printing  will  be  most  gratefully  received. 

Leaflet  No.  10  -"  LABOR  LEADERS  AND  THE  BOER  WAR."  How  Joe  Chamber- 
lain would  cheapen  white  labor.  Reprinted  from  circular  issued  in  London  to  1,000,000 
workingmen.  t  ^  ^  American  peop,e      Ana|y,te  of  the  British  Conditions  of 

Peace  Offered  the  Boers-Justification  of  the  Boers  for  Their  Re  ect  on-Hr.  Chaml ber- 
lain  and  Sir  Alfred  Milner  Obstacles  to  Peace-War  of  Ruin  Unless  Stopped  by 
American  People  in  Interest  of  British  and  Boer  Alike."  By  Charles  D.  Pierce.  The 
South  African  War.     Views  of  Samuel  W.  Pennypacker,  presiding  judge   of  the    Phila-  . 

delPNoCir-AfRe°Zrtab2erH.toric.l  Parallel.  Cose  analogy  between  the  American 
Revolution  and  the  Boer  struggle  for  liberty.  The  United  States  Government  does  not 
recoSz s  the  annexation  of  thf  South  African  republics  to  Great  Britain.  English  Soldiers 
Pravinz  for  the  End  of  the  War.    The  Boer  Prisoners  on  St.  Helena. 

No  15—  THE  BOER  RELIEP  FUND  OF  AMERICA.  Duplicate  of  authority  issued  by 
envovs  to  Charles  D.  Pierce,  trustee  and  treasurer.  ,  „  .  .  ,  ,  . 

No  16 -ENGLISH  BARBARITIES  IN  SOUTH  AFRICA  British  generals  past  and 
present.     Copy  of  proclamation  showing  British  Treachery      Boer  women  deported 

No  17-Copies  of  Letters  from  English  People-''  DRUNK  WITH  BLOOD."  Boer 
women  and  children  bought  and  sold.     Something  deplorable. 

women  an  "^  ROBERTS  A    FAILURE.     An   English  soldier's  poor  opinion  of  his 

commander-in-chief.  Experience  of  an  Arkansas  boy  who  enlisted  in  the  English  army, 
Bo^r™  remain  masters  of  African  situation.     English  control  railroad  towns,  but  Boers  hold 

"^X^-Ttfe1  MSPaSq  WAR.  Many  trains  derailed.  Disasters  on  the  line. 
British  mails  captured.    The  detention  camps  for  Boer  women  and  children,  and  the  horrors 

°f  'nT  -Z  -^THE  fewrmSCHURCH  AND  HIS  ATTITUDE  TOWARD  THE  BLACK 

RACE."     The  racial  and  religious  situation  in  South  Africa,  a  four-page  article  by  Charles 

D     No"  -THOUSANDS  CHEER  THAT  BOERS  MAY  FIQHT  ON.     Speeches  of  Com- 
mandant W  D.  Snyman,  of  General  De  Wefs  staff.    Story  of  South  African  War,  four  pages. 
No  22 -THE  BOERS  REACH  THE  SEA,  NEAR  CAPE  TOWN,  as  cabled      Fifteen 
Thousand  Afrikanders  Join  Boer  Army.    Situation  In  South   Africa.     British   losses 

I02'5N6o   £38SttXSSSl  ^^HdI^^SZ^TSU  wounded,  missing  and 

prisoners o^r  10c ,000  men  A  go^rt^  ^  ^  war  Extraordinary  letter 
from  the  Church  of  England  What  the  English  press  has  to  say.  The  better  heart  of 
England  T^^^^SomWT  BANKRUPT  ;  CAN'T  PAY  THE  TROOPS  Soldiers 
desertfne  Financial  panic  feared.  The  war  is  all  over  South  Africa.  The  British  refuse 
fo  let  Red  Crss  nurses  attend  Boer  women  and  children.  Why  British  soldiers  die  from 
disease      Sidelights  on  the  Boer  war      Comments  from  twenty-four  leading  newspapers 

exposures.     The  policy  of  murder.     109,418  Boers  in  prison  camps.     Ill-feeling  of  the  Eng- 

liShra5-"TrHrABsVNaf.MINDED  BURGHER."  a  poem,  parody  on  Kipling  "The 
Absent-minded  Beggar."  The  finest  Boer  poem  published.  Grand  and  sarcastic.  The 
price  that  staggers.     Pay,  pay,  pay. 

Beautiful  Photo-eneravings,  on  enamel  paper,  from  original  photographs  of  Presidents 

KruSr^nd  Steyn-  'General  Cronje's  Last  Stand";  Secretary  Reitz;  Martha  Krantz  the 
KcBoer  vvoman'soldilr;  the  American.  German  and  Irish  Commandoes  and  Officers  of  the 
Boer  Armv" Three  Generations  in  the  Boer  War";  "British  Refugees  Leaving  Pretoria  ; 
"font  Tom"  with  the  Boer  forces;  Boer  Camps;  British  Prisoners  in  Boer  Commando; 
Wa?  Sgcenes-F7ghting  Women  and  Children  in  the  Trenches;  Destruction  of  Boer  Farm; 
Houi-burning  Iceland  many  other  very  interesting  pictures  of  : ^enes  during  the  war  1  n 
South  Africa  suitable  for  albums,  framing,  panels,  etc.  Price,  5  cents  each ,  50  cents 
per  dozen. 


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